1. If God does not exist, there are no objective, culture-transcending moral duties.

2. There are objective, culture-transcending moral duties.

3. Therefore, God exists.

Anderson then notes:

The argument doesn’t appear to be circular in that question-begging way. After all, there are many atheists who accept that there are objective moral duties (and plenty more who argue as though there are). Furthermore, a number of atheist philosophers have agreed with the first premise of the argument.

This raises a further question and invites a further refinement of our criteria for proofs. If atheists have granted both premises of the argument, and they recognize that the argument is logically valid, why don’t they accept the conclusion that God exists? The short answer is that few atheists would affirm both premises. Those who affirm premise one will typically deny premise two, and vice versa. The explanation for this, of course, is that anyone who accepts both premises is logically committed to the conclusion—and most atheists simply don’t want to accept the conclusion.

This particular point, I believe, is well-worth expanding on and repeating.

There are atheists who agree with either of the first two premises. This puts the argument in a very interesting place, and I think it makes it a very powerful argument. In a way, it is like arguing:

i) A = C
ii) B = C
iii) Therefore A = C.

Suppose that there were a group of people that disagreed with iii). These people would have to deny either i) or ii). Yet some of this group affirms i) and others of this group affirm ii). The only thing this group agrees on is that iii) is wrong.

That is essentially where the atheists are in the above example Anderson gives us. If we have atheists agreeing on each premise (though, obviously, not both at the same time), then that means that each premise by itself is not problematic even on atheistic grounds. They only become problematic for the atheist when both are affirmed. Yet there is enough evidence to convince some atheists that premise 1 is valid, and other atheists that premise 2 is valid.

Overall, therefore, it appears that there is sufficient evidence for the theist to conclude the question of the existence of God in the affirmative. We can use the evidence Atheist A uses for premise 1 and add it to the evidence that Atheist B uses for premise 2, agree with both, and affirm the conclusion. This presents the theist no problems at all. In fact, it would serve to put even more pressure on the atheist to demonstrate why he does not accept evidence for the premise he disagrees with, given that others who deny the existence of God affirm what they reject.

Seen in this light, the argument Anderson put forth truly is a remarkable apologetic affirming the existence of God.

It is not by accident that the first time my own Arminian ideas were questioned came at the hands of an atheist. (Yes, I was at one point in time an Arminian.) You see, atheists, for all their incorrect assumptions about God, are not stupid people. They can see a fatal flaw in Christianity if ever there was one.

Well, there isn’t one. But I found that as an Arminian, I could not adequately defend Christianity. For the Calvinist, there is little surprise as to why I could not—I couldn’t defend Christianity when I was an Arminian because Arminianism is self-contradictory. Of course, I do not expect Arminians to agree with this. Yet my own experience convinces me that it is impossible to defend Arminianism under the close scrutiny of a logic-oriented atheist.

Given this, it is little wonder to me that so many Arminian Christians flee debates with atheists. Indeed, looking at the many Arminian websites around the net today, they are almost exclusively oriented toward attacking Calvinism rather than toward defending the faith against atheists. Could it be that their own thinking shows us flaws in the Arminian system of salvation and because they know these flaws are there, they do not feel comfortable talking to atheists?

Atheists are quick to jump on Arminians, and it’s easier to do so because Arminians are wrong. Since most Christians in America today are Arminians it is no wonder that atheists seem to be gaining the upper hand in much of the scholarly debate.

The simple fact of the matter is this: Atheists can defeat Arminianism. But atheists cannot defeat Calvinism. Why? I claim that it is ultimately because Calvinism is right and Arminianism is wrong.

Yet it is one thing to claim and another thing to prove. Therefore, I shall spend the next bit of this post demonstrating the illogical beliefs at work in Arminianism. These points will not apply to every single Arminian across the board. There is a wide range of belief. In fact, Arminians are still undecided as to whether or not you can lose your salvation. But I am looking at the views of Arminians I have debated and read from. My aim is to accurately portray modern Arminian thought (as opposed to what Arminius himself taught—which is often vastly different than modern Arminianism) since there are far more of these types of Arminians than the so-called Classical Arminians.

“If God is sovereign, then you cannot have free will.”

During a high school trip, one of my atheistic friends (Nate) said those words to me. I, like any other typical Arminian Christian, quickly jumped at him with the usual, “Yes there is!”

So Nate offered an example. “Suppose that I have a hamster in my hand. I am completely sovereign because the hamster must do what I demand it to do. If I put it down on a table, it can now make free choices, but I am no longer sovereign, because I cannot determine what the hamster will do.”

It was the first time I had heard such an argument. Try as I might, I couldn’t think of a way out of that simple argument. Could it be that there was no such thing as free will, or was it that God was not sovereign? But didn’t all the preachers and theological writers of the time proclaim that we had free will and God was sovereign? I had heard a sermon in the local community where the pastor said, “God will never violate your free will” yet this same pastor also said he believed that God was sovereign. So, how could I defend this position?

The problem arose because I couldn’t. Here’s why. What I thought of as freedom was really autonomy. And if His creation has autonomy, God had no sovereignty. It is precisely this confusion of terms that led atheist Nate to his attack on Christianity.

Autonomy—literally: self-law. Theologically: absolute freedom to do as one wishes.

The most common understanding of what it means to have free will renders God as kind of a nebulous spectator watching the world. Most Christians today feel that God doesn’t interfere in our choices; that He has set events in motion, but that He allows us to do as we please, watching how things will turn out. Yet, those same Christians also believe God is sovereign. (Truly, if you do not believe that God is sovereign at all, then you cannot be a Christian, for you do not even believe in a “god” let alone the God of the Bible.)

In other words, if there is a famine, God is sovereignly using that to His ends—but if you decide to commit adultery, then God will not interfere. At this point, let me make the distinction between the two classes of Arminians. There are Arminians who believe that God CANNOT interfere with your free will because He is unable to do so (these people would rightly be called Pelagians, and are not even true Christians). The other class (which is where most Arminians belong) believe that God could interfere, but that He never will.

The point I wish to make is this: that even though Arminians (not the Pelagians listed above!) say that God can interfere with your freedom, in actuality, He cannot do so. This is because the arguments that Arminians use to say Calvinism is immoral (for example) would equally apply to the Arminian view, meaning that if their arguments are actually sound, the Arminian view can only pay lip service to the idea that God could interfere if He chose to do so. The result is that under the Arminian system, you still have autonomy.

I was once asked, “Why can’t God have made a planet somewhere with even one autonomous human being on it? Aren’t you limiting God if you say He can’t?” My answer is this: “It is no more limiting to God than to say that God cannot make a round square.” It is impossible for God to make an autonomous being, for to be autonomous you must thereby be a law unto yourself so that God cannot do anything to you, nor can He interfere with anything that you choose.

The will cannot be free in that sense at all, because to be free it must be autonomous. Otherwise, it is not free but bound by some other law. Granted, most Arminians will say that human will is contingent on the will of God (in which case, I must point out it is no longer “free” will but “contingent” will).

This presents the Arminian with a choice (pun definitely intended). Either they become full Pelagians, or they must recognize that their will is not as free as they think it is.

But let’s look at the fundamental question again. Why can’t God violate your free will? Under the Arminian position above, it is because He doesn’t want to violate your free will. Arminians believe that God loves us so much that He gives us free will. What this effectively does is take God out of the picture completely, at least as it regards our choices. It says that God sovereignly grants us freedom to act apart from Him—which is to say God sovereignly grants us the nullification of His sovereignty. As a result, in Arminianism, God has granted us autonomy.

At the heart of Arminianism is this issue of free will. Upholding free will is so important to the Arminian when it comes to salvation that they will literally sacrifice God’s sovereignty to uphold it. This is because the Arminian views free will as essential to morality. Indeed, a common Arminian refrain is, “God is sovereign, but also just. We cannot give so much to His sovereignty that it takes away from His justice.”

But what does Salvation have to do with God’s justice at all? The answer is, of course, nothing. Salvation depends on God’s mercy (Romans 9:16), not justice. So the Arminian position on the Sovereignty of God in salvation begins from a flawed starting point, for it is looking upon Salvation as if it needed to be just. Suppose God were to work out Salvation in matters of Justice. If God was only Justice without Mercy, what do we have?

“For the wages of sin is death” (Romans 6:23).

“For all have sinned and fall short of the glory of God.” (Romans 3:23)

We all sin, and the wages of sin is death. If God were only Just, then all would deserve death. But what does the end of Romans 6:23 say? “But the gift of God is eternal life in Christ Jesus our Lord.” Therefore, salvation is dependent on the gift of God. It must be so, because if God were only Just then all would die and go to hell.

But does this mean God is unjust? Far be it from being so! To use RC Sproul’s terms, God is not unjust, but rather non-just. Non-justice comes in two forms: injustice and mercy. Mercy is not justice, but neither is it injustice; it is simply non-justice. We do not want justice from God; we want non-justice in the form of mercy. Mercy is the good form of non-justice, while injustice is the bad form.

Salvation is a gift of God. As such:

What then shall we say that Abraham, our forefather, discovered in this matter? If, in fact, Abraham was justified by his works, he had something to boast about—but not before God. What does the Scripture say? “Abraham believed God, and it was credited to him as righteousness.” Now when a man works, his wages are not credited to him as a gift, but as an obligation. However, to the man who does not work but trusts God who justifies the wicked, his faith is credited as righteousness (Romans 4:1-5).

Our salvation is a result of the gift of God. A gift is not something that we deserve, otherwise it would be a wage (or a payment) not a gift. What do we deserve? We deserve death (for the wages of sin is death).

So what does this have to do with the sovereignty of God? It has everything to do with it, because of the way that typical Arminians view salvation. In the Arminian scheme of salvation, we are dead in our sins. (This is a stand from classical Arminianism; Arminius himself taught Original Sin. If you don’t believe this, then you are a Pelagian, not an Arminian.) But though we are dead in our sins, God makes us alive. Does God make just some alive, under Arminianism? No, but rather all are made alive enough so that they can choose whether or not to follow God. This being made alive is not the same thing as Regeneration. Rather, God gives each sinner the ability to make a choice about salvation.

Herein lies the problem. In Arminianism, the sinner decides whether or not to believe. As such, God is out of the picture in regards to that choice. He makes the ability to choose, but does not determine the outcome of the choice. By definition God is thereby not sovereign over the choice of salvation.

Arminians believe that God gives all sinners a choice to believe or not to believe. It is thereby contingent on the individual person as to whether or not they will believe. Further, God does not interfere one way or the other in the decision. In Arminianism, God cannot justly interfere with the sinner’s choice, for if God made a sinner believe in Him then the Arminian claims it is not true love toward God, and if God made a sinner choose hell, then everyone agrees that would make God a tyrant (no matter what system of theology you believe). So here is the point where Arminians make freedom into autonomy—if God is completely outside of the picture, then there are no laws restricting the sinner in this choice; the sinner is therefore a perfectly free agent (and has, by definition, autonomy over that choice).

So, as you can see, by definition, God is not sovereign in the Arminian system of salvation. He does not control who will believe—each individual autonomously decides that himself. Arminians try to maintain sovereignty here by saying that God still knows what the future is.

Let’s examine this argument for a moment. Suppose you see a man on the street. He has a gun, and has pointed it at the head of a passing motorist. If you know that the murderer will pull the trigger and kill the motorist, does that make you sovereign? Obviously not. You can know all the future events forever, but that doesn’t make you sovereign. Things can still happen that you don’t want to happen, and just because you know they will happen doesn’t mean you are in control of the situation, any more than the apostle Peter became sovereign when Jesus told him what kind of death he would have. No, you see, foreknowledge does not give you sovereignty.

Let’s put it another way. Suppose you’ve watched Top Gun five thousand times so that you have every line memorized and you can mentally recall every single scene. If you put the DVD in your player and start the video, does your knowledge of what will happen make you sovereign over the events that unfold? Can you keep Goose from being killed in the film? Obviously not.

So let us suppose that God looks through time and sees what’s going to happen and decides that He wants it to happen that way without interference from Him. Does that make Him sovereign? No, merely an oracle and a fortune teller. If God is sovereign then He must be able to interfere in the events that are going to happen. If God just looks through time as a spectator, then it is nothing less than Him saying, “Hmmmm. I decree that that which shall happen shall happen because that’s what I want anyway.”

But that brings up another problem in Arminianism. God doesn’t always get what He wants! And this brings us to an interesting logical dilemma. By definition, a sovereign gets what he or she wants. That’s what being sovereign means. So the problems mount for the Arminian. How can a sovereign God not get what a sovereign God wants?

The Arminian often counters that a sovereign God wants us to have free will more than He wants us all to be saved. This seems to be rather disturbing though. Why would a loving God want freedom more than salvation? If a child wanders into the street and is about to be struck by a car, we all know that we should care more for saving the child than for allowing them freedom. Even if the child is petulant and throws a fit on the side of the road and annoys us to the point of our wanting to throw the child under the nearest city bus, the moral thing is still to save the child rather than saving the child’s freedom, isn’t it? Maintaining freedom as higher than salvation simply doesn’t fit in Arminian ethics.

Let us return to the issue of sovereignty again. Arminians claim that though God loves everyone and wants all to be saved, He would rather we have freedom to choose to reject Him. So God wants us to have free will more than He wants us all saved. The result is that God’s salvation is subservient to human will. God wants our wills to be so intact that He will allow you to go to hell rather than sacrifice your freedom. Even if He doesn’t want you there, He will still rather have you there than to violate your freedom.

Now remember what was stated above: By definition, a sovereign gets what he or she wants. When it comes to salvation, who gets what they want under Arminianism? It is not God, for He wants all saved and clearly not all are saved. But who does always get what he or she wants? Every single person who chooses whether or not to believe. Our choices are sovereign. We determine our salvation. We get what we want. If we want to be with God, we will be; if we do not, we will forever be away from Him. Therefore, we—not God—are sovereign.

But look at another erroneous concept from the Arminian. They presuppose that God loves everyone, and that He wants all to be saved. Now, if God is sovereign and if this is true, then there’s no logical reason why any should be damned. I’m not God, yet I can devise several ideas that would get all men saved if I want them all saved.

If I was in the place of God, I could do the following:

1) Arrange the stars to spell “Jesus Christ is Lord” in every human language.

2) Have choirs of angels sing out what the stars say so that illiterate people are saved too.

3) I could whisper in the minds of everyone that I Am The Way.

4) If anyone was blind, mute, or deaf—I could cure them, and show them everything else I’ve done.

5) I could send my Son Jesus to every house to personally perform miracles for all to see.

6) I could make faith no longer a prerequisite for salvation, and instead just say “any who exist are saved”.

And you see, none of these ways would even violate free will. And though no one doubts this, God’s a lot smarter than I am! Why can’t He come up with better plans for everyone to be saved?

The answer is simple: God doesn’t love everyone the same. “Just as it is written: ‘Jacob I loved, but Esau I hated.” (Romans 9:13). What did Jacob do to deserve the love of God? “Yet, before the twins were born or had done anything good or bad—in order that God’s purpose in election might stand: not by works, but by him who calls—she was told, ‘The older will serve the younger.’ Just as it is written: ‘Jacob I loved, but Esau I hated.’” (Romans 9:11-13).

Arminians dislike this passage (to be fair to them, they will say they only dislike the Calvinist interpretation of the passage). The plain meaning is obvious. God doesn’t love everyone.

Now why would this be wrong for God to do? It is only wrong if those people that God “hates” deserve love instead. But we have already shown above that all deserve hell. How, then, is it wrong for God to hate people who have sinned?

I was given this analogy by an Arminian: Suppose a ship sank and you can save all the people by tossing a life preserver into the water. If you do not do so, isn’t that immoral?

But the analogy has two problems. First of all, sinners do not deserve salvation. It is one thing when people are dying in the water—from the human perspective, they do not deserve that. But if they did deserve death, it would actually be non-just for anyone to save them! Is it just for you to save someone from the electric chair when he justly deserves to die? Likewise, if people deserve hell, and you do not give it to them, then you are not acting in justice, but in mercy.

The second problem is this: in this analogy, if one person dies because you didn’t save them, even though you had the power to, then you are not being just. But with God, that already happens. God already doesn’t save everyone even though He could. Even Arminians realize that God could save everyone by forcing them to believe, if He so chose to do so! Indeed, there’s no reason why God had to insist on faith being the requirement for someone to be saved, even on Arminian grounds. So every time an Arminian uses this illustration, he is literally arguing that God is not just.

Again, they claim that God doesn’t want to violate our free will (again, asserting our autonomy). Yet God can and does save us, and does so without violating our “free will!” God can save all the people without violating free will at all. God is all powerful! Going back to the analogy: Suppose He tosses you a life raft and you do not accept it, God can still make it possible for you to breathe underwater. He is sovereign! He can make the ocean dry up! He can do anything He wants, none of which would violate your free will, so that you will be saved. In salvation, He merely needs to change the basis of salvation to existence instead of faith. But He doesn’t do that! Why would God not do that if He wants all saved? Because He doesn’t want all saved. He wants something more than salvation, even on Arminian grounds (He at the very least wants us to freely choose Him more than He wants us to be saved).

So you can see that Arminians have inconsistent views, not only because they believe they can be autonomous while claiming they do not believe such things, but because they believe that God wants all men saved while He acts in a way that even they must agree will not get all saved. Arminians claim God is sovereign, yet man is sovereign in salvation. The Arminian view is full of self-contradictions and is therefore rightly considered illogical.

In our current age in America, it seems that the philosophical trend is toward more and more pluralism. That is, we do not wish to “rock the boat” or upset anyone, so we accept all religious claims as being equally valid. People who claim the name Christian start to say things like, “There are many paths to God” and “Doctrine isn’t important, just give me the love of Jesus.”

Indeed, I’m sure that you’ve often heard the expression “Doctrine divides.” It is spoken as if it were a bad thing for doctrine to divide people. The fact of the matter is that our doctrines are extremely important because they define what we believe. Because people are ignorant of this, they misunderstand what it means to assert a particular doctrine. Indeed, the assertion that it is wrong to hold to any doctrine is, by definition, a doctrine itself.

Ignorance is rampant in many forms in today’s church. Ignorance of important theological distinctions is just one aspect of it. Most people have never read a single book in the Bible, let alone its entirety. Most cannot quote the Ten Commandments at all, even in paraphrased form (and it does no good to argue that the US Government prohibits them being posted in schools—believers still have the Bible and are without excuse).

In fact, you can give yourself a quick mini-test to see how Biblically aware you are:

What is Scripture and how do we know?
What is the greatest commandment and why is it the greatest?
What was the purpose of the Old Testament?
What is atonement?
What did Christ’s death accomplish?

These are just a bare sampling of questions, all of which dealing with basic issues important to Christianity. Most Christians would not be able to correctly answer all these questions. Many would not even bother trying in the first place! Equally saddening is the fact that there are many pastors and seminary professors who would answer wrongly or not at all on these questions.

Naturally, I am not saying that our salvation is dependent upon our knowledge of these things. However, that does not decrease their importance. Just as we can eat food without understanding how it is digested by our stomach, so we can believe in Christ with a sincere faith without knowing the full extent of what He has done—although there is a basic level of knowledge that must obviously be met if Christ is to mean anything to the one claiming Him as Savior. However, although we can partake in nourishment without fully understanding the digestive system, our limited knowledge in eating does not equip us to fight diseases such as ulcers and pancreatic cancer. Doctors must study the digestive system in order to understand the causes of these things so they may find a cure. Likewise, it is impossible for us to recognize heresies and falsehoods if we do not study who Christ is and what He has done. This is the reason the Bible has been given to us.

I have been on the `”front lines” (so to speak) in debates on many doctrinal issues, including debates on the very existence of God. It is impossible to argue meaningfully with an atheist about issues such as morality, historical proofs, and philosophical necessities without understanding first what Christianity is. Unless you understand your faith—unless you know what you believe and why—then you will be tossed by every wave in a philosophical discussion.

Most of us wish to avoid all such discussions whatsoever, however (a result, I am convinced, of the fact that most people realize they are ignorant of what they should know and do not wish to be exposed). You might be thinking to yourself, “I’m never going to debate an atheist, so why should I worry about understanding these issues?”

Frankly, because God commands you to. The Christian is not called to avoid controversy and conflict with irrational worldviews. In 2 Peter 3:15 we read “always [be] ready to make a defense to everyone who asks you to give an account for the hope that is in you, yet with gentleness and reverence.” We are commanded to be able to make a defense (an argument, or explanation) of why we believe what we do. In order to do so, we must first know what it is we do believe.

Consequently, while it is easy to dismiss the debate on Calvinism and Arminianism as being a minor argument that has no practical application to any real world issues, it is most decidedly not so. I have had practical experience debating atheists, first as an Arminian, and then as a Calvinist. The Arminian position does not stand very well against the atheistic attacks because it is based on a misunderstanding of the Scriptures, which leads to contradictions that atheists can point out. Calvinism, however, is a firm system of beliefs that is based not on philosophies of man, but on the very words of God. God will not contradict Himself, and in Calvinism He does not do so.

Calvinism wins in apologetics. In a recent discussion that I had with an Objectivist atheist, I mentioned that I was a Calvinist. His response was “At least Calvinists have the luxury of being consistent with the Bible.” The atheist does not reject Calvinism because it is inconsistent; he rejects it because he hates the system of Calvinism. It is not a matter of consistency, but of personal feelings towards it.

Why must we have a solid faith, one built on the truth of Scripture and not on our feelings? Because our feelings often change like shifting sands. Indeed, feelings are how many people are persuaded to join cults, like Mormonism. A solid faith, one built on the Biblical foundations of real knowledge will not fail when it is put to the test. It does not sway to the emotion of the time. It does not crumple under the pressure of vain philosophies. It stands firm because it is truth.

When Jesus spoke to the woman at the well, He said that worshiping God must be done “in spirit and truth” (John 4:24). If our foundation is on anything other than the truth of God, then it is vain worship.

The reasons for a solid faith are numerous. Sure, it takes discipline. It takes reading the Bible. It takes prayer. It takes a relationship with God. It takes effort to do. But the rewards are vast indeed!

Several years ago, I heard a caller to a talk radio show make the claim that he could prove God doesn’t exist. Since I am a Christian apologist in my spare time, I wanted to see what this amazing proof of the non-existence of God was (despite the fact that it is impossible to prove a negative).

The caller said that God couldn’t exist because, in his words, “crap exists.” He did not mean this euphemistically, as a reference to bad things—although that might have been a better argument for him. Instead, he meant “fecal matter.” He later also said that a woman’s period proves God does not exist.

This kind of “proof” is enough to make any thinking person go, “Huh?” After all, it would be sorta like saying that unicorns don’t exist because horses have to wear horseshoes. In other words, even if God does not exist, the argument is a non-sequitur. It’s also a bogus argument because, in order for it to be valid, the definition of God would need to include “a being who would not create people that produced fecal matter or had monthly periods”—a definition of God that would be quite unique, to say the least.

There is also the assumption the atheist makes about what the nature of God is. How does the atheist know that God would not do something? It is certainly logically possible for God to design people who give off waste products. So why would this be a problem prima facie?

But there is more.

This argument also assumes the purpose for which God would design something. People don’t like dealing with fecal matter because it’s nasty and smelly and unpleasant for us, but that doesn’t mean that fecal matter serves no purpose at all. After all, millions of bacteria live in it. Who’s to say that God wouldn’t have designed people to produce waste material because He had in mind another creation that would benefit from it? It is only if we assume that God’s entire purpose is for the atheist’s comfort that we could accept this argument.

This argument, therefore, is easily dispatched. It is surprising, however, to see how many atheists use variations of this same argument. It goes like this: “God wouldn’t do X, therefore He doesn’t exist.” X can be anything the atheist wants to argue.

But even if an atheist could come up with something else that we can perceive no practical value for, how would that disprove God? Just because you would not design something a certain way does not mean that God would not do so. And therefore, just because something is not the way you would have made it does not mean that God does not exist.

This would be like saying, “If I were to design a computer operating system, I would make it so it wouldn’t crash every fifteen minutes. Windows crashes every fifteen minutes. Therefore, no one designed it.”

While Apple computer aficionados will agree with this just out of spite for Microsoft, it is most certainly the case that Windows was designed by the people at Microsoft. And just because it doesn’t work the way you would have made it does not make the programmers non-existent.

Some may yet take this argument a bit further. For example, some may say the evidence of Windows proves that programmers make mistakes. Therefore, people make mistakes. But a perfect God would not make mistakes. Since God created people who make mistakes, God created a mistake. Therefore, God does not exist.

Can you see how this is the same argument as before? “God would not do X, therefore He does not exist.” Or, “God would not create flawed people, therefore He does not exist.”

This argument has the same problems as the previous one. It assumes both the nature of God (that God, qua God, cannot create flawed people) and the intention for which people are created (that the purpose of God creating people was to make them flawless). Furthermore, this assumes a definition of perfection and automatically defines flawed people as outside of it.

But if God designed the world to have flawed people such that He might demonstrate His mercy and power toward them, then their very flaws are in fact the means for God doing so. And thus, those flaws are not an imperfection in God’s plan. Flawed people may very well fit perfectly into God’s plan.

It is only when you think of God in an anthropocentric manner that you would see any problems arise. But God exists theocentrically, not anthropocentrically. And God’s plans are not just for people, but ultimately for Himself.

With that in mind, it is obvious that the atheist’s entire line of argument cannot stand unless the atheist himself is God. For all he has proven is that the atheist would not do X, therefore the atheist did not create the world.

A conclusion not in dispute.

When two people differ over a subject and come to contradictory ideas about it and then decide to discuss or debate the issue, one side often assumes the burden of proof. Logically, this must be the side that is asserting something positive. It cannot be the side that is denying something.

The reason for this is obvious: it is impossible (with rare, usually contrived or otherwise uninteresting exceptions) to prove a negative proposition. That is because in order to prove a negative, you must have universal knowledge, something no finite person has. However, what you can do is show how the person asserting the positive side has not proven his point, and as such you have no reason to believe what he asserts.

For example, I can state firmly that there are no unicorns. How do I prove this statement? I could say that no credible source has ever documented one, photographed one, or produced one for us to see. The idea of a mystical creature with magical powers seems completely alien to everything that we do know about all the other animals. Therefore, I can conclude there is no evidence to believe that unicorns exist anywhere.

However, someone might still assert that unicorns exist (perhaps on the dark side of the moon, or deep in the ocean, or invisibly). As soon as he does so, however, he is taking the burden of proof in the argument. I do not need to disprove the existence of unicorns because it is up to the person presenting the argument that unicorns exist to prove that statement valid. If he does not do so, then I have no reason to believe in unicorns.

It is by this reasoning that atheists often challenge Christians about the existence of God, and rightly so. We should not expect them to disprove the existence of God. That is asking them to prove a negative. But that doesn’t get them off the hook completely either. They still need to prove the things that they do positively assert work in the absence of God. After all, they still hold to some set of morals, they still believe logic is valid, they still hold to universal truths (even relativists). And so that’s where I focus the argument, while also presenting a positive argument for the existence of God.

Now let us examine the issue of Sola Scriptura in the debate between Protestants and Catholics. I assert that Sola Scriptura is true. At first glance, then, it appears that I have the burden of proof since I am the one asserting something. But it turns out that this is a grammatical fluke.

Sola Scriptura is defined thus: “The Bible is the sole infallible and sufficient rule of faith for Christians.” This is a very specific definition. It means that the Bible is the only such standard for Christians.

At this point, a Catholic apologist may claim, “You are saying Sola Scriptura is valid, so the burden of proof is on you.”

The problem is that Sola Scriptura is actually a negative statement. We can look at the passage this way: “There exist no other infallible rules of faith for Christians other than the Bible.” By saying “Scripture Alone” the Protestant is really saying, “Nothing else, just Scripture.” As such, the burden of proof cannot be on the Protestant.

Let me give you an illustration, using the above mentioned unicorn example. Suppose that I was to state the following: “Horses alone are four legged animals with their body shape, size, and configuration.” Now suppose someone said, “You are wrong! Unicorns are also four legged animals with the body shape, size, and configuration of a horse.” Who holds the burden of proof? Or to put it differently: which of the two makes a positive assertion? The person asserting that a unicorn exists, because the person saying “horses are the only animals like horses” is stating a universal negative—there are no other animals, including unicorns, that look like a horse.

Back to the definition of Sola Scriptura. If I said, “The Bible is the only infallible and sufficient rule of faith for Christians” and a Catholic said, “You are wrong! Tradition and the Church are also infallible” who would hold the burden of proof? That’s right—the person asserting the infallibility of the Church and Tradition. The Protestant says there is no other infallible rule of faith, and the Catholic says there is.

This is easily seen in another way. If I said, “The Bible is the only infallible and sufficient rule of faith for Christians” and a Mormon said, “You are wrong! The Book of Mormon and the First Presidency are also infallible” once again, the burden of proof would be upon the Mormon, and not the Protestant. That is because the Protestant’s statement is a negative.

Therefore, in debates on Sola Scriptura, it is improper for Catholics to demand the Protestant prove there are no other infallible sources of authority because that would be a logical impossibility. But, as mentioned above with atheists, it is permissible to question the positive assertions the Protestant does make. Namely, that the Bible is an infallible rule of faith for the Christian. Yet this is something that Catholics agree with Protestants on (at least on paper).

The Protestant need only prove the Bible is authoritative, infallible, and sufficient and after that, his burden of proof ends. If the Catholic cannot prove the infallibility and sufficiency of the Church, then his position is unproven no matter what the Protestant believes. The Catholic is the one asserting a positive statement in this debate—that the Catholic Church is infallible. Protestants are taking the negative on that issue. Therefore, the burden of proof is upon Catholics, not Protestants.

First off, the people. Over the course of the year, my blog referenced 150 unique individuals. As I was inputting the tags, I went through the stretch where my blog was in the midst of a blog war with the Debunking Atheism Christianity site, and I figured John Loftus would be the top individual mentioned. Instead, it turns out that Daniel Morgan got 29 posts mentioning him to Loftus’s 27 posts.

The other key aspect is Scripture. I had 266 unique Scripture tags. The most commonly referenced Scripture in that first year was Hebrews 6:18.

Very definitely, presuppositional apologetics took the center stage during that first year. I even had my seven-part critique of Witmer’s critique of presuppositionalism. However, being “ancient history” in blog terms, I discovered much of what was linked has vanished.

I also discovered that the old comments were wiped out during one of the updates I did. Actually, I seem to remember this happening at the time as it didn’t exactly surprise me. I’ll still like to see if I can find the comments, maybe on an archive, and restore them.

In any case, I’ll have more thoughts when I finish the entire project and get caught up to this year’s posts. Only 5 years and change to go! :-D

Objectivism, as a philosophy, has its champion in the writer Ayn Rand. A summary of Objectivism can be found by going to the Ayn Rand Institute website, specifically at http://www.aynrand.org/site/PageServer?pagename=objectivism_essentials.

Due to the fact that Christianity also asserts that there is such a thing as objective truth, one would expect there to be a great compatibility between Objectivism and Christianity. While that is basically true, it is only due to inconsistencies within Objectivism itself.

In order to properly examine Objectivism, we must first look at what it is. This article will be a critique of Objectivism and will use the above linked article as the source for Objectivism. There will, naturally, be other writers who could go in-depth on the issue, but given the fact that Rand was the founder of this philosophy, it is only right to use the Ayn Rand Institute’s definitions as the “official” standards of Objectivism.

We begin with a look at the metaphysics of Objectivism. The Ayn Rand Institutes states:

Metaphysics

“Reality, the external world, exists independent of man’s consciousness, independent of any observer’s knowledge, beliefs, feelings, desires or fears. This means that A is A, that facts are facts, that things are what they are; and that the task of man’s consciousness is to perceive reality, not to create or invent it.” Thus Objectivism rejects any belief in the supernatural; and any claim that individuals or groups create their own reality.

Christianity actually agrees with everything in the above claim up to the “Thus Objectivism rejects any belief in the supernatural” clause. Indeed, Christianity even agrees with the rest of the sentence in rejecting “any claim that individuals or groups create their own reality.” The point of contention lies in the statement that Objectivism rejects any belief in the supernatural.

It is certainly true that A is A, and that what exists does so independent of man’s consciousness, knowledge, beliefs, feelings, desires, or fears. However this is to say nothing about what it is that does exist. To say that A is A does not define what A is. As such, it is incorrect to conclude that the supernatural cannot exist if A is A, because if the supernatural does in fact exist as our A, the supernatural must exist because A is A.

In fact, the statement that the supernatural does not exist does not rest within the metaphysics of Objectivism at all, but rather in the Epistemology. We can see that if we further quote the Ayn Rand Institute:

Epistemology

“Man’s reason is fully competent to know the facts of reality. Reason, the conceptual faculty, is the faculty that identifies and integrates the material provided by man’s senses. Reason is man’s only means of acquiring knowledge.” Thus Objectivism rejects mysticism (any acceptance of faith or feeling as a means of knowledge), and it rejects skepticism (the claim that certainty or knowledge is impossible).

Here we see explicitly stated the naturalism of Objectivist philosophy, and it is that naturalism that excludes supernaturalism, not the metaphysics of A is A. The statement that “Reason is man’s only means of acquiring knowledge” (emphasis added) is a statement of naturalistic philosophy. Simply put, naturalism views all of existence as physical existence within the ability of man to sense. As such, man’s reason (defined as “the faculty that identifies and integrates the material provided by man’s senses”) is based on empirical experiences of the universe interpreted by the brain.

I have engaged in debate with several Objectivist philosophers who insist that their beliefs begin with the axiom, “existence exists.” Yet clearly Objectivists begin not with the metaphysical axioms but with epistemological axioms. The assertion that existence exists does not in any way imply that man is fully capable of understanding and knowing all that exists (or even part of what exists).

Objectivists start with the notion that they perceive data in the form of sensory input. Reason then interprets this data giving the brain information about reality. As a result, it is necessary that existence and consciousness both exist, because without either of these two things the perception and the reasoning of what that perception is cannot occur.

The assumption made here is that what is perceived by the senses is accurate and true. However, we know that our senses do not always give us accurate information. For example, in 2001 I underwent some abdominal surgery. As I recovered, I was given morphine to help with the pain. Morphine is a hallucinogenic drug. I distinctly remember a conversation that I had with my brother wherein I asked him to video tape a TV show for me so I could watch it later. It turned out that I never actually had this conversation with him, because I had imagined the entire event. Since my brother had assumed I’d want to watch the show and recorded it for me anyway, if I had not talked to him, I would have just assumed that he had heard my conversation and recorded the show because I asked him to do so. I would have had no way to differentiate between the false data that I had perceived and the reality that was.

As a result, it is not certain that what we see is valid. Our senses are not 100% accurate, so we cannot rely upon them to give us certain truth. However, there is a certain truth that must be true regardless, and that is: perception exists. Because I perceived something, even though it turned out to be illusion, that perception demands that I have a consciousness in order to perceive it, and my consciousness demands existence (because a non-existent being would not exist to have a conscious thought). As a result, perception presupposes both existence and consciousness.

As you see, perception alone demonstrates that existence and consciousness are undeniably true. This is in total agreement with the Objectivist philosophy, but with one extremely important difference. It does not follow that man’s reason is fully competent to know all there is to know about reality because, as I have shown, false data would be indistinguishable from real data unless there was something to contradict the notion.

This demonstrates a fundamental contradiction in the Objectivist position. On the one hand, the Objectivist states that A is A apart from any observer’s knowledge; but on the other hand, the Objectivist states that the observer’s knowledge is accurate to know what A is, with the erroneous conclusion that if one cannot observe something then it does not exist. This is why the Objectivist rejects the supernatural, such as a spiritual existence and the existence of God. Immaterial objects cannot be perceived with physical senses and so the Objectivist states that they cannot exist, when the fact of the matter is that A is A even if A is immaterial and unable to be known by man.

The rejection of the supernatural and the assertion that all of reality can be known by man’s senses are alien concepts to the idea of objective truth. Indeed, by accepting naturalism the Objectivist undermines all attempts at stating an objective truth because there are no longer transcendental truths. By asserting that man’s reason alone is capable of determining what reality is, the Objectivist makes reality conform to man’s senses; thereby destroying the metaphysical axiom that “A is A apart from any knowledge, desires, etc. of man.” The naturalistic Objectivist, in other words, is not objective at all, but purely subjective. He is just as much an irrational relativist as the person who claims there is no truth. Truth can only be objectively known if it is universal and transcendent.

Well, Steve Hays and Jason Engwer have just completed a response to TEC entitled The End of Infidelity. I was more than happy to help edit the project for them, and I’m excited to now host that ebook here on the CalvinDude site (simply click on the title of the book).

While one might think the book reads best if you’ve read TEC, Hays and Engwer actually include a host of beneficial apologetic material that makes The End of Infidelity a great book even on its own. I highly recommend it for anyone who has encountered the arguments from the new atheists.

UPDATE: You can read an overview of The End of Christianity by Loftus, et al., here (HT: Jason Engwer).

HT: Patrick Chan

The book delves into Jobs’ decision to delay surgery for nine months after learning in October 2003 that he had a neuroendocrine tumor — a relatively rare type of pancreatic cancer that normally grows more slowly and is therefore more treatable.

Instead, he tried a vegan diet, acupuncture, herbal remedies and other treatments he found online, and even consulted a psychic. He also was influenced by a doctor who ran a clinic that advised juice fasts, bowel cleansings and other unproven approaches, the book says, before finally having surgery in July 2004.

What a rather odd definition of “skeptic.”