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WHEREAS Libertarian Freewill (LF) followers maintain that the ability to make a free choice is the most important moral attribute that God has given man, such that it is more important that man be free than that God’s will be done upon Earth;

WHEREAS God refrains from interfering with man’s LF because it would be sinful for God to put restrictions upon man;

WHEREAS God furthermore calls us to be like Him, to be Holy as He is Holy, and to derive our moral precepts from Him;

AND WHEREAS Egomakarios claims LF

I HEREBY DO PROPOSE that sanctions be set forth against Egomakarios for violating LF concepts, as demonstrated:

1. When comment moderation is in effect, man’s free will to post whatsoever he chooses to post is infringed.

2. If it is a sin for God to restrict freedom, it is likewise a sin for man to restrict freedom.

3. Egomakarios is therefore sinning by placing comment moderation on his blog (http://egomakarios.blogspot.com/) for he restricts man’s ability to post in freedom on his blog.

FURTHERMORE, WHEREAS Compatiblist Freewill (CF) is consistent with the idea that man can be free to do some things so long as he is not in conflict with a will that trumps his own;

WHEREAS Egomakarios imposes his will in a manner that trumps LF;

I HEREBY DO PROPOSE that Egomakarios no longer be considered a LF at all, but instead publicly admit he is CF like every other rational person.

FINALLY, I HEREBY DO PROPOSE that if Egomakarios does not submit to this proposal the Committee to Form Proposals prefix his name with “the liar” such that all references to Egomakarios from this point on would be “the liar Egomakarios.”

Henry/Robert/Arminibot 3000 Serial Number 777666 is questioning Reformed doctrine once more. While it is obvious to anyone who has studied the issues that H/R/A has not, I thought it might be a beneficial exercise for those concerned if we took the robot motif up once again and pondered a thought experiment.

Is it possible to give a robot free will? To make, as it were, an android?

The question is important because it helps us to define how exactly a choice is made. Currently, computers can be programmed to make “choices” by assigning a weight-value to different options. From there, a risk/reward calculation can be made, and the computer can pick which option has the greatest potential for reward with the lowest amount of risk. This is ultimately how computers can play chess games. They analyze a multitude number of possible moves and rank the orders in terms of which one is statistically most likely to occur.

But obviously this “choice” isn’t a free choice. It relies upon a set of initial factors, such as the hardware used to create the computer. (If a chipset is flawed, the calculations will be flawed and the computer will make erroneous choices.) Further, the software has to be programmed such that the computer is able to assign a weight to various chess functions. A computer is not “born” knowing that pawn a5 is a horrible opening move. It has to be programmed in, and the various values of the board have to be programmed in. Further, the specific values of what levels of risk are acceptable must also be programmed in. These are not laws of nature. They are dependent upon the programmer.

Naturally, one can test the computer after that by simulating several games until the best moves are found. Further testing against human opponents can further hone the skills of the computer. Eventually, you have Deep Blue beating Garry Kasparov.

But this brings up an interesting problem for the libertarian, especially as defined by H/R/A. H/R/A believes that a choice cannot be free unless it is possible to choose a different option. But let us present a computer with two options for an opening move. Either the computer can pick pawn to e5, or it can pick pawn to a5. Given the programming in place, it is impossible for the computer to actually pick pawn to a5 because of how horrible that opening move is compared to the standard pawn to e5 approach.

Now ask Kasparov to make the same decision. Given Kasparov’s knowledge of chess, it is equally impossible for Kasparov to make the move pawn to a5 instead of pawn to e5. Yet we would not say that Kasparov is acting against his free will were he to always play pawn to e5 instead of pawn to a5. We would say he is making the smart move. He would be an idiot to make the other choice.

H/R/A might respond by saying that Kasparov could choose to behave stupidly, if that’s what Kasparov wanted to do, but Kasparov doesn’t want to act stupidly, so he will limit his selection to the smart move each time. This, however, changes H/R/A’s position! What first defined free will as the ability to do otherwise has become simply doing that which one wants to do.

But this secondary definition of free will is actually the very definition that Calvinists hold to. People always do that which they want to do, and the unregenerate always wants to disobey God. Under this definition of free will, Calvinists fully support free will. As such, moving to this explanation doesn’t help H/R/A at all. In fact, it forces an immediate checkmate against his viewpoint.

Before abandoning this illustration completely, let us take another thought experiment. I own Chessmaster 10, and the lowest AI opponent you can face is a chimpanzee that uses completely random moves. There is no attempt to weigh which move is better. The computer compiles a list of all possible legal moves and randomly chooses one of those moves.

Is this random choice any freer than the choice a computer makes by weighing a list? The answer to that question is a resounding no. Once again, the computer chooses based on hardware structures and software limitations. Computers are not really random—they have random seed generators that are strictly controlled. They mimic random events, but in reality they are not random at all. (Each time you reuse the same random seed generator, you get the same result. To avoid this as much as possible, most programs use the date and time functions for their random seed generation. Since it is basically impossible for a person to pick the exact same millisecond on a clock each time he runs a program–even if he resets the clock–it always appears to us as a random result.) So, even engaging in random “choices” is not really random for a computer. Suppose a computer randomly picks the move pawn to a5. This move is determined by the hardware features working together with the software features of the computer so that at the exact moment the program is run, it will always pick pawn to a5. There is never a time when it will not pick pawn to a5 under those circumstances.

But there is a way to get truly random data (assuming one doesn’t have access to the omniscient mind of God). You could hook the computer up to a piece of radioactive matter. Since radioactivity occurs at a completely random, totally impossible to predict, rate for individuals particles, you could create a computer to use those random results to make decisions about chess moves.

But is this any freer? Again, the answer is a resounding no! After all, there is no value in the radioactive decay that says, “If this particle goes now, choose option pawn to a5.” The ability to translate a truly random event into a choice is still based on the software to define what each selection must be. And we haven’t even addressed the elephant in the room: the fact that these random choices are still determined by radioactive decay!

Suppose, however, we were able to surmount those obstacles and create a computer that could make choices that were not based on its hardware or software. It could play a truly random game of chess.

Does anyone think the computer would win the chess game? Of course not. Does anyone think that a computer making choices without reference to a designers hardware specs or software instructions would make good choices? Of course not.

Why, then, do Arminians insist that people must be able to make choices without regard to our hardware (brains) or our software (our nature)? How is it possible for our choices to be good ones if we are able to ignore the hardware specs and the software limitations? How is it possible for us to make any decisions at all outside of the governing physical and spiritual specs that we have?

I was just catching up on the comments on Triablogue’s Sincere Offer Polemics post and saw this quote by Steve.

He [the libertarian] believes that hellbound sinners have freedom of choice for the first 70 years of life, give or take, but lose their freedom of choice for the remainder of eternity.

I think this perfectly hit the nail on the head, although I would expand it slightly. Not only is this the case for the hellbound sinner, but also for the heavenbound redeemed. For, if Arminianism is true, then we have freewill on Earth for our lives, but as soon as we die we lose our freewill. In heaven, we will never sin and fall from grace; in hell, we can never choose to trust in Christ.

Why is this the case? Why is it that libertarian freewill plays such an important role for such a meaningless insignificant portion of time? The argument that God must really respect libertarian freewill rings hollow when we realize that He only “respects” it for a glimpse of time under the most common Arminian theological systems. Indeed, the fact that God doesn’t respect it in the future under most Arminian schemes is a death nail for that system: If God can make it so that the Arminian cannot sin in heaven, then why could God not make it so Adam would never sin in the Garden? The argument is that God cannot violate liberatarian freewill so Adam had to be free to choose–but if this is the case, then the Arminian can never be assured of his salvation for he must always be free to choose to leave heaven too.

On the other hand, the Calvinistic view is consistent both in this life and in eternity. Our natural state is to hate God. We do not need to teach men to sin, it comes naturally. Only the changing of a person with the God’s merciful regeneration can alter this state. If God does not act to alter someone’s nature, that man will always remain a sinner. Thus, Hell will be eternal for the unregenerate. On the other hand, if God regenerates someone, His justification is an eternal decree. In heaven, we will not sin for God will complete our sanctification and make it impossible for us to sin. At no point in the Calvinistic scheme does libertarianism come into play (although compatiblism does), and thus Calvinism remains consistent through both the present and the future.

Arminianism isn’t.

The recent discussion Paul’s been having on compatibalism over on Triablogue reminded me of an argument by Arthur W. Pink in The Sovereignty of God. This argument is addressed to believers (sorry, atheists who wish to respond—this is an intramural discussion) who have a problem with the Calvinistic understanding of the sovereignty of God:

Friend, was there not a time when you walked in the counsel of the ungodly, stood in the way of sinners, sat in the seat of the scorners, and with them said, “We will not to have this Man to reign over us” (Luke 19:14)? Was there not a time when you “would not come to Christ that you might have life” (John 5:40)? Yea, was there not a time when you mingled your voice with those who said unto God, “Depart from us; for we desire not the knowledge of Thy ways. What is the Almighty, that we should serve Him? and what profit should we have, if we pray unto Him?” (Job 21:14, 15)? With shamed face you have to acknowledge there was. But how is it that all is now changed? What was it that brought you from haughty self-sufficiency to be a humble suppliant, from one that was at enmity with God to one that is at peace with Him, from lawlessness to subjection, from hatred to love? And, as one “born of the Spirit,” you will readily reply, “By the grace of God I am what I am” (I Cor. 15:10). Then do you not see that it is due to no lack of power in God, nor to His refusal to coerce man, that other rebels are not saved too? If God was able to subdue your will and win your heart, and that without interfering with your moral responsibility, then is He not able to do the same for others? Assuredly He is. Then how inconsistent, how illogical, how foolish of you, in seeking to account for the present course of the wicked and their ultimate fate, to argue that God is unable to save them, that they will not let Him. Do you say, “But the time came when I was willing, willing to receive Christ as my Saviour”? True, but it was the Lord who made you willing (Ps. 110:3; Phil. 2:13); why then does He not make all sinners willing? Why, but for the fact that He is sovereign and does as He pleases!

Pink, AW (1961). The Sovereignty of God: Revised Edition, Edinburgh: Banner of Truth Trust (pp. 45-46; all emphasis in the original).

One point I would focus in on is the personal aspect Pink brings up. Everyone is born a sinner in rebellion against God, and as such “a non-believer.” Each of us—even those of us who were saved at a young age—knows what it is like to be in rebellion against God. The question is rightly asked: “What was it that brought you from [that state] to one that is at peace with Him…?”

The common reply of “I was willing to receive Christ” begs the question. Why did one become willing? What is it that was involved in the mechanics of your choice? The choice is not made in a vacuum—if it were, it would be a random, arbitrary choice, morally no different than flipping a coin.

Yet we know that when we chose Christ, it was because we desired Him. We longed to be with Him. We wanted fellowship that only He could give us.

In short, the choice was made only after we found Christ desirable. We could not have chosen Christ if we hated Him for such a choice would go against our nature! We could only choose Him then if we are coerced into doing so. But that is not how we know we were saved. We did not choose Christ grudgingly or against our desires; we chose Him after our very hearts were already turned toward Him! We chose that which we most desired.

The choice, therefore, was nothing but a reflection of what was already present in our heart.

Scripture is clear that we are born at enmity with God (Romans 8:5-8). This explains why those who are disbelieve refuse to submit to God’s law. Yet something must occur within us to change us from hating God to loving God. This change cannot be the choice we made to follow Christ for, again, that choice can only be made after the change has already taken place.

The common Arminian refrain, “I’m elected because I selected” echoes hollowly when you realize that your being—your nature—began to love Christ before you chose Him. Your selection had nothing to do with your altered nature; your altered nature dictated your selection.

Just before I went to bed last night, I noticed a discussion on #prosapologian regarding hell.  The basic gist was actually amazingly similar to the discussion of the Problem of Evil, which is partly why I’m now blogging about it too (the other part is that it is an interesting subject, IMO, and helps to show why Calvinism is superior to Arminianism theologically).

Put simply, one of the participants had trouble reconciling the existence of Hell with a good God.  Specifically, the claim was made that God would torture people throughout eternity, and this was morally wrong.

Leaving aside the issue of whether justice is torture, the argument is based on several misconceptions of Hell.  This primarily comes from various analogies that the Catholic Church came up with through the Middle Ages, views such as Dante’s Inferno, and other extra-Biblical “scare tactics” used by overzealous “evangelists.”  The result is that the Biblical concept of Hell has become twisted, Hollywood-ized, and morphed into something out of a Stephen King horror novel rather than the simple concepts discussed in Scripture.

For one thing, the concept of the fire and brimstone is highly metaphorical in Scripture.  Hell is described as a lake of fire, but also a place of outer darkness.  If these are both literal, there would be a contradiction (i.e. how do you have a dark fire?).  The physical aspects of Hell are most often seen in parables or in apocalyptic literature; both of which are highly metaphorical in context.

Of course, I should point out that I believe Hell is far worse than simple fire and brimstone would have been; but there is a reason for that, one that has nothing to do with God actively torturing anyone.  Hell is primarily a separation between God and man.  Man was created for fellowship with God; God’s judgment of man’s sin is to remove that fellowship completely.

As a result, man cannot be other than “pained.”  But this pain is a pain of his own making.  Man refuses to be near God, refuses to submit to Him, refuses to do as his nature was created.  Man is the one who acts in this situation.  It is man who actively tortures himself in hell.

The subject in hell is not radically different from the reprobate here on Earth today, except for the removal of God’s common grace.  The Arminian concept of salvation is that as long as anyone is alive on Earth, there is a chance that he could be saved.  I maintain that the Reprobate has just as much chance on Earth as he does in hell (which is to say “none”).  But this is not to say that God forces the reprobate to turn against Him in hell anymore than He forces the reprobate to turn against Him on Earth.

Sinners hate God; God does not need to force any sinner to sin, for that is what sinners do.  So, nothing changes for the reprobate when he reaches hell.  He could just as much turn to Christ at that point as he could on Earth; yet he will refuse to do so.  As such, once again God is not forcing anyone to remain in Hell; they stay their of their own free will.

This is part of the pain of hell too.  No matter how much sinners rail against God, they always know in their hearts that they chose to be in Hell.  Furthermore, they continue to choose to remain in Hell.  Such is their hatred of God they would rather experience Hell than be near Him.

In point of fact, Hell need not be any actual place.  A sinner in heaven would be just as much in Hell, for that is his level of hatred toward God.  It would actually be worse for the sinner to be forced to remain there with God.  Separation from God is actually, at some level, still an act of mercy, not torture.

Naturally, the Arminian will balk at this understanding of Hell; yet we must ask, how does the Arminian remain consistent?  We have seen the above explanation remains consistent within Calvinism.  God doesn’t change; the reprobate don’t change.  Everything remains the same, and what is just on Earth is just in Hell.

But the Arminian is in a different boat.  In his worldview, God changes from having an opportunity (a chance) for salvation while the person is alive to complete removal of that opportunity once a person is in Hell.  At that point, the person is in eternal agony; yet it is “too late.”  God, in the Arminian view, suddenly becomes the charicature that Arminians have the Calvinistic God: a vengeful being who doesn’t care about the will of the one in Hell.  The Arminian God on Earth is at radical odds with the Arminian God of Hell.

Given that this has drastic implications to the doctrine of the immutability of God, I think it encumbant on the Arminian to justify this change in God’s behavior.  Once again, I merely point out that the Calvinist doesn’t have this same problem.

Thanksgiving is a great holiday, but one that throws off my schedule in a myriad number of ways!  Before the holiday, I spoke with a co-worker about my previous blog entry about free will.  In that post, I raised a question about if it were even possible for God, in the Arminian system, to create a being with free will who would not sin.

Unfortunately, the holiday kept me from actually writing on that until now!  And since we’ll most certainly be doing overtime at work to make up for all the work we missed over the holiday weekend, I figured I’d better get this in before work :-)

In any case, to offer a clarification of my position and to restate it in a way that will hopefully make a bit more sense.  Unfortunately, it is impossible to write 100% clearly on the issue since we are going to have to discuss the issue of what “before” means to a timeless Being.   In other words, when Ephesians 1:4 says, “…even as he chose us in him before the foundation of the world…” we have to understand what the “before” means.

I will delve into that more in the future (unless I go completely insane with all the overtime).  For now, I will just mention that my belief is that the “before” mentioned in Ephesians 1 refers not to time but to a logical order.  We can view that as the logical order of the decrees of God.  Because God is timeless, there is no “before” or “after” inherent in Him; yet He is also aware of the passage of time in His creation.  That is, God knows that yesterday happened before today, even though he doesn’t experience time in the sense that we do.  God knows that He created the world before the world fell, but this knowledge is not experientially gained as it is in our case.  (In other words, we know the passage of time because we experience it; God knows it because He decreed it.)

Thus, we can look at the order of the decrees of God.  By this, we are speaking of a logical order not a temporal order.  When we look at Ephesians 1 again, we see that before the foundation of the world, God had already decreed that there were certain people (the Elect) who were chosen in Him unto salvation.  Regardless of whether we hold to the “foundation of the world” as being temporal (that is, the actual creation and starting point of time) or the decree that there would be creation, the logical order is still the same: Election precedes creation.

After all, what the decree that occurs before the foundation of the world says is: “he chose us in him before the foundation of the world, that we should be holy and blameless before him.”  Thus, at the very least what we see is that in the logical order of things God has decreed:

A. There would be some who must be holy and blameless before him.

B. Then God created those very people.

As we move to Revelation 13:8, we see the same theme.  To see the relevant portion in a few versions:

everyone whose name has not been written before the foundation of the world in the book of life of the Lamb that was slain. (ESV)

whose names are not written in the book of life of the Lamb slain from the foundation of the world.  (KJV)

all whose names have not been written in the book of life belonging to the Lamb that was slain from the creation of the world (NIV)

everyone whose name has not been written from the foundation of the world in the book of life of the Lamb who has been slain. (NASB)

As you can see, the Greek refers to either Christ’s being slain before the foundation of the world, or else there are certain people whose names have been written in the book of life before the foundation of the world.  Ultimately, both of these are taught in Scripture.  Once again, we see that before the actual creation of the world, God had logically decreed certain things to occur; namely, that there would be some who are saved.

This is epitomized in 1 Peter 1:20, which says of Christ: “He was foreknown before the foundation of the world but was made manifest in the last times for your sake.”  This passage is especially fruitful for our discussion because it speaks about God’s eternality (in having Christ foreknown before the foundation of the world) yet also about His acting within time (in having Him become “manifest in the last times”).  Thus, we see Scriptural warrant for the previously mentioned idea that God is atemporal and yet still knows what goes on within time.

Now, all these things culminate to show something specific as relates to the act of Creation.  Before God created anything, He already had in mind both that there would be a savior and that there would be some who are saved.  But in order to save anyone, there must be a reason for the salvation.

This is key to the discussion with the Arminian.  We know that when God created Adam in the Garden, Adam was created good.  Yet these passages also indicate that despite the fact that Adam had been created good, God had already decreed that there would be sinners and that He would save some.

The Arminian seeks refuge in the foreknowledge of God.  He might even take comfort from the passage in 1 Peter which specifically uses that term of Christ.  However, what the Arminian gains in “warm fuzzy feelings” he loses in the matter of consistency.  For if it is the case that God foreknew that Adam would sin, then the question must be: Why did God create Adam?

In other words, even if we suppose that God’s decree was based on God’s foreknowledge this doesn’t solve anything for the Arminian.  God created Adam knowing full well that Adam would sin.  God decreed that He would save some through the death of Christ, but at the point of Creation Adam could not have done anything but fall because God had already decreed it.

In other words, the Arminian cannot rescue freedom here.  Adam was just as bound to sin as he is for the Calvinist, because God’s plan at the point of creation included Adam’s fall.

This brought us to the point I made in the previous post that my co-worker asked for clarification on.  The Roman Catholic I spoke with last week argued that God’s primary goal was to create actually free creatures (as argued above, this still doesn’t work even granting Arminians their entire presupposition).  But let us throw a wrench into the system.

God’s omniscience includes not only all actual events, but all potential events too.  A quick Biblical proof of this is found in the condemnation of Chorazin and Bethsaida in Matthew 11:21: “Woe to you, Chorazin! Woe to you, Bethsaida! For if the mighty works done in you had been done in Tyre and Sidon, they would have repented long ago in sackcloth and ashes.”  Thus, Christ knew not only the actual events (that Tyre and Sidon had not repented) but the possibilities too (that if the works done in Chorazin and Bethsaida had been done there, they would have repented).  So we know that God knows the possibiles and not just the actuals.

This brings me to my question.  If God knows all possible actions that Adam could have done, then either God intentionally did not choose the universe or universes in which Adam did obey Him, or else there were no such universes in which that could have happened.

Naturally, this gets a little sticky for us since we only live in the “actual” universe and not in potential or possible ones.  But if God’s decree is based on His foreknowledge, as the Arminian declares, then God is free to act before the fact to ensure which possibility occurs.  Consider, for example, if you foreknew what tomorrow’s lottery numbers would be.  You could then act in such a way that you will win the lottery, if that is what you desire; or you can act in a manner in which you will not win.  This is completely up to you to do.  All you have to do is choose which path you want.

In any case, the Arminian is stuck with a huge problem.  Either God is too incompetant to create a man who can freely choose to obey Him, or else God intentionally chose to create a universe in which sinful man would of necessity exist.  The only way to avoid this dilemma is to either accept Open Theism (in believing that God cannot see a free choice, and thus one denies His omniscience) or else to accept Calvinism (that God sovereignly decreed what would happen).

Given the numerous Biblical passages that demonstrate both that God is in fact omniscient even over free choices, and the abundant Biblical evidence that God has in fact decreed whatsoever comes to pass, we know that the Biblical response is Calvinism, not Open Theism.

UPDATE:  By the way, I would also add this point.  When the Arminian speaks of God’s foreknowledge, he speaks of it as if it would be a one-shot event for God.  That is, God is “trapped” by what He knows will happen. 

It’s like God knows the outcome of what would happen if He rolls a pair of dice, but is powerless to change that outcome.  He has freedom to roll the dice, but not freedom to determine how they’ll land.  And if they land poorly, He can’t just pick them up and re-do it.  He’s stuck with the result. 

In other words, God knows the future but is powerless to change anything about it.

Ultimately, this relies on a misunderstanding of how God knows something.  We, as humans, deal with odds and probabilities.  There is a chance of something happening.  God doesn’t deal with chance though.

Going back to the dice metaphor; God created the dice.  He designed them in the first place.  The laws of physics are based on His very nature and the way He designed the universe.  If God drops the dice, He’ll know exactly what needs to occur for them to come up in a specific way.  In short, God can’t help but determine the outcome.  His foreknowledge is based on His determination of what will happen.  He knows because He decrees.

God cannot “learn” anything.  He cannot gain knowledge.  He cannot be surprised.  This is only possible if there is no such thing as chance for God.  There can only be chance if there is ignorance.  If there is no chance, there must be determination.

I finally have a moment to explain the background to my previous post on Freedom while I have a moment at lunch!  (That’s right, we’re working overtime again…unfortunately, since we’ll have Thursday and Friday off this week for Thanksgiving, we won’t get overtime pay…which kinda makes it hard to be motivated to work overtime sometimes….)

Anyway, on Sundays I get together with some friends for a theological/philosophical discussion at a local coffee shop.  The coffee shop is called Agia Sophia, which is Greek for “Holy Wisdom.”  As one might guess from the name, it’s also run by people who are Greek Orthodox (I’m making the distinction for my parent’s sake, who get to deal with the Russian Orthodox believers in Ukraine–but from now on, I’ll just call it Orthodox for short!).

Ironically, this Sunday we had five people there.  The names: Peter, Andrew, Joshua, Joseph, and John.  Yes, we could practically write our own gospels :-D  In any case, the make-up of the group consisted of myself (PCA Presbyterian) and my brother (Reformed, but non-denominational at the moment), a Roman Catholic, an Orthodox, and a person who is coming out of the general Evangelical church who is now looking intently into Catholicism.

In any case, one of the people whom I had not met before gave the presentation Sunday.  This is before I knew what his background was.  It began as a look at when the New Testament Church began.  Eventually, we morphed into a discussion as to what the intent of Genesis 1:1 was.  That is, what is the reason God created anything in the first place?

This person presented the “freedom” argument that I mentioned briefly in that Pensèe previously linked.  This was in response to my pointing out that given Ephesians 1 and the fact that we were chosen in Christ before the foundation of the world and also Revelation 13:8 which speaks either of people’s names being written in the book of Life before the foundation of the world or that it was the Lamb (Christ) who was slain before the foundation of the world (depending on how one translates the Greek) then it would certainly be the case that before Creation, God had already intended to save some and for Christ to be the means by which this salvation would occur (this is also demonstrated in 1 Peter 1:20, which speaks of Christ in the following manner: “He was foreknown before the foundation of the world”).

In other words, my argument was that the purpose of Creation was primarily soteriological.  That is, Creation occured so that God could demonstrate the depths of His love in saving those who are sinners (Romans 5:6-8).  This required there be sin first, and thus part of the intent of Creation included the fact that there would be sin.  This is obviously a hard saying, yet one that is inescapable based on the Scriptures I’ve alluded to here.

Naturally, there was some disagreement from the guy who was presenting the talk.  He gave the freedom argument.  That is, God wanted to create people who were able to either accept or reject Him.  He didn’t want to create automatons.

Yet this doesn’t solve the fact that Christ was foreknown before the foundation of the world, and it doesn’t solve the fact that we who are saved are chosen in Him before the foundation of the world.  Both of these things occured before God created anything.

Thus, we are left with a problem for Arminianism.  Either we must stipulate that God intentionally created people so that they would sin, or else we must argue that it is impossible for God to actually create anyone who would not sin.  You see, if God did not want them to sin, yet He knew that they would sin and He created them anyway, then this means that God is not able to create people who could freely refrain from sinning–for if He could, would He not have done so?

In short, the Arminian must argue that free will necessitates sin!  This is an even stronger version of total depravity than the Calvinist holds to, for indeed the Calvinist argues that it is not man’s freedom that is the problem but it is his nature.  Thus, in heaven, Christians will have freewill but their natures will be sanctified and thus they will continually choose good; but for the Arminian, the nature isn’t the problem–freedom itself is, and therefore there can be no guarantee of salvation even in heaven!  What is to stop the Christian from freely sinning from heaven in such a scenario?

Since my lunch break is over I’ll have to stop here for now :-)  However, a quick question:  Do you know which theological background the presenter had?

That’s right: he was Roman Catholic.  Which only goes to show that when it comes to the mechanics of soteriology, there is very little difference between Arminians and Catholics.

I had a discussion yesterday (more on that on a later post) with a person leaning semi-Pelagian (aka: Arminian) on the question of why God created the world.  His response was basically that God’s intention was for man to be free to either choose or deny Him.

In short, Freedom for the creature is the ultimate Good.

But if this is the case, then I merely ask: is God free to not love all?  If God is, then what problem does the semi-Pelagian/Arminian have with Calvinism?  If He is not, then would that not mean that God Himself can grant what He Himself cannot do; that God’s creation, in other words, usurps Him in the very thing defined as the highest good?

They [libertarian free will theologians] also argue [against Calvinism] from the manner of speaking both in the Scripture and in the words of men: good works are indeed called “ours”; and we are credited just as much with doing what is holy and pleasing to the Lord, as with committing sins.  But if sins are rightly imputed to us as coming from ourselves, surely for the same reason some part in righteous acts ought to be assigned to us.  And it would not be consonant with reason to say that we do those things which we are incapable of carrying out by our own effort and are moved like stones by God to do.  Therefore, although we give the primary part to God’s grace, yet those expressions indicate that our effort holds second place.

If our opponents simply urge that good works are called “ours,” I will object in turn that the bread that we petition God to give us is also called “ours” [cf. Matt. 6:11].  What does the possessive pronoun “ours” signify to them but that what is otherwise by no means due us becomes ours by God’s loving-kindness and free gift?  Therefore they must either ridicule the same absurdity in the Lord’s Prayer, or recognize that good works, in which we have nothing of our own save by God’s bounty, are not follishly called “ours.”

Calvin, John (1960). Institutes of the Christian Religion Volume 1 (II. v. 14) F. L. Battles Trans.,  Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press. (p. 333)

I just had an interesting thought regarding the Arminian/Calvinism debate. Arminians like to say that God does not elect men, but instead men choose God. Let us stipulate that this is the case for the sake of argument.

How does one person choose God and another not choose God? Perhaps it is upbringing, society, etc. But no matter what it is, if God has no control over who choose Him then it is logically necessary that God likewise has no control over where anyone is born or who anyone interacts with. God has no control over how smart a person is, or how spiritual he will be in his make-up, or what his character is.

In other words, if an Arminian says that God does control where a person was born, and who he interacts with, or what kind of person he is, then God does determine who will believe in Him and who will not. It’s simple cause and effect.

How many times have you heard an Arminian say, “God brought this person into my life”? If God has no control over your salvation, God does not bring anyone into your life. An Arminian, to be consistent, would have to conclude that God is in control of nothing if God is not in control over who comes to Him and who does not. If God is in control of anything then God can use what He is in control of to ensure that someone is saved.

Of course, if God really wanted every single person on Earth saved He would be able to present Himself to every single person in such a way that people would believe in Him. If God really is trying 100% to save everyone, why are there still some who do not believe? Could it be because they are depraved?

Face it. An Arminian has to either accept that men are even more depraved than the Calvinist asserts (for they are able to resist God’s 100% full effort to save them, an action that could only be the epitome of depravity as it is obviously not righteousness to resist God), or else God really isn’t trying all that hard after all.

Ah, it’s wonderful to not have to live in that inconsistent theology :-)