I’m reading through Against Relativism: A Philosophical Defense of Method by James F. Harris. It’s rather interesting because Harris is a secular author and considers himself a champion of scientific inquery. In any case, he said the following which, in my opinion, is one of the clearest demonstrations of how science is itself a philosophy:
As every schoolchild learns, the two primary purposes of science are explanation and prediction. … Explanation and prediction are activities which naturally arouse interest in and questions about numerous related issues and notions which quickly lead to metascientific, epistemological inquriy. “Explanation of what?” we might ask. And, “Prediction of what?” “Explanation as opposed to what, and prediction as opposed to what?” Are some explanations preferred to others? Why? Does this not mean that there are “good” explanations and “bad” ones? Why? And are some explanations “scientific” while others are not? Again, why? And similarly with predictions, why is it that some predictions command our assent or belief in preference to others? On what evidence? How do we gather the evidence? How do we come to accept and believe certain evidence? Answering such questions presupposes a fundamental, meta-scientific, epistemological inquiry into the nature of “reality”, facts, truth, reasons, evidence, belief, and knowledge. Such an inquiry creates the domain of the philosophy of science.
Harris, James F. (1992).  Against Relativism: A Philosophical Defense of Method, LaSalle: Open Court (pp. 13-14)
