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I wanted to put this in a post by itself instead of including it in the previous blog post since it’s the closest I think Daniel Morgan gets to a good argument in his responses :-)

Daniel wrote in response to Part 2:

i) The sky is purple
ii) Those who do not see the sky as purple have been blinded by The Great Filter Snake (TGFS)
iii) God told me this in a dream, after I dug up an old book in my backyard that God told me was inspired that confirmed this [from some interpretation work, of course]
iv) Anyone who denies the sky is purple is incoherent — the very basis of observation is eyesight, and eyesight depends upon light, and light is filtered by TGFS before it hits the eyes of unbelievers. Once God chooses you, you will see because God breaks the power of TGFS over unbelievers.
v) Light presupposes “not-light” (eg, light can either exist or not exist), and neither of these can be “accounted for” without the TGFS actions and God.What, you want me to support that argument? I just did — if you use other premises than mine, you’re begging the question against my worldview. I can show you you’re incoherent via (v), and any explanation you give me to explain how light/not-light can exist without the TGFS and God is incoherent. Go ahead, try! ;)

Here Morgan has attempted to formulate an opposing Presupposition in an attempt to disprove Presuppositionalism.  Of course the first thing we should note is that Morgan is asking me to disprove something he himself does not believe in.  After all, Morgan doesn’t believe in TGFS.

Be that at it may, Morgan’s approach fails for several reasons.  The most blatant problem is that Morgan isn’t distinguishing between objective and subjective truth here.  His first premise is “The sky is purple.”

But colors are subjective.  I happen to know this because my father is color blind.  Purple is meaningless to my dad.  I remember many times riding in the car with my parents, and my dad would point to some flowers and say, “That’s a pretty blue” while my mom responded, “Those are purple.”

So the concept of “purple” doesn’t even come close to the concept of “logic.”  The analogy has fallen apart and we’ve only looked at the first premise.

It also fails on the last point:

v) Light presupposes “not-light” (eg, light can either exist or not exist), and neither of these can be “accounted for” without the TGFS actions and God.

But light, in the analogy, exists independent of TGFS and God.  Thus, Morgan has not given us how light is dependent upon either of them.  In fact, his argument has been that light does exist for everyone, it’s just filtered for some and not for others.  Once again, this breaks down as being analogous to the Presuppositional view of God.

Morgan, obviously, doesn’t think that the above is valid, of course.  He requires it not to be, for the assumption is that if his argument is invalid, so too must the Presuppositional argument be invalid.  But as we have shown, the analogy isn’t a proper one in the first place.  Thus, the incorrectness of Morgan’s faux-Presupposition in no way provides any evidence against the Christian Presupposition.

In Part 2 of the Witmer series, Daniel Morgan comments:

The most terrible thing I’ve experienced, and learned a lot from, is that 95% of these conversations end up placing a huge burden on the atheist to justify every aspect of his metaphysics and ontology.

Indeed, this is true but hardly “terrible.”  In point of fact, atheist is not simply a rejection of something.  Atheism has positive assertions as well; and as such, atheism needs to be justified.  In essence, Daniel is here complaining that it’s not fair that he has to justify his position while he deamns that the theist justify the theistic position.  But turnabout is fair play.

Daniel continues:

That isn’t a positive argument of any sort, and showing the atheist to be stupid or incoherent does not show that your premise (2) is correct or supported.

Actually, “my” “premise (2)” is actually a premise Daniel came up with, which is “If logic, then God.”  (Despite the fact that this premise didn’t really have to deal with the point of contention I had with Witmer to which Daniel was responding, it’s still worthwhile to address it so I shall do so.)  Let’s demonstrate (using general terms, as Daniel did):

1) Either God exists or does not.

2) Logic is valid

3) If God, then Logic is valid.

4) If not-God, then Logic is invalid.

5) .: If Logic, then God must be valid.

As such, demonstrating that the atheist is “stupid or incoherent” actually does establish the idea that If Logic, then God.  After all, if there is no atheist position that can demonstrate Logic then 4) in the above stands.

Naturally, Daniel could argue that at some future point the problem might be sovled; but as I have argued before, I already have If God, then Logic.  Why would I have to give up that premise on the blind faith that atheism might come up with a way to validate logic in the future?

Daniel says:

Seriously, though, you seem to have missed a larger point — falsification of Daniel Morgan’s ontological/metaphysical justification of logic doesn’t lead to:
1) Logic [generally] does or does not exist
2) God [generally] does or does not exist

True; but undercutting your position does demonstrate that your ontological/metaphysical justification of logic is flawed.  YOU still cannot account for it.  YOU are still up a creek without a paddle.

I, on the other hand, am still waiting for an atheist to actually present a claim that doesn’t self-destruct.  Surely, if there was one out there, a smart atheist such as yourself would be able to come up with it, right Daniel?

In reality, Daniel, you should recognize that at this point my argument is no different than the vast majority of atheist arguments I’ve heard against the existence of God.  Let’s put it in the Flying Spaghetti Monster analogy.

There could be a Flying Spaghetti Monster somewhere, just like there could be an atheistic justification for logic and morality.  But barring any evidence for it, why should I accept it?

In short, you want me to prove a universal negative after I have already disproven the specific concrete examples given to date.  Why should I change my beliefs if you’re not going to offer any more evidence that atheism can account for these things?

Oh, and since the atheist commentators like to use this one so much, I can’t resist.  Daniel wrote:

But instead, the real philosophers, like Plantinga, don’t make the same claims you guys do.

  In other words, NO TRUE SCOTTSMAN….