Witmer concludes his talk with some tactics for atheists. What is most interesting about these tactics is that they once more demonstrate that Witmer is writing for atheists to win debates and not to come to an understanding of truth.

 

Witmer begins:

Keep in mind that the presuppositionalist wants to trip you up in the sense of showing that you contradict yourself or are committed to things that are incoherent. 

(ibid, 17)

But it is not a question of Presuppositionalists “wanting” to trip up atheists. Instead, it is the fact that Presuppositionalists are pointing out that the atheistic worldview is self-contradictory and incoherent in and of itself. Thus, the Presuppositionalists only “wants” to demonstrate this to the atheist in the hopes that God will use it to open the unbelieving heart. 

Witmer continues:

It’s not surprising that he can enjoy some success in the online world, because, frankly, he asks questions of a philosophical sort that are hard to answer; and if you feel forced to answer and venture to say something, you can easily become tripped up. Suggestion: don’t be too ambitious. Instead of setting out ambitious but exploratory theses about the nature of logic and morality, simply be modest and refuse to overcommit yourself. 

(ibid, 17)

This is advice that I truly wish more atheist would actually follow! Instead, what we find online usually degenerates very quickly into ad hominem, insult, and abuse. This is, in my opinion, a direct result of the fact that the Presuppositionalist does ask those very philosophical questions and atheists realize that they cannot answer the questions. Thus, they have no recourse but to flee into the realm of non-scholarly debate. At this point, I wish they would follow the advice of Lincoln: “It is better to be thought a fool than to open one’s mouth and remove all doubt.” 

So with Witmer, I would also encourage atheists to not over-commit. On the same token, I’d encourage theists who have not studied Presuppositionalism enough to not try to beat someone over the head with it either. While typically those who are really skilled at Presuppositional argumentation (e.g. Greg Bahnsen, John Frame) make it look easy, you can quickly run into areas that you haven’t studied yet yourself, thus giving the atheist a chance to turn the tables on you.

 

So on this advice, I think Witmer’s correct both for the atheist and the theist. We should all know our limits and not seek to go beyond them.

 

Witmer continues:

Think in terms of tactics. That is, keep in mind that the presuppositionalist is not approaching you with an eye towards reasoning together to get to the truth. He’s admitted as much by saying that he sees you as deranged and in need of some kind of personal confrontation. 

(ibid, 17)

While the use of the term “deranged” is poisoning the well, the concept is accurate enough that my objection to it need not be strenuous. It is not so much that Presuppositionalists view atheists as “deranged” as it is that atheists are spiritually blind and totally depraved (i.e. depraved in the totality of their being (all parts), not that they are as evil as they could be). The atheist begins with a flawed view of “reasoning” and as such it is impossible for us to “reason together” without establishing that common ground. 

Again, Presuppositionalists do not deny that there is some common ground; we simply deny that it is neutral common ground. The atheist has to use theistic common ground in order to begin to think. The Presuppositionalist is merely trying to point this out to the atheist.

 

In any case, as far as it goes, it has been my experience that there are very few atheists who do not think theists are “deranged and in need of some kind of personal confrontation” either. This knife cuts both ways.

 

Witmer continues:

In an ordinary intellectual discussion among friends, it’s fine to speculate on things, refining one’s ideas as one goes along; but in this sort of encounter they will try to commit you to as much as they can, to force you off balance. So when I say “think in terms of tactics” I mean: keep focused on how your words will be used by the presuppositionalist. In effect, think of those famous Miranda warning words: “Anything you say can and will be used against you.” 

(ibid, 17)

That’s the funny thing about words… 

They’re supposed to mean what you believe. Thus, if you use them carelessly you should expect that carelessness to be pointed out. Likewise, I know that I too am fully aware that atheists pick over everything I write. This comes with the territory when you’re doing apologetics.

 

Witmer continues:

Regarding terminology, I recommend being aggressive in forcing your opponent to slow down and explain his questions as you go along. The presuppositionalist has little patience, I gather from what I’ve read. He sees himself as dealing with a fool, so he tries to rush in and “fix” him with a quick shock of amazing argument. 

(ibid, 17)

Of course we remember that Witmer has not had much experience with Presuppositionalism, so his sweeping generalization here doesn’t carry much weight. (Or at least, it shouldn’t.) Secondly, the Presuppositionalist ought not be interested in “winning debates.” We are not looking for the “quick shock of amazing argument.” We are interested in what is true.

 

The fact of the matter is that we believe the Bible is true, and it is the Bible that calls atheists fools. We cannot both accept the Bible as true and deny its descriptions of atheists if we are to remain faithful to our beliefs. Be that as it may, the “job” of the Presuppositionalist is not to change the unbeliever—that’s God’s job. I never expect an atheist to agree with the Bible’s assessment of their condition. That’s why it is necessary to demonstrate that the Bible is correct: the atheist holds to self-refuting philosophy and, as such, is a fool.

 

None of this ought to mean the Presuppositionalist is rushing headlong in without any concern of what his “opponent” is saying. Not at all! The Presuppositionalist looks at this as an opportunity to share the Gospel with another fallen human being; one who, were it not for the grace of God, we would be identical to. Furthermore, since the method of Presuppositionalism requires that we demonstrate to the atheist the foolishness of his beliefs, it is vitally important that the Presuppositionalist pay attention to what the atheist is saying!

 

Indeed, I would go so far as to argue that Witmer’s tactic of slowing down is important because it is the atheist who rushes too fast and he quickly gets in over his head. The Presuppositionalist merely listens to the atheist and points out the fallacies in the atheist’s thinking. Thus, the atheist needs to go slow to avoid the fallacies in the first place.

 

Anyway, Witmer continues:

If they mock you for this, you can always deflect it… 

(Ibid, 18)

I will be the first to point out that if a Presuppositionalist mocks someone he is not engaged in proper evangelism. However, it is also important to point out that often times atheists are offended by simple declarations of the truth because they don’t like the truth. Their dislike of the truth will often lead them to assume that the Presuppositionalist is “mocking” them. So I would argue that the atheist must first determine whether he is actually being mock, or whether he is just taking offense at the Gospel. 

Witmer continues:

If the presuppositionalist position is as I’ve described it, where they think it’s okay to take certain things for granted, then you should keep in mind that you can make the very same move. 

(ibid, 18)

Can you now? 

The Presuppositionalist position does take certain things for granted; but does the atheist’s position allow the atheist to take certain things for granted? And not only that, but does the atheist position allow the atheist to take for granted the very thing that is at debate?

 

This is the point that Witmer (and also Daniel Morgan) fail to grasp when it comes to Presuppositional argumentation. All arguments are grounded in certain unproven ideas, but these unproven ideas cannot be created on a whim.

 

Naturally, Daniel Morgan in the comments has said often that my saying this is imposing an external restriction on the atheist. But this is not the case. For if it were actually possible for someone to just whimsically pick Presuppositions, then to be consistent within that system there can be no truth!

 

Thus, if an atheist argues that he ought to be able to pick Presuppositions at a whim, then he cannot argue that theism is wrong! For that matter, he cannot argue that anything is wrong!

 

Witmer continues:

So if they say they take God for granted and insist you give a “basis” for logic, you can say that you take logic for granted and insist that they give you a “basis” for God. 

(Ibid, 18)

Let’s carry this out then in a true internal critique. Assume for the moment that the atheist can “just assume” logic is true without establishing it. 

How does it follow from this that the atheist can now insist the theist give a basis for God?

 

It does not follow. You see, if we accept that logic can “just be” then it is illogical to require the Christian give a basis for God; it in fact refutes the atheist’s worldview to require such a thing. For God is defined by Christians as something that is not contained by logic. That is, logic is an attribute of God; thus, God is higher than logic. As such, one cannot start with logic and then assume that logic compels someone to argue for something that is higher than logic. Such is absurd.

 

But this is not the case for the Presuppositionalist. The Presuppositionalist argues that God is the grounding of logic. Therefore, since logic is lower than God, we are not going beyond our worldview to demand that atheists account for logic apart from God.

 

Thus, the Christian Presuppositionalist avoids the internal problem while the atheist is stuck with it; unless the atheists wants to argue that we have no need to argue for anything, in which case I am content that everyone (not just theists) will consider him a fool.

 

Witmer continues:

Don’t make the mistake of thinking that you yourself don’t take anything for granted, as this is almost surely false, and it leaves you very vulnerable. Admit that there are things you don’t have settled or figured out or the like. 

(Ibid, 18)

Indeed, this is sage advice. In fact, it is advice that Witmer should have engaged in in the previous section. If an atheist responds with, “I don’t know. I’m not sure what to think there” any charitable person will not harass such a person! We might point out that this is something the atheist ought to think about, but we will not “mock” him for his ignorance—we are all ignorant at the start! 

But if instead of saying you don’t know you create a false worldview (like pretending you can just say logic is true without a basis for it), then you are not admitting you are ignorant and unsure. You are instead making up stuff. In such a case, the Presuppositionalist has every right to tear down these false worldviews and demonstrate that they are bunk.

 

Witmer continues:

Keep in mind that while you might want to have more interesting and ambitious theories about, say, the nature of logic and morality, you can always say things like “While I’m inclined to think that the laws of logic can be explained by linguistic facts, I recognize there are problems here. If it turns out that the laws of logic are primitive and unexplained by anything else, then, so be it.” 

(Ibid, 18)

Of course this is NOT the same thing as saying, “I don’t know.” This is asserting, “While I’m inclined to think that the laws of logic are linguistic facts, after you’ve destroyed that argument I will just claim, for absolutely no reason, that they are unexplained and then I will not listen to you demonstrate that they cannot be unexplained.” Furthermore, what is obviously lacking is the notion that the atheist will ever concede, “If it turns out that the existence of God is the only way for logic to be valid, then, so be it.” 

Witmer continues:

They will strenuously resist you imposing certain demands on them (e.g. that they provide a certain kind of evidence for accepting the Bible as the Word of God, &c); they will insist that you’re imposing views on them, about what is required, that they don’t hold; and if you find that those views lead to trouble, that is no worry for them — they just don’t accept those views about what is required in the first place. Realize that you can resist things in just the same way. 

(Ibid, 18)

Except, of course, for the fact that rejecting them in this manner refutes your own worldview. 

Witmer is now pretty much revealing his tactics. It doesn’t matter whether your arguments fit your overall philosophy of life. The only thing that matters is that you can find something to plug a hole in each step of the way. Never mind if those plugs tear larger holes as you cram them in. We’re not interested in consistency here; we’re interested in surviving the debate and getting out without considering if the theist is right.

 

Let’s illustrate this for better clarity. Suppose that Witmer were to argue that everything must be reduced to materialism. I then say, “That’s not true.” But Witmer argues that it must be true. So I say, “Fine, God is a material object.” If Witmer then says, “But if God is material, He’s not God” can I respond with, “That’s not fair! You get to say everything is material, so I do too! I’m just using your tactic back at you.”?

 

No, I cannot respond this way! Because if I were to say that, I would refute my worldview. In the same manner, if Witmer says, “I don’t need to establish logic; I’ll just be a Platonist at this point” then he refutes his worldview. Just as I cannot use Witmer’s presuppositions and pretend that God fits into them, Witmer cannot use my presuppositions and pretend atheism fits into them. If Witmer wants to establish that logic can just be assumed, he must demonstrate this within his own worldview rather than try to steal it from mine.

 

Continuing with Witmer:

Above all: remember that insofar as they have an argument, it is purely negative in character: trying to show that the atheist is committed to some incoherent view. This gives you enormous resources for responding. All you have to do is point out that you can be minimal in your commitments and not be incoherent. You can say that lots of things are primitive and unexplained and that they’ve hardly shown that you can’t consistently say such things. 

(ibid, 18)

Leaving aside the fact that I have shown atheists can’t consistently say such things, the atheist who agrees to the above minimalism is at a tremendous disadvantage. If you are minimal in your commitments, you cannot very well present a positive argument for atheism. If you escape Presuppositionalism by making your worldview gelatinous, you cannot solidify it later! 

In point of fact, Witmer in the above paragraph all but concedes that the only way atheism can be rational is if it has no substance. As soon as you start putting substance into it, the Presuppositionalist can point out that you’re wrong. Witmer therefore argues, “Just leave out the substance and wait for the Presuppositionalist to go away; then you can continue in your fundamentalist atheism unchallenged by critical thinking.”

 

Witmer continues:

A final thought on these matters. What I’ve discussed above is all about playing defense against the negative argument the presuppositionalist is likely to try to use against you. I’ve not said anything about how you could try to persuade the presuppositionalist theist that he is wrong, only about how you could try to show them they have no case for saying that you are irrational. 

(ibid, 19)

Of course, if you are able to show that atheism is not irrational, then you have refuted Presuppositionalism… 

In any case, Witmer is correct that he has offered no positive arguments for atheism. This is because all the positive arguments for atheism rely on stolen concepts (such as logic), and those are the issues that Presuppositionalism addresses. Witmer has to remain shadowy in order to not get pinned by Presuppositionalism, but in remaining shadowy he cannot mount an offense.

 

Witmer says:

But what about that other project — going on the offense? With many believers, I think this can be a fruitful pursuit, since many believers will in fact accept many claims that we also accept, and we can work from there. My impression of several of the presuppositionalist theists online, however, is that it is very unlikely to be fruitful to try to do this. If they take for granted not just the beliefs that God exists and is the author of scripture and so on, but nothing else, then we have nothing in common to work with by way of argument. 

(ibid, 19)

In other words, Witmer agrees with me that there is no neutral common ground between theism and atheism. 

He finishes:

In general, it’s only sensible to engage in such debate if some common ground can indeed be found. I wouldn’t recommend trying to browbeat them into acknowledging what they already know, that God doesn’t exist, the way that they aim to do that with us. This is because, first, I don’t believe they already know this; I don’t think they are just being willfully self-deceptive. And second, even if they are in some cases deceiving themselves in such a way, I don’t have any reason to believe that personal confrontation would have any positive effect. I have, after all, no faith that a God might in his grace enable them to see the truth. 

(ibid, 19)

I do wonder. If Witmer doesn’t think we are being willfully self-deceptive, what does he think? 

In any case, the second point is indeed telling. I, as a Presuppositionalist, do have faith that God not only can, but does enable atheists to see the truth. He does this every day through various means. As such, I don’t have any concerns actually engaging atheists. Because, you see, it doesn’t depend on he who runs, or he who wills, but on God who has mercy.

 

I have no problem acknowledging that my words have never convinced anyone, even if God has seen fit to bless me by using them. Since God is a God of second causes, I have no problem engaging atheists anywhere. And indeed, it is the very reason that I do so.