We now move on to what I consider Witmer’s weakest argument: morality. Witmer begins by giving some variant definitions to morality:
(1) What someone in fact morally ought to do
(2) What someone believes he morally ought to do
(3) What someone is motivated to do
(4) What someone actually does(ibid, 12)
These definitions are, of course, valid. However, when it comes to Presuppositionalism and morality, we’re only interested in his first definition, although it suffers from the problem of using the term in the definition. In other words, Witmer defines morality as that which one “in fact morally ought to do.†As such, it begs the question as to what morality is in order to define the term morality! Therefore, it’s not a very useful definition. But we can correct it simply by dropping the “morally†from the sentence and instead define morality as “that which in fact ought to be done.â€
Naturally, Witmer brings up each of these definitions because he is banking on the confusion between the terms. He writes: “Talk of ‘relative morality’ often confuses these four in a very bad way†(ibid, 12). This may indeed be the case in many discussions, but it is not the case when dealing with actual Presuppositionalism. Witmer’s only hope is in kicking up enough dust to force the confusion between the terms (and, of course, some theists do help him along by not defining their terms correcty too).
Witmer demonstrates his tactic here:
When a theist says that morality requires theism, which of these might he have in mind? Most likely he has either of two claims in mind. One concerns motivation; the other concerns moral facts:(a) If there is no God, there is no reason or motivation to be moral.
(b) If there is no God, then there are no moral facts; that is, no one is ever actually morally obligated to do anything.
(ibid, 12)
As we mentioned above, since the first definition is the one we have in mind then his (b) section here is the one we need to focus on. Ultimately, (a) does come from (b) (after all, if there are no moral facts then any motivation to be moral is going to depend on something other than morality, by definition), but this is further down the chain than what I want to focus on now.Regarding (b), Witmer writes:
Unfortunately, many atheists — at least of the layman sort — tend to agree with (b), although this is often put in very confusing terms by talking about “relativism” and the lack of “absolutes.” I think (b) is clearly false, but we’ll have to talk about all of these.
(ibid, 12)
The sad thing is that despite Witmer’s claim that he believes (b) is “clearly false,†he never gets around to demonstrating that (b) is false. That is, Witmer never establishes how he can have moral facts. This lack of demonstration is glaring in this discussion.In any case, Witmer continues:
If someone says that “morality differs from culture to culture,” which one do they mean? Probably a combination of beliefs and behaviors. But when people start to theorize about morality, they tend to focus on the facts about what people really ought to do and get that mixed up with facts about how people behave or what they believe.
(ibid 12-13)
Of course, this is a generalization. One that might have some backing in ”lay” apologetics, but one that also conveniently ignores the heart of the real issue.What we are interested in is not the argument that is obscured by distortion. We are interested in the correct definition.
Witmer, however, is interested in getting atheists to win debates. He is not concerned so much with establishing the truth as he is with knocking down what he perceives to be the majority arguments. But if Witmer cannot address the real, undistorted Presuppositional argument, then he will either have conversions based on distortions, or he will only solidify the opposition to his ideas all the more. Either way, I don’t see how that can be considered “successful†for a supposed Freethinker.
So again, we are not interested in any of the four definitions save the first. Are there any actual moral facts? This is not answered by appeals to confusion.
Witmer continues, after providing a distinction in the term “forâ€:
Very often, the big problem in talk about “relative morality” is that people go from the latter (using “for” to indicate what someone believes) to the former (using it to indicate the application of the rule). So, they might think: “According to A, doing X is morally okay; so, for A, doing X is morally okay; so, it’s okay for A to do X; that is, there’s nothing wrong if A does X.” This is very confused, of course. The fact that someone thinks that something is morally okay does not imply that it is okay for anyone, including them, to do that thing.
(ibid, 13)
Now here we see Witmer forget his previous four definitions of morality and engage in the very confusion of terms that he was at first critical of! The example that X is okay for A to do banks on the second, third, and fourth definitions given by Witmer: it is something that A believe he ought to do, is motivated to do, and/or actually does. What it is not is the first definition: an establishment of moral fact.
Witmer sees this, which is why his last sentence is “The fact that someone thinks that something is morally okay does not imply that it is okay for anyone, including them, to do that thingâ€â€”a sentence I agree 100% with! But in order for this conclusion to be valid, one must first disregard the other three definitions of morality and assume that they are not in play in the first part of the illustration. But when someone says, “According to A, doing X is morally okay†what is his definition of morality? It is the definition that is dependent upon A. It appeals to the second definition of morality—one’s beliefs. It does not appeal to the first definition of moral facts.
Witmer only continues this when he writes:
The confusion here is made worse — aided and abetted! — by the fact that if someone really does believe it’s morally okay to do X, and does it, we may say that since A was following his conscience, A was “doing the right thing.” But that’s a bad expression of what we’re trying to get at. A better way to put it is to say that A was sincerely trying to do the right thing, even though he didn’t; we then might say that he is not as much to blame, perhaps, but he still in fact did the thing he ought not to have done.
(ibid, 13)
No, what makes the confusion worse is that Witmer is falling back onto the first definition of morality without demonstrating that there are moral facts (aside from his statement of faith that he believes there are moral facts)! The only way there can be any confusion at all in the above relativistic ideas is if Witmer is admitting that the first definition of morality is the important one. But if all Witmer seeks to do is to demonstrate that the relativist cannot reach a definition of moral facts then he has argued about as complicated and unclearly as possible to get there!
In short, from what we see, Witmer, though acknowledging alternate definitions of morality, Presupposes the primacy of the important first definition in everything he argues, whether he is cognizant of it or not.
Witmer continues:
The claim about motivation seems to depend on the claim that nobody has any reason to behave morally unless they can be rewarded for it. Perhaps the presuppositionalist who advances this argument thinks that no one can be motivated to be moral unless they believe God exists and will reward those who do good. But it is just false to say that nobody has any reason to behave morally unless they can expect a reward for it. Doing good can be its own reward.
(ibid, 13)
Here Witmer steals so many concepts that it’s hard to know where to start. First, how is Witmer defining “good� If we’re looking at the idea of motivation, as Witmer claims, then “good†is nothing more than doing what one is motivated to do. There is no actual behavior that is inherently good or evil; there is just behavior that one is motivated to do or not to do.
But suppose that I am motivated to murder people. Is that “evil†for me to do? Not in the above definition. I am motivated to do it, therefore it must be good! To say that there are moral facts apart from motivation is to once again blur the distinction in the definitions that Witmer himself draws! We are not speaking of the first definition of morality here; we are speaking of the third.
The simple fact of the matter is that “Doing good can be its own reward†is nothing more than saying “Doing anything can be its own reward.†Not very helpful at establishing morality though. Witmer is engaged in an is = ought fallacy here.
Witmer continues:
Now, of course, you might be suspicious of any particular claim that someone did something just to do the right thing, without any expectation of a reward. But while there are suspicious cases, I think it’s just overwhelmingly plausible that people do, at least sometimes, in fact try to do the right thing for no other reason than that they want to do the right thing.
(ibid, 13)
And yet there is no right thing! Witmer hasn’t established what is “right†and what is not yet; he is assuming that there is, indeed, right and wrong behavior. But he is just asserting that it is out there, he is not demonstrating why any specific action is right or wrong.
Again, motivational morality is nothing more than doing what you want to do. But our wants and desires don’t make something moral, as even Witmer acknowledges (remember, he said: “The fact that someone thinks that something is morally okay does not imply that it is okay for anyone, including them, to do that thingâ€). Witmer’s entire motivational argument here relies on the Presupposition of actual moral facts!
Continuing:
Now the presuppositionalist might assume than atheist is bound to believe that all people are pure egoists, only interested in themselves. But of course it’s not part of atheism itself to make that claim. If the presuppositionalist is trying for an internal critique, he can’t foist this claim on us. And we shouldn’t make it anyway, as it seems implausible. Yes, people are often self-interested and don’t behave very morally; but that’s hardly the same as saying that people are only ever self-interested and have no motivation at all to do the right thing.
(ibid, 13)
Of course the only thing Witmer misses here is the boat. The Presuppositionalist is not arguing that everything the atheist does is immoral; he is arguing that the atheist cannot define what is moral or immoral in the first place! Witmer continues to fall into the trap of using morality without establishing morality. He argues that “people are often self-interested and don’t behave very morally†without demonstrating what is moral in the first place! He continues to simply beg the question and avoid actually demonstrating anything.It doesn’t get any better:
It might be thought that atheism requires an evolutionary story, which in turn requires that only selfishness is selected for. But this is obviously not mandatory. Evolution doesn’t require that every state be selected for; and it’s clear that it could be adaptive to develop altruistic tendencies. (Notice I am not saying that evolution provides a “basis for morality” in the sense that it explains why certain things are in fact morally obligatory or wrong or the like, only that it could explain why people have certain desires or inclinations.)
(ibid, 14)
And thus, Witmer all but admits that he is not even bothering to establish morality in his argument! He is simply assuming it’s true. He has no reason for this assumption; and yet because he assumes it, he is then motivated to obey his views of right and wrong. Such is truly frightening for one claiming to be a “Freethinker.â€
Witmer then moves on to critiquing the idea of the specialness of humans. But of course, it’s only the specialness that presupposes a “soul†that is wrong. Thus, we read:
Perhaps the idea behind Copan’s comments is that if atheism is true then, it seems, humans do not have these special things called “souls”. And that, perhaps, is the source of the thought. If humans don’t have souls, they aren’t sufficiently special for there to be moral principles applying to them.
(ibid, 14).
Here, Witmer doesn’t bother to define what a soul is (although he’ll give a really weird definition later); nor does he bother demonstrating how a soul is what Copan refers to in Copan’s argument. Basically, all he does here is say that people can be unique without a soul. But how does this solve the moral problem regarding the specialness of humans?
If we say that there are no souls, that is not, of course, saying that there is nothing at all distinctive about humans. There are, of course, various features that differentiate humans from other things in the world, and some of those features may be quite significant. Being self-aware is one such feature. The implication of atheism, however, is that one cannot cite “having a soul” — understood in the theological sense as a nonphysical substance created by God to be the bearer of personality and moral significance — as the thing that makes for specialness.
(ibid, 14)
Here we finally see Witmer’s definition of a soul. For some reason, he restricts it to “a nonphysical substance creatd by God to be the bearer of personality and moral significance.†But why should we accept that definition of the soul? Witmer doesn’t bother to argue for it, he just assumes we must accept it.
If, on the other hand, one accepts that self-awareness is part of the soul, then it is indeed true to say that humans have souls. And therefore, Witmer’s argument fails when he denies a soul.
Of course, at this point we’re just dealing with semantics. What’s actually important is the fact that Witmer still must account for why being “self-aware†grants a part of nature a special moral virtue. He doesn’t bother to argue for this. Once again, he just asserts it and assumes everyone will agree with him.
Witmer tries to avoid this by setting up the argument with his meaning defined in the outset:
To illustrate: suppose we say that being self-aware is indeed a very special and morally significant feature.
(ibid, 15)
But A) why should we say that being self-aware is a “morally significant†feature and B) what definition of moral is he using here? Witmer once again banks of the confusion he previously introduced to try to sweep in his stolen concepts without anyone noticing. Unfortunately, those who have actually studied Presuppositionalism can see this tactic for what it is: nonsense.
It’s especially nonsensical when you realize that Witmer doesn’t even agree to this! That’s right, he concludes his argument by saying, “I don’t endorse the view that being self-aware is the thing that is so special; I’m using it just for illustration purposes here†(ibid, 15). That’s nice; but aren’t we interested in the truth? At what point is Witmer going to actually put forth arguments for what he believes is true?
Apparently, never.
Witmer continues with a variation on the above by introducing reductionism:
One common line of thought is that if atheism is true, then we have to take a “reductive” view of humans, holding that a person is nothing but a collection of atoms in formation, and this, allegedly, causes some sort of trouble for seeing humans as morally significant. “If you’re just a bunch of matter,” we are asked, “why should you have rights while a pile of dirt here doesn’t?”
(ibid, 15)
This is, of course, the same as the above—arguing regarding the specialness of humanity. Again, Witmer “solves†the problem by asserting that there are differences between dirt and humans. In fact he states, “The only difference I can’t point to, as an atheist, is to say that I have a divinely-created soul and the dirt doesn’t†(ibid, 15).
But again Witmer does not establish why those differences ought to matter. He simply asserts that they do.
Witmer then moves on to the Conditional Problem of Evil argument, which I already addressed here and the Euthyphro problem, I already addressed (when John Loftus brought it up) here.
This concludes Witmer’s morality section. Let us quickly look over it again. Remember, Witmer begins by asserting “I think (b) is clearly false†where (b) was “If there is no God, then there are no moral facts.†Yet nowhere does Witmer demonstrate what these moral facts are! Indeed, he constantly argues as if he has established those moral facts, and all his arguments depend on those moral facts…and yet he NEVER demonstrates A) what these moral facts are; B) how he can prove these moral facts are true; or C) why those moral facts apply equally to us as well as to him.
If someone wants to refute the Presuppositionalist claim that one cannot establish morality apart from the existence of God, all the atheist need do is establish morality apart from the existence of God! The fact that Witmer did not even bother to try speaks volumes.
