Witmer now moves into the realm of logic, which is his second weakest response (his first weakest being morality, which will be addressed later). After a brief look at the modus ponens law of logic and the troubles it brings forth for atheists who try to say logic is conventional or mental, he entitles section 10: “What’s wrong with Platonist atheism?†(Ibid, 9).
You mean, what’s wrong with an atheist who is not a Platonist in any aspect of his philosophy to suddenly grasp for Platonism because it’s the only thing he can think of that isn’t refuted by the Presuppositional argument, but who then promptly ignores Platonism when he returns to his regularly scheduled worldview? The answer is in the question.
In any case, titles aside, here’s what Witmer argues:
One thing that atheist can do is simply say that the laws of logic are unexplained, primitive facts in the world. They don’t need any further explanation; they just are. What we might call “Platonist atheism” is just this sort of atheistic view.(Ibid, 9)
Again, Witmer resorts to mere claims. He does not establish how the laws of logic are “unexplained, primitive facts in the world.†He instead still seems to think that one can create a presupposition simply by declaring it to be so.
Witmer says:
This may be thought inconsistent with atheism if you think atheism requires a certain kind of materialism according to which everything that exists is in space and time. But there is no reason to insist an atheist be a materialist in this sense.(Ibid, 9)
But there is reason to insist an atheist be a materialist when the atheist claims to be a materialist. Now certainly, there are atheists who are not materialists in this sense. However, one cannot begin with a logic not based in materialism and then conclude a materialistic worldview. Such shows an automatic presuppositional failure. Therefore, those atheists who are materialists (and I’ve met many) cannot use the Platonist escape route.
On the other hand, those who would use the Platonist escape route are no longer able to argue against God on materialistic principles! To do so is to commit intellectual suicide.
Witmer unwittingly exposes his ultimate purpose here though, for he continues:
Of course, you might not like Platonist atheism. Maybe you’d like something more satisfying. But it’s certainly available as an option. One could explore other explanations but hold out this one is always what you can revert to if the other explanations fail.(Ibid, 9, emphasis his)
But this is flat out false. This explanation is only available to revert to if it does not refute the rest of the atheist’s position! In other words, if you don’t like Platonist atheism (presumably because you’re a materialist), then you cannot revert to it in an attempt to escape a presuppositional argument without proving that your worldview is inconsistent, incoherent, and self-refuting.Witmer, it appears, seems more interested in winning debates than he does in understanding the truth. Here, he is proposing nothing more than a debate tactic to get an atheist out of a bad position.
Continuing:
The presuppositionalist cannot complain that this is unacceptable, of course, since he has his own unexplained thing in his system, namely, God and his nature.(Ibid, 9)
But at question is not whether there are unexplained things in a system; at question is whether a person’s unexplained things disprove their own position. Therefore, the presuppostionalist is perfectly justified in complaining that an atheist plugs a hole in his worldview by inserting something that refutes his worldview.
Witmer then tries to demonstrate that the presuppositional argument for logic being grounded in God is wrong. He quotes an argument from CARM. I’m not going to get into great detail on his critique of that argument since I’m critiquing Witmer’s critique of presuppositionalism in general, not his critique of CARM. Besides, I’m sure that Daniel Morgan and I will get into a discussion on my own defense of the theistic position anyway. Likewise, I am not going to deal with Witmer’s claims regarding induction (as induction is not a part of my arguments either).
October 20th, 2006 at 9:16 am
After a brief look at the modus ponens law of logic and the troubles it brings forth for atheists who try to say logic is conventional or mental, he entitles section 10: “What’s wrong with Platonist atheism?†(Ibid, 9).
So far as I know, Prof. Witmer is a physicalist. He hinted at the way that a physicalist can explain logic consistent with physicalism, but he did not have time to go into it in depth, and he said he wanted to stay on the sole topic of responding to/debating with PS positions. In this talk, he cautioned against those who would say that logical truths don’t exist, but he did not actually indicate he subscribed to Platonic Realism with regards to universals/logic. He simply pointed to it as a way to not have to go in depth about physicalist explanations of logic’s metaphysical/ontological state. Now, I did actually quote you a few sources (like this one) in which a natural defense of logic is presented (sections 6-8). But we can get into that later.
You mean, what’s wrong with an atheist who is not a Platonist in any aspect of his philosophy to suddenly grasp for Platonism because it’s the only thing he can think of that isn’t refuted by the Presuppositional argument, but who then promptly ignores Platonism when he returns to his regularly scheduled worldview? The answer is in the question.
Not exactly. He never advocates holding contradictory or absurd positions. He is pointing to a position which some people hold, which is not inconsistent with atheism, albeit it is inconsistent with pure physicalism.
Again, Witmer resorts to mere claims. He does not establish how the laws of logic are “unexplained, primitive facts in the world.†He instead still seems to think that one can create a presupposition simply by declaring it to be so.
? First, this seems a bit contradictory. If something is unexplained and primitive, it has to be explained as such? Is this not definitionally contradictory? Hopefully we will get more into what you mean here, and how this reconciles with the PS position, which is that “external presuppositions” (like the one you just made) cannot be used to judge the veracity of internal presuppositions (that presupposing that something is primitive or basic is fine within your own worldview).
But there is reason to insist an atheist be a materialist when the atheist claims to be a materialist.
Obviously. You are holding someone to a claim they’ve just made.
Now certainly, there are atheists who are not materialists in this sense.
Right, those who do not claim to be. Or those who qualify physicalism and Platonism to try to reconcile universals and abstractions with concrete things (matter/energy).
However, one cannot begin with a logic not based in materialism and then conclude a materialistic worldview.
One can hold a naturalistic worldview that is consistent with both physicalism/materialism and logical realism, though. I noted this before.
Such shows an automatic presuppositional failure. Therefore, those atheists who are materialists (and I’ve met many) cannot use the Platonist escape route.
If someone is asserting, “There is only matter; there are Platonic forms,” then they aren’t “escaping” anything, but instead making a contradictory statement. If someone asserts “Physicalism explains every concrete object; logic and morality are not concrete objects; Platonism explains those,” Are they contradicting themselves or holding absurd premises? I suppose the question here is, “What is concrete, and what is abstract, and how do we know?”
On the other hand, those who would use the Platonist escape route are no longer able to argue against God on materialistic principles! To do so is to commit intellectual suicide.
I don’t know exactly what “materialistic prinicples” are, or what you mean by this. Hopefully you can explain it further. Obviously, one cannot say, “1) all minds require matter; 2) there is only matter; 3) therefore there is no God,” and then say, “4) logical truths exist in Platonic forms, which are real and are not matter.” 4 and 2 clash.
Witmer unwittingly exposes his ultimate purpose here though, for he continues:
He is hardly being unwitting. He is pointing to a strategy in a debate — turning your own strategy against you.
But this is flat out false. This explanation is only available to revert to if it does not refute the rest of the atheist’s position!
He knows that. He already pointed out that atheism doesn’t necessitate any particular ontology.
In other words, if you don’t like Platonist atheism (presumably because you’re a materialist), then you cannot revert to it in an attempt to escape a presuppositional argument without proving that your worldview is inconsistent, incoherent, and self-refuting.
Yes. And…?
Witmer, it appears, seems more interested in winning debates than he does in understanding the truth. Here, he is proposing nothing more than a debate tactic to get an atheist out of a bad position.
Physicalism is not a bad position. Those who cannot explain how it jives with logic are in a bad position if they explicate a contradiction between it and physicalism. Two different things. If something is primitive and unexplained, this is not contradicting one’s own position. Ignorance, sure, but not a contradiction, which is your entire argument.
The presuppositionalist cannot complain that this is unacceptable, of course, since he has his own unexplained thing in his system, namely, God and his nature.(Ibid, 9)
But at question is not whether there are unexplained things in a system; at question is whether a person’s unexplained things disprove their own position.
Exactly. And Prof. Witmer is not saying that physicalism is false, or that Platonism is true (neither am I, btw). What he’s saying is that once you’ve committed to something, trying to explain it without contradicting yourself is the whole crux. If you cannot do this, you are better off not explaining it at all (just as you do not explain God) and therefore making it a foundational/primitive/unexplained part of your philosophy.
1) “Physicalism is true.”
2) “Logic just exists.”
versus
3) “God just exists.”
4) “Logic requires God.”
1 does not contradict 2.
4 is not supported by 3.
Therefore, the presuppostionalist is perfectly justified in complaining that an atheist plugs a hole in his worldview by inserting something that refutes his worldview.
If it does indeed contradict. Not if it doesn’t.
Witmer then tries to demonstrate that the presuppositional argument for logic being grounded in God is wrong. He quotes an argument from CARM. I’m not going to get into great detail on his critique of that argument since I’m critiquing Witmer’s critique of presuppositionalism in general, not his critique of CARM. Besides, I’m sure that Daniel Morgan and I will get into a discussion on my own defense of the theistic position anyway. Likewise, I am not going to deal with Witmer’s claims regarding induction (as induction is not a part of my arguments either).
Fine.
BTW, in my earlier comment regarding Platonism, I want you to note that I am not actually advocating Platonism, but asking you if it is necessarily contradictory to frame the ontological conditions as I have — that there exist two separate frameworks for the explanandum of logic and that of the physical universe. I am actually setting up a sort of “qualified” ontology — the description of what exists, relative to the type of explanandum we refer to at that moment: whether it is a universal, or a particular.
On another note/from the other direction:
In addition to the text that I pointed to earlier (sections 6-8), in defending logic as consistent with naturalism/physicalism, I have put on reserve two books that Prof. Witmer suggested to me about the handling of universals, but they are not due back until 12/4/06. I plan to study them and think this issue through thoroughly. Until then, I will stay pretty minimal and open-minded in my commitment to physicalism.
One other (small) point is that even if atheism is incoherent, which a PS could only really approach using a positive argument like the TAG, this only provides for the necessity of some sort of God. Other arguments can be leveled against revelation and the Christian religion, plus the Problem of Evil would still make the character of this God dubious, at best. My point in saying this is to again reiterate the false dichotomy of “If atheists are wrong, Christianity is right.” There is quite a ways to go from one to the other.