Witmer continues by giving us an example of two types of meanings behind “justify” (note to Roman Catholics, I’m not using the theological term here) and “account.” He says:
If I ask you for a basis for your belief that (for example) 15+16=31, one thing I might be asking for is a justification or argument for that belief. Why believe it’s true? In response to this I might present to you the process by which I calculated the sum. The other thing I might be asking for is an explanation of its truth: why is it true? In response to this I might say that numbers have their relational properties essentially, perhaps; this question is harder to answer in the case in question.
(Ibid, 7)
This can, indeed, be a valid distinction to make. As such, it is important that the presuppositionalist be able to specify which meaning he intends. But granting this doesn’t solve Witmer of his problems, as we shall see.
Witmer continues:
One could have good reason to believe something is true while still finding it mysterious why it’s true. So, for instance, suppose my doctor calls me up one day and tells me, “Listen, I’m in a rush and I can’t explain, but your student So-and-so is going to have a fit this afternoon, probably during your class, and when this happens you need to react immediately and call the paramedics.” And then he hangs up. Now I have a good reason to believe this student will have a fit, but I have no idea why he will have a fit.
(Ibid, 7)
In this case, we see that Witmer has surrendered personal thought for an argument from authority. He assumes that the doctor knows what he is speaking about, and therefore Witmer trusts that what the doctor claims will come to pass.
There is nothing wrong with this approach in general. It is certainly impossible for any person in one lifetime to become an expert on everything! Therefore, we are forced to move to arguments on authority at some point.
However, what cannot be denied is that an argument from authority is a faith-based argument. In the above, Witmer does not actually have good reason to assume that something would actually happen to one of his students because he, presumably, isn’t a medical technician. Instead, he says he has a good reason to trust the doctor who has made the claims. But Witmer’s trust of the doctor does not make the claims of the doctor more sure. The doctor’s claims either are or are not valid, regardless of what Witmer believes about the doctor.
Thus, Witmer’s argument is really that he has a good reason to trust the doctor. Again, there is nothing wrong with this approach as long as one accepts that it is an argument from authority that gives Witmer the ability to “know†something without knowing why.
Let us continue:
One could also have a good explanation for something’s being true without having any good reason to believe it is true in the first place. So, for instance, suppose that I speculate that someone I know (but haven’t seen in years) has just been murdered by her husband; I have no reason to believe this, it’s just an idle speculation. Even so, I might be able to suggest a good explanation for it. If she’s been murdered, one thing that could explain this is her husband’s tendency to alcoholism and extreme jealousy.
(Ibid, 8)
I don’t see how this could be considered a “good†explanation. It’s a hypothetical explanation, yes; but “good�
Continuing:
Notice that our discussion earlier of beliefs that we take for granted indicates that some beliefs might be reasonable without argument. So if my belief that my senses are mostly trustworthy is to be taken for granted, then, if someone insists on a basis for this, I can of course say, “there is no basis; this is one of the things I take for granted.”
(Ibid, 8)
Again, this shows that Witmer does not understand truly presuppositional positions. (Likewise, based on Daniel Morgan’s comments to my previous blog entry in this series, Daniel doesn’t understand this part either.)
Just because someone says “X is my presupposition†does not mean X actually is his presupposition! (If presuppositionalism was that easy, everything could be claimed a presupposition!) One’s statement that something is foundational does not make it truly foundational. One must actually establish that a claim truly is presuppositional. Here’s a major hint: if your “presupposition†requires other presuppositions in order to be true, you’re not at your presuppositions yet.
True, Witmer could argue that I am forcing my definition of presupposition on him; but Witmer is the one who chose to write in the English language. And the terms we use have definitions. If he seeks to abandon those definitions, then he is operating from a completely different presupposition than anything he’s written so far anyway.
Moving back, when Witmer claims that he can presuppose the trustworthiness of his senses without any basis at all, we are not yet at a presuppositional position. In order to be able to take our senses as valid for granted, one must first presuppose that our senses are accurate and that they provide a totality of information about our universe (two ideas that are subjected to much criticism already). In other words, there are presuppositional requirements to saying that our senses can be taken for granted, and that is a presuppositional idea of the nature of the universe!
In order to take our senses for granted, we must presuppose that there is no supernatural world. We must presuppose empiricism. We must presuppose that there cannot be anything outside of the range of our senses that could actually impact reality. All these things precede the concept that our senses are trustworthy, and therefore Witmer’s objections are groundless.
Continuing:
(Again, there’s a good question as to why some things should be taken for granted and others can’t; that’s a deep question that I don’t want to try to tackle here.)
(Ibid, 8)
And yet it is the backbone of his argument at this point. If his argument is to be considered by rational people, Witmer must explain this very point!
Witmer continues:
In the same way there are truths that don’t have any deeper explanation. So, perhaps the right answer to “why is it that 15+16=31?” is just “That’s just the way it is; there’s no further explanation.”
(Ibid, 8)
Except that I, for one, can already see something more basic than 15+16=31 at root. It is correct because of the Law of Identity. 1 = 1. We define the number 2 as 1 + 1, etc. We could just as simply define ^ as 1 + 1; the symbol doesn’t matter. What matters is the identity of the defining unit, in this case 1. Therefore, 15+16 is simply another manner of writing 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + … It is a matter of identity and definition.
Now Witmer could certainly argue about the concept of “identity†and “definition†and say that those are things that “just are†instead. At least that would get us closer to a basic starting point.
Witmer continues:
Just as it’s hard to see how one could avoid taking some beliefs for granted, it’s hard to see how one could avoid allowing that some facts are just primitive or unexplained in this fashion.
(Ibid, 8)
Of course; but what is at issue isn’t the fact of primitive, unexplained facts. What’s at issue is which facts actually are primitive and unexplainable.Witmer concludes this section by stating:
I stress this because it is in fact always open to you, if you are defending yourself against this negative strategy whereby they aim to show that all belief systems contrary to theirs are self-undermining or incoherent, you can take advantage of this option. If they say, “But what is your basis for logic?” (and if they mean “what explains why these things are true?”), you can always say, “They just are, and that’s the end of the story. They can hardly complain that this move is never allowed, as they need to make it themselves, albeit with a different (alleged) truth.
(Ibid, 8)
Again, this shows that Witmer does not understand truly presuppositional positions. Again, something is not a presupposition just because it is claimed to be foundational. It must be foundational first.
Therefore, Witmer’s claims that theists “can hardly complain that this move is never allowed†is false. It is only “allowed†at the presuppositional level, not at something built two hundred stories above the foundation!
October 18th, 2006 at 3:00 pm
But granting this doesn’t solve Witmer of his problems, as we shall see.
? Granting what? What was he asking you to “grant” him? He was making a distinction that must be made — justifying your belief that something is true may refer back to a method or approach, whereas justifying the “T”ruth of it is different. He’s just stating a fact.
Also, what “problems” does Prof. Witmer have? Do you even have a clue as to what he thinks and why?
Ready to start “imputing” problems to the man’s worldview, and begging the question against what he really thinks, yet?
In this case, we see that Witmer has surrendered personal thought for an argument from authority. He assumes that the doctor knows what he is speaking about, and therefore Witmer trusts that what the doctor claims will come to pass.
It’s an example.
I will say one funny thing re arguments from authority — that’s all the morality you have. You tell me that something is right because an ultimate authority said so. I suppose I could go down the path of discussing what intrinsic property that authority has that makes it what it is, and how we know that authority = good = trust them…but that would be a long tangential convo.
Prof. Witmer could’ve given other examples of how beliefs can be justified, or not, and how things can be explained, or not.
An example of the argumentum ad ignorantium fallacy of the presuppositionalist is that they claim that they are somehow proven right by falsifying other worldviews, but in most cases, simply prove the ignorance of the person they’re interrogating regarding metaphysics and ontology. For instance, we both see lightning. A few seconds later, we hear thunder. You say, “I have an account for that — it’s Zeus bowling,” while I say, “I’m really not sure what makes that sound, but I believe there is a better explanation than that, and that your ‘account’ is flawed.” Aha! The PS thinks he’s shown his superiority because the other guy doesn’t know the answer to a question, and the PS [presumably] does. The PS breaks his own rule, though, when he starts to tell the other guy what is required to substantiate belief — after all, these would be subjective judgments from the PS, and not premises within the worldview of the other guy. I mentioned this in the last post. A third fellow comes along, a scientist, perhaps years later, and explains that lightning heats up the air, creating a vacuum, and you hear the same “sonic boom” as you do when jets fly overhead as air rushes back in to fill the void. The PS was wrong. The other guy was ignorant. The PS claimed he’d “falsified” the other guy’s entire worldview as “inconsistent” and that he had thus proven his own theory…
Another example that doesn’t rely upon authority is induction — I have beliefs that are justified by my own repeated, predictable experience of them.
At any rate, he is making a point that we are justified in believing some things that we cannot completely explain. Believing that logical arguments are true, so long as their premises are facts, is an example of a justified belief — as I’ve argued. Without getting into why that is so [why logic is logic], one can point to justification: incorrigibility and the self-evident nature of logic.
However, what cannot be denied is that an argument from authority is a faith-based argument.
Sure. I have no problem with that. The reason it’s justified you just explained yourself — scientific authority is earned, and consensus is a safe bet [not an absolute certainty, granted]. The question is — do people want to remain completely ignorant, or form beliefs, even if they have some low probability of turning out to be wrong?
But Witmer’s trust of the doctor does not make the claims of the doctor more sure. The doctor’s claims either are or are not valid, regardless of what Witmer believes about the doctor.
The doctor’s claims are made more sure by the authority of being a doctor, as you yourself just said, as well as Prof. Witmer seeing the kid have a fit, fulfilling the prediction.
Thus, Witmer’s argument is really that he has a good reason to trust the doctor. Again, there is nothing wrong with this approach as long as one accepts that it is an argument from authority that gives Witmer the ability to “know†something without knowing why.
I think this was painfully obvious.
I don’t see how this could be considered a “good†explanation. It’s a hypothetical explanation, yes; but “good�
His point is that we can construct plausible scenarios even when there is no evidence to support them. (I.e. God takes care of this or that difficulty)
Again, this shows that Witmer does not understand truly presuppositional positions. (Likewise, based on Daniel Morgan’s comments to my previous blog entry in this series, Daniel doesn’t understand this part either.)
I look forward to hearing more about it.
Just because someone says “X is my presupposition†does not mean X actually is his presupposition! (If presuppositionalism was that easy, everything could be claimed a presupposition!) One’s statement that something is foundational does not make it truly foundational. One must actually establish that a claim truly is presuppositional. Here’s a major hint: if your “presupposition†requires other presuppositions in order to be true, you’re not at your presuppositions yet.
Everything you just said is a part of your worldview, CalvinDude. I think you don’t understand how your own method applies in reverse: you claim there is no “neutral common ground”, right? And so you forfeit every right to tell me what I can and cannot hold as presuppositional. The only arguments you can bring against me are in my maintaining absurd, contradictory claims that arise from my presuppositions. Please tell me what is absurd or contradictory about, “Logic is a properly basic belief.” You do realize that you lose your own right to critique my worldview on the basis of your presuppositions when you engage in this system of argument?
Anyway, I’m sure we’re going to get more in depth into this, and I look forward to it.
True, Witmer could argue that I am forcing my definition of presupposition on him; but Witmer is the one who chose to write in the English language. And the terms we use have definitions. If he seeks to abandon those definitions, then he is operating from a completely different presupposition than anything he’s written so far anyway.
Now, I have to agree with you about this — we obviously have to have common definitions. However, defining what logic is, versus telling me whether it qualifies as a presupposition, are two completely different things.
Moving back, when Witmer claims that he can presuppose the trustworthiness of his senses without any basis at all, we are not yet at a presuppositional position. In order to be able to take our senses as valid for granted, one must first presuppose that our senses are accurate and that they provide a totality of information about our universe (two ideas that are subjected to much criticism already).
You just imputed, big time. “A totality of information about our universe”??? C’mon, dude. The first premise is exactly what he said in different words, you just restated it. The second premise is add-on baggage that you have to justify.
In other words, there are presuppositional requirements to saying that our senses can be taken for granted, and that is a presuppositional idea of the nature of the universe!
If we cannot trust our senses, then we will self-undermine 95% of what we know and have learned — all from reading, hearing, etc. Anyway, I’m not getting into this argument, as it’s stupid, because I know we both trust our senses.
In order to take our senses for granted, we must presuppose that there is no supernatural world. We must presuppose empiricism. We must presuppose that there cannot be anything outside of the range of our senses that could actually impact reality. All these things precede the concept that our senses are trustworthy, and therefore Witmer’s objections are groundless.
You are SO doing exactly what he described as “imputing”. Just because I say, “That picture I see over there of a corn field is not a hallucination,” now means, “There is no supernatural world?” What have you been smoking, dude?
And yet it is the backbone of his argument at this point. If his argument is to be considered by rational people, Witmer must explain this very point!
His “argument” is that some things are more trustworthy as premises than others, and some things are more “basic”, and thus more reliable, than others. He doesn’t go into a method, but you already know what he refers to.
Foundationalism, coherentism, etc., are not exactly 5-minute topics in this talk, he had to narrow it down. For your information, he gave a lot more background in person than he did on paper.
Except that I, for one, can already see something more basic than 15+16=31 at root.
It seems that you are going off on a bit of a tangent into how entities are defined in mathematics, rather than why the proposition given is true. What he’s actually asking for here is a real explanation, not just “well, see, those numbers mean…and + means add them…” He’s saying that this is how one can respond if asked, “Give me an ‘account’ for it,” in the same way that you ask for any metaphysical stuff — what you’ve given below is not even foundational in itself. What in the crap is “1″? Right? That’s the sort of depth one can plunge into (an infinite regress of justifications), and that’s exactly why you PS’s think you always “win”, because God is “at the bottom”…
It is a matter of identity and definition.
CalvinDude, what is the difference in identity and definition/convention? What you’re giving is the method you use to make a sum, which he indicated is different than “What is ‘15′? Does it exist? How? Why?”
Now Witmer could certainly argue about the concept of “identity†and “definition†and say that those are things that “just are†instead. At least that would get us closer to a basic starting point.
Aren’t those the “Laws” of logic that you love to talk about? A is A, right?
Of course; but what is at issue isn’t the fact of primitive, unexplained facts. What’s at issue is which facts actually are primitive and unexplainable.
I agree with you.
Again, this shows that Witmer does not understand truly presuppositional positions. Again, something is not a presupposition just because it is claimed to be foundational. It must be foundational first.
And in your worldview, you define God as foundational. So you rig the game and then you win and pat yourself on the back. Big whoop.
Therefore, Witmer’s claims that theists “can hardly complain that this move is never allowed†is false. It is only “allowed†at the presuppositional level, not at something built two hundred stories above the foundation!
But as you just said above, who gets to decide that something is primitive and foundational? You have to watch, or you’ll be committing external critiques rather than internal ones…you’re not allowed to do that in PS. Why is it that you think that saying, “God just is,” is more rational and justified than, “Logic just is”? Actually, we’ve beaten this horse already. Nevermind that question. But you get the point — there is no external standard by which you can judge whether my presupposition about logic, or your presupposition about God, is any more true. You appeal to many layers of authority [Bible, tradition, revelation, etc] in defining the concept of God and telling me about it in the first place, since it is obvious that there is no such thing as a universal and objective “standard” by which we can judge your concept of God. How do you know what God is? What is God defined as? How do humans get to define something which seems beyond definition?
You start using all these “big words” that have no basis in reality — omni- everythings, but you make no veridical statements whatsoever. When God becomes the explanandum, things don’t go so well. You start spinning yarn out of your butt, basically, to assert “God’s nature is such and such”. Really? And how do you know this? “Everything God does is good” — maybe in your worldview, but that’s your presupposition, not mine. Et cetera and so forth.