As we continue with Witmer, let us look at how he defines the extent of presuppositional argumentation. Witmer says:
The presuppositionalists in effect treat debates between believers and unbelievers the way a “coherentist” would. A “coherentist” is someone who thinks that the only way to evaluate a belief for its being reasonable is to see if it fits into an overall coherent framework of beliefs. This indeed seems the only option if we cannot agree on which beliefs ought to be taken for granted.Â
(ibid, 6)
Indeed, Witmer is correct that this is the only option we have available. However, I would qualify the above slightly. While we can determine if Belief A is reasonable in Worldview A, we cannot use the criteria from Worldview B, or vice versa. Therefore, in theory, it is possible for us to come to a Belief A that is consistent in Worldview A, and Belief B that is consistent in Worldview B, where Belief B is non-Belief A. That both Beliefs are consistent in their own worldview would not demonstrate which belief is reasonable between the two beliefs; “reasonableness†is defined by the worldview one accepts in the first place!
As such, Worldviews are the definition of what is reasonable within that worldview. Because they function this way, this doesn’t mean that this is the only option if “we cannot agree on which beliefs ought to be taken for granted.†Instead, this is the only option to determining reasonability even if there is agreement on which beliefs ought to be taken for granted.
Continuing:
If we did agree that certain beliefs are to be taken for granted, then we could evaluate a given belief by reference to whether or not it is appropriately supported by those beliefs that we can legitimately take for granted.(Ibid, 6)
Yet this is the same method as before. This is evaluating a belief based on the worldview the belief is rooted in. The only difference is that here the two who disagree share the same basic worldview.
Now I understand the main point that Witmer is trying to get to (I will quote the relevant portion in the next blockquote). Witmer is aiming to show the difference between “internal†and “external†argumentation; and this is valid! In fact, I agree with it 100%. However, it is unfortunate that he wasn’t just a little more precise in the above, as it could lead to some confusion regarding appropriate argumentation.
In any case, Witmer writes:
An “internal” criticism of someone’s position is that which tries to base its criticisms on premises or standards already used by that person elsewhere in his overall system. So if we criticize A’s beliefs we might criticize it by showing that what A already takes for granted as certain standards, A is not living up to his own standards. That would be an internal criticism. An “external” criticism is one that doesn’t try to make any such contact with elements already in the system.(ibid, 6)
This is, indeed, the heart of presuppositional argumentation. Arguments must be made internally if they are to be effective. Again, as I wrote above, it is possible for Worldview A to produce Belief A and Worldview B to produce Belief B, where Belief A is the direct contradiction of Belief B. If Belief A contradictions the presuppositions of Worldview A, then we have demonstrated that Worldview A is irrational via the internal critique. That is, we have assumed the presuppositions of Worldview A to argue that Belief A is inconsistent with Worldview A.
Witmer continues with an example from the Manata-Barker debate. Normally, I wouldn’t comment on this since the debate isn’t really looking at what Witmer believes; but in this case, it does form the foundation for an argument Witmer goes off on. Witmer writes:
An important point needs to be highlighted here. One can try to foist upon one’s opponent certain commitments that they don’t actually have, or that they can easily avoid, anyway. A nice example of this is found in the Manata/Barker debate I mentioned earlier. Manata pointed out that Barker makes this claim:The only way to know anything is through scientific methods.
Manata points out that if this is true, then we can ask how it applies to itself. Do we know this claim? If so, then we must know it through scientific methods. Yet it’s hard to see how that can be right. If we don’t know it, then it seems that by his own lights, his view is incoherent. This is a good criticism. What should Barker do in response? Simple: He should drop that sweeping claim about how we can know things. It’s naive and implausible besides leading to such internal incoherence.
(Ibid, 6-7)
In this case, Witmer’s advice to Barker is sound. Indeed, although Witmer does not realize it, he has at this point conceded that Manata was correct. Barker was issuing a sweeping claim that did not have a proper founding.
Unfortunately, Witmer does not realize that the presuppositional position has been verified at this point. Instead, he seeks to avoid this by writing:
Note how dropping this claim gets rid of the incoherence. I stress this because it seems that the presuppositionalist will be very likely to do this to you: They ask if you believe in laws of logic, in the reasonableness of induction, or in moral obligations, and they then ask you to give an account of these things. I can imagine them saying: “You have to have an account! Your account is presumably thus and such…” and then, after imputing this to you, pointing out some self-refutation.(Ibid, 7)
Of course, I must point out that the presuppositionalist is not “imputing†anything to the atheist. Instead, the presuppositionalist is going off what the atheist himself claimed. After all, remember in the Manata debate, Manata was simply quoting Barker.Witmer continues:
If they demand that you offer an account, or a basis, don’t just take the bait and start offering one. Instead, be very cautious in two ways. First, be cautious about what “basis” or “account” is supposed to mean. These terms tend to get people confused. …Second, be cautious in what positive declarations you make. You can always, of course, say that you are not committed to any particular “account” or “basis.”(Ibid, 7)
First, it is good advice that Witmer says the atheist should be cautious about what “basis†or “account†means. This is something that the presuppositionalist ought to be able to define fairly easily though. However, Witmer’s attempt to avoid the problem by urging one to say “you are not committed to any particular ‘account’ or ‘basis’†is simply intellectual dishonestly. It is nothing more than an attempt to defend one’s belief by appealing to ignorance when, in reality, both sides know that the atheist has some reason for why he accepts the laws of logic, morality, and induction.
These things do not occur in a vacuum, and Witmer is actually urging the atheist to not be a “freethinker.†He is urging the atheist to avoid trying to explain something.
Witmer argues this is valid because:
Indeed, you can always say that it’s part of your view that no account or basis is needed. If they say that this is not fair, that of course you have to have an account, then you can say that this is an external criticism, not an internal one, and they are begging the question: they are relying on their presuppositions about what is needed.(Ibid, 7)
But this conveniently forgets that it is the atheist who has said that it is irrational to believe in God; it is the atheist who supposedly champions knowledge over ignorance. In fact, I have yet to meet an atheist who actually believes this presupposition that Witmer advances. Indeed, it is not an external argument to point out that the atheist’s position requires him to have an account for logic. This is especially true for the atheist who claims, “One must not accept anything on faith.â€
In other words, the atheist can say what he wants about what his presuppositions are, but his statements do not make the presuppositions. Instead, how he thinks is determined by his presuppositions. One finds one’s own presuppositions not by declaring them to be so, but by seeing what is necessary to one’s thinking. Therefore, it is still possible for the presuppositionalist to disprove the atheist’s notion that the atheist has a presupposition that does not require the atheist to have a basis for his logic or morality.
October 17th, 2006 at 1:41 pm
Indeed, although Witmer does not realize it, he has at this point conceded that Manata was correct.
Why do you think that he does not realize that Manata was correct — that we can not claim, “All reliable knowledge comes via the scientific method…”????
Of course, I must point out that the presuppositionalist is not “imputing†anything to the atheist. Instead, the presuppositionalist is going off what the atheist himself claimed.
Caution is in order for generalizations, but I will concede that these debates (I’ve seen) typically result from a PS asking, “How do you justify X” and the atheist starts the long, drawn-out explanation, which the PS critiques. However, I’ve also seen people jump a little too fast at the opportunity to knock down physicalism or naturalism from unwarranted grounds — the atheist hadn’t yet made any claim that the PS imputes to them. It happens more with people like Manata, I think, who spend all their time doing this stuff.
First, it is good advice that Witmer says the atheist should be cautious about what “basis†or “account†means. This is something that the presuppositionalist ought to be able to define fairly easily though.
I don’t really think so. I think that, just as you have still insisted that logic cannot be basic, many other PS’s confuse necessary ontological and metaphysical commitments.
However, Witmer’s attempt to avoid the problem by urging one to say “you are not committed to any particular ‘account’ or ‘basis’†is simply intellectual dishonestly. It is nothing more than an attempt to defend one’s belief by appealing to ignorance when, in reality, both sides know that the atheist has some reason for why he accepts the laws of logic, morality, and induction.
Wait just a minute, though. The whole PS argument is, “You, atheist, are incoherent…let me show you…just go ahead and tell me what your ‘account/basis’ is for X”. This is a claim that the atheist is self-refuting.
Suppose said atheist replies, “I am really not sure about how and why X exists, but I believe that it does. (my own claim, when X = logic) I am not yet educated enough in ontology, metaphysics, and philosophy to give substantial explanations such as you seem to want.” You cannot then turn around and say, “Aha! You’re incoherent.” All you can say is, “You have an unjustified belief,” or, “you’re using faith!” This is a far cry from incoherence, and you know it. Prof. Witmer is making a sound point — it is one thing to accuse someone of believing in something without adequately justifying it, but another thing to accuse someone of holding beliefs which are absurd and irrational due to internal incoherence.
PS is all about the latter. The worst you can do is accuse me of being ignorant and too gullible, regarding logic’s “account”. Remember, if you take it the next step and tell me, “But you have to give me more!” you’re begging the question against my worldview, as I don’t hold that presupposition. Fighting PS with PS is fun ;)
Game, set, match.
These things do not occur in a vacuum, and Witmer is actually urging the atheist to not be a “freethinker.†He is urging the atheist to avoid trying to explain something.
Now you are being dishonest. Read his words:
I think that he is making a point that too many atheists (and theists) are too cocky and self-confident to admit and see: all of us can be corrected, or at least have our position critiqued, in the sense that our premises are [nearly] never “a given”. And what he’s really saying is that this is the heart of your method — a critical method of making someone commit to something, then if they admit error or that a weakness exists, you pretend that your own system has none, although they can be pointed out to you and you can simply ignore them ["oh, logic isn't dependent on God, it's God's nature..." is somehow an "account" for logic?] or pretend them away.
But this conveniently forgets that it is the atheist who has said that it is irrational to believe in God; it is the atheist who supposedly champions knowledge over ignorance.
And this inconveniently forgets that the PS entire argument/defense is about, “you can’t impose your presuppositions on me,” but you appear not to like it when that is reciprocated…what’s good for the goose, and all that.
Since the PS is the one making the claim about the atheist’s incoherence; therefore, the PS has the onus to prove it. You just don’t seem to like this fact, and you want the atheist to prove it for you by supplying you with enough ammunition (like Barker’s sweeping claim) to take the burden away from you. Logic exists. You telling me I have to be able to get far into metaphysics is your own problem, your own presupposition, not mine.
In fact, I have yet to meet an atheist who actually believes this presupposition that Witmer advances.
That we ought to want to explain things, but realize that “committing” to some interpretation of logic (say, nominalism, or conceptualism), when a person basically dares us to try to put on the philosopher’s tunic, may get us into trouble with respect to one argument or another, if we haven’t done our homework? I’m humble enough to admit that I had done precious little looking into such things before meeting the PS’s. I’m glad I did, as I have read a little more, and find a lot more peace of mind from it.
Indeed, it is not an external argument to point out that the atheist’s position requires him to have an account for logic.
And why is that? What is it about atheism, simply not believing in God, that “requires” anything? I think you’re injecting a few presuppositions on me, here.
This is especially true for the atheist who claims, “One must not accept anything on faith.â€
Well, I wouldn’t make that claim, if by “faith” we mean, “trust, unsubstantiated belief…”
In other words, the atheist can say what he wants about what his presuppositions are, but his statements do not make the presuppositions.
CD, are you on crack?
Instead, how he thinks is determined by his presuppositions.
If that’s the case, then we can’t change our presuppositions by thinking about them.
One finds one’s own presuppositions not by declaring them to be so, but by seeing what is necessary to one’s thinking.
We “find” our presuppositions by taking things to the “bottom” of well-reasoned argument, and comparing and contrasting different possible starting points. All of us look at those and make a rational judgment:
i) does logic exist?
ii) are there moral facts?
iii) how do we know that the universe won’t suddenly change tomorrow?
We look at these and say, well, there may not be absolute certainty in explaining why any of these things are true, but if these things aren’t true, then we can’t really be sure of anything else, either.
Therefore, it is still possible for the presuppositionalist to disprove the atheist’s notion that the atheist has a presupposition that does not require the atheist to have a basis for his logic or morality.
Now hold the gravy train. You can disprove my notion that I can have a presupposition that doesn’t require a basis? I would love to see that. After all, CalvinDude, presuppositions are, definitionally, “to require as an antecedent in logic or fact; undefended premises”. How can you get “before” my starting point?
Plus, you already tried with logic, but didn’t fare so well. I’m still convinced that logic exists, and I’m not sure how or why, but I’m also convinced that I don’t need to know in order to justify that statement — since logic is incorrigible and self-evident. But you can keep firing away if you wish.