Daniel Morgan has asked me to respond to a talk D. Gene Witmer gave September 26, 2006 for the AAFSA. The link to it can be found here. Note, in the below if something is in blockquotes then I am just cutting and pasting it. Any spelling, grammatical errors in those sections are in the original; if I quote it in the middle of a sentence “like this†then you may assume any errors are my own typing.Witmer begins his critique of Presuppositionalism by acknowledging that he isn’t very familiar with it. He writes:
At a talk last year to the Undergraduate Philosophy Society I was asked a question about responding to “presuppositionalist” advocates; this threw me for a loop, as I didn’t know who these people were. After some investigation, it became clear that there is a position quite popular online but mostly invisible in the academy, one that is quite vocal and confident….
Caution: While I think my attempted characterization here is relatively accurate, I’ve hardly devoted enormous time to making a study of the presuppositionalist position. There are some differences in positions held by Christians associated with the presuppositionalist label, and some of these might be interesting or important. So what I offer is surely oversimplified in various respects, but I expect it is still true to what most of these advocates hold and how they want to argue.
(Witmer Talk p. 1)
First, I would definitely acknowledge that presuppositionalism is “mostly invisible in the academy.†This is because presuppositionalism is grounded in a Calvinistic worldview, one that takes the doctrine of Total Depravity seriously (that is, the idea that all men are born depraved in all aspects of their being, including their thinking). If someone does not believe in the depravity of mankind, it is going to be difficult to convince them of the need for someone to have their mind renewed before they can understand theism.
But its lack of popularity doesn’t make it wrong. In fact, I would argue that its truth is the reason that people reject it—they do not want to agree with the basic starting point that all men must begin correct thinking in God. All men are sinners, and as such all men long for autonomy in thought. Therefore, demonstrating the truth that men are not autonomous in thinking is going to create an automatic knee-jerk reaction (especially among non-Calvinists) against the position, regardless of the strength of the position.
Interestingly enough, Witmer does argue that the presuppositionalist position works well in a debate. He writes:
The [Barker-Manata] debate made it clear that presuppositionalists can be effective in throwing advocates of atheism off balance, leaving them disoriented and at apparently a terrible disadvantage in responding. …[I]t’s worth looking at the presuppositionalist arguments and trying to offer some advice on dealing with their challenges.(ibid, 1)
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Witmer quickly clarifies that he does not accept the truth of presuppositionalism:
I don’t mean to suggest by this that I think any of their arguments are good or persuasive, but I do think that they can be confusing, and if one is not cognizant of their general strategies and positions, it could be very difficult to know how to handle oneself.
(ibid, 1)
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We can see from this that Witmer’s idea is that presuppositionalism works well in a debate only because it is confusing. However, what is confusing is not presuppositionalism; it is the atheist’s position! In other words, since presuppositionalism attacks a part of atheism that most atheists have considered unassailable, it seems “confusing†to the atheist. Why attack what we assume must be true no matter what? they wonder, and such leaves them confused. This will be further demonstrated as we continue through the rest of Witmer’s talk.Witmer begins his definition of presuppositionalism by pointing out two positions that are true. First, unbelievers actually know that God exists but willfully blind themselves to this; secondly, that this knowledge still comes out in various ways that belie the atheist position. Wittmer writes of these:
The first psychological claim is important as it makes a big difference in how presuppositionalists approach unbelievers. Suppose you think that someone already knows that P and refuses to admit it; in that case you’re certainly more likely to treat him with disrespect or anger. Indeed, the temptation to treat him with scorn or abuse will be greater yet if you think the refusal to admit that P is due to some kind of immoral motivation. (Imagine how angry you might get at the corporate driven scientists who insists that, say, nicotine is not really addictive.)(ibid, 2)
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This, however, isn’t an argument. It’s an emotional plea that, in itself, relies on someone treating another person with anger and contempt! In other words, it boils down to, “If you accept this position, you’re more likely to be a hate filled bigot!†Implied at the end of this is the idea that, “Since you accept this position, you are a hate filled bigot.†Naturally, it’s couched in terms of probability. You’re “more likely†to do that; the “temptation†is stronger.Unfortunately, the behavior of some on-line also gives credence to this emotional argument Witmer puts forth. But even if we grant him the truth of it here, it is not an argument against the validity of the presuppositional point of view! The only way it could be would be if Witmer is arguing that the truth must be non-offensive. And that is a position that I highly doubt he holds to.
Continuing with Witmer:
On the presuppositionalist view, we already know that God exists; as a result, as they see their job, it is not so much as to offer an argument. After all, if we already know this claim to be true, we don’t need an argument. Rather, they see their job as getting us to admit what we already know. Their goal is more akin to using torture to extract a confession than it is to offer a rationally persuasive argument.(ibid, 2)
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The last sentence is nothing more than a slanderous attempt to poison the well while also being completely non sequitur. There is absolutely nothing akin to torture at all in the presuppositionalist argument, and it doesn’t follow that it would be from the previous sentences in the paragraph.Furthermore, that last sentence demonstrates that Witmer is engaging in the very behavior he will condemn in Vincent Cheung! When Witmer labels presuppositionalism as “the position [that] encourages seeing others as willful ‘morons’†he forgets that his position is the one that sees presuppositionalists as the folks who would use torture to convince someone of their position!
I must ask, why would it be wrong from Cheung to call someone a moron when you are calling Cheung a torturer?
In any case, Witmer continues:
It’s worth noting, too, that the presuppositionalist view of unbelievers helps explain why the actual arguments they do offer are in fact as bad as they are. They don’t really see argumentation as the main point, as they’re just trying to get you to agree to what you already know.(ibid, 3)
But if it is true that presuppositionalist arguments are “as bad as they are†then one must wonder why Witmer spends so much time presenting a defense against them. One must wonder why the debate between Barker and Manata came out so poorly for Barker (as Witmer himself acknowledged).Witmer then moves on to John Frame’s illustration of a paranoid person who will not accept any proof against his position since, naturally, that is part of the conspiracy against him. After quoting Frame, Witmer concludes: “This is how the presuppositionalist sees us: as using completely out-of-whack background ideas about the world and sticking to them resolutely†(ibid, 4). I merely point out that that is exactly how atheists see Christians too. Just spend five minutes in an atheist chatroom as a Christian and see how many times you’re said to hold to “out-of-whack background ideas†and that you hold to them “resolutely†denying everything that isn’t of faith, ignoring reason…etc. And the fact of the matter is that one of the two groups is right. This is nothing to be ashamed of; this is simple logical deduction. Either the atheist has an out-of-whack worlview, or the theist does. It’s that simple.
Witmer continues:
On the one hand, the presuppositionalist thinks that the unbeliever indeed uses standards of reasoning that presuppose God’s existence, but they also think that there is no common ground between the believer and unbeliever.(ibid, 4)
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This is slightly off. It’s not that there is no “common ground†between believer and unbeliever; it is that there is no neutral ground. In point of fact, since the unbeliever has to presuppose God in order to say anything, there is common ground—but the common ground is theistic ground, not neutral ground.And, to be fair, this is close to what Witmer gets to when he concludes that presuppositionalists must think there is a conscious lack of common ground, but an unconscious common ground.
Witmer continues:
The presuppositionalist picture, then, has an internal logic to it; it should not be dismissed as simply crazy.(ibid, 4)
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I am glad for the concession, but this seems to fly in the face of Witmer’s earlier claim that presuppositionalist arguments are “as bad as they are.â€Â They are only bad when one ignores the internal logic.
October 14th, 2006 at 11:20 am
Therefore, demonstrating the truth that men are not autonomous in thinking is going to create an automatic knee-jerk reaction (especially among non-Calvinists) against the position, regardless of the strength of the position.
The question is really twofold:
1) Why hold any particular premise? Especially this one? What good reason do you have to suppose this?
2) Is this premise a bit self-undermining? Can the premise be proven wrong? Any argument I try to bring against you, even if sound, is “just the result of corrupted thinking” if it contradicts your committed “standard” — the Bible. But what basis can you stand on to say that you know what you know (uncorrupted thinking)? You have to assume that human beings are able to “detect” truth in the one case (in the BIble) and not elsewhere (things that are contrary). Therefore, their “reasoning faculties” cannot really be at fault, can they?
The last sentence is nothing more than a slanderous attempt to poison the well while also being completely non sequitur.
Poison the well? Perhaps.
Non sequitur? Please explain.
There is absolutely nothing akin to torture at all in the presuppositionalist argument, and it doesn’t follow that it would be from the previous sentences in the paragraph.
It follows that the *goal* of PS (if the opponent already knows God exists) is to get someone to admit what they know, rather than to convince them that they are wrong. His analogy may have been a bit “over the top”, but it wasn’t inaccurate or false — I’ve witnessed many of these “confession extractions” myself first hand.
But even if we grant him the truth of it here, it is not an argument against the validity of the presuppositional point of view
Again, he admits as much in simply saying it is good to keep in mind the mindset of one’s debate opponent in order to have a good idea of what to expect. He is just making an inference (and a justified one) from the premise of PS and from observing how *some* PS’s argue: that it isn’t seen (by them) as a burden to convince the other position that the PS position is true [since the opponent "already knows"], but instead to use any [asserted] areas of ignorance or weakness in the opponents position as further evidence that the opponent *already knows* they’re wrong.
since presuppositionalism attacks a part of atheism that most atheists have considered unassailable
I don’t know that PS really “attacks” anything — it asserts many things about itself, but it mostly picks at areas of ignorance and assumption. It doesn’t present positive arguments in 90% of cases I’ve seen. It just attempts to show that someone is confused or cannot properly justify their own position [which is obviously not an argument that your position is correct].
it seems “confusing†to the atheist. Why attack what we assume must be true no matter what?
It seems “confusing”, period, to look at this:
0) Logic just exists;
And assert instead “My premises are “more accounted for”, or “better”, or whatever the hell you’d call it:
1) Logic is contingent upon God’s existence,
2) God just exists
But if it is true that presuppositionalist arguments are “as bad as they are†then one must wonder why Witmer spends so much time presenting a defense against them.
But you already quoted his motive — he said that the method is effective at causing confusion. A lot of the reason for this is the method is passive — it requires the opposing party to spend a great deal of time laying things out in a rational fashion, and all you have to do is try to find a single part of it that is weak or that the person is unsure of. In philosophy, it’s always easier to critique an argument than to make one, right?