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I just got home from watching The Nativity Story.  All in all, I would definitely recommend it.  First, some quick pros and cons:

Pros.

1) Very well written!  The characters were believable, and the cultural context was explained quite nicely (although see the first con below)

2) It wasn’t cheese-ified!  That’s right, the angel visitations, etc. didn’t take place with uber-Hollywood special effects.  (Now I should point out that the version we saw wasn’t the final cut–hopefully they won’t be stupid and change this part of it!)

3) There was no blatant heresy in it, even in hidden form (like a certain other Jesus film that smuggled in the stations of the cross, for instance…).

4) It was believable.  It showed rational linkages between events rather than the all too often (especially on the atheist side of the aisle) assumptions made about events.

Cons.

1) A steep learning curve if one has no familiarity at all with 1C Palestine; shouldn’t be a problem for most Christians, but some people might wonder about the Temple ceremonies, etc.

2) Some of the order of events were changed for purely Hollywood reasons.  For instance, we talked with the Producer of the film (he was there at the screening) and he mentioned that they were originally not even going to do the Magnificant but the Catholic advisors protested.  They put it in, but not where it occurs in Scripture.  A minor point, of course–for Hollywood you have to take some creative license.  Still, I prefer theological soundness over Hollywood endings.

3) The manger scene was the only scene that allowed for Hollywood cheese.  I think it was a little overdone, but it might be fixed in the final cut.  It probably won’t bother Christians, but if you’re going to take your atheist friends to watch it I know they’ll be gagging at the point due to the cheesiness rather than due to the message.

So, with those out of the way….

I would give it an A- over all.  Could use a little improvement, but in terms of quality it ranks up there with most other good movies I’ve seen (not a knock-your-socks-off GREAT film, but still good).  The three magi actually provided some comic relief, but it wasn’t overdone.  It was appropriate and fit what you would see between three close friends (i.e. some semi-sarcastic jabs, etc.).  The scene where Mary’s marriage to Joseph was announced to Mary was greatly done too–it fit the historical context of arranged marriages and you got to see some insight into that.  Of course, I think part of Mary’s reaction in the film was 21st Centurified since all the people at that time knew they were going into arranged marriages; but still, it illustrated it quite nicely without making it appear to be some stupid tradition that only whackos did.  And the struggle Joseph went through when he had to weigh charging Mary with adultery or pretending the child was his was well done too.

Finally, the nice thing about the movie is that it also showed that Joseph was a righteous man!  That’s right, I think the Catholics have hijacked the Christmas story with their deificiation of Mary and they only focus on her.  This story gave you a human Joseph who was, nevertheless, a Godly man.  He actually is one of the great heros of the story, and that’s something that is missing in a lot of Jesus films (mainly because Joseph was probably dead by the time Jesus began His ministry and, since most movies are focusing on Jesus’s death, Joseph is sort of an historical footnote.)

So I would definitely recommend it.  Of course, as I watched it I constantly thought, “I know what Daniel Morgan would say at this point.”  :-)  But I think even atheists such as he might find this movie worthwhile to watch (at least it’s not fluffy cheese fru-fru stuff), and (probably most comforting to the atheists) it’s not “preachy.”  All it does is require you to suspend disbelief for the sake of the movie–something every movie does (e.g. if you watch The Matrix while refusing the suspend disbelief that the world could possibly be a computer, you’re not going to “get” the movie; but suspending disbelief for the duration of the movie to get the plot doesn’t require one to suspend disbelief forever, of course).  This doesn’t mean that I would say The Nativity Scene is a great “evangelism” movie, but at least it’s a movie that is not going to get slapped with the anti-semitism red herring.  I think it has a wider audience appeal, and at the very least would give people something to talk about.

By the way, check out this new creed (thanks Floggy!!!–excerpts follow):

We believe in Marxfreudanddarwin
We believe everything is OK
as long as you don’t hurt anyone,
to the best of your definition of hurt,
and to the best of your knowledge.

…

Jesus was a good man
just like Buddha, Mohammed, and ourselves.
He was a good moral teacher
although we think His good morals were bad.

We believe that all religions are basically the same–
at least the one that we read was.
They all believe in love and goodness.
They only differ on matters of
creation, sin, heaven, hell, God, and salvation.

…

We believe that man is essentially good.
It’s only his behavior that lets him down.
This is the fault of society.
Society is the fault of conditions.
Conditions are the fault of society.

We believe that each man must find the truth that is right for him.
Reality will adapt accordingly.
The universe will readjust.
History will alter.
We believe that there is no absolute truth
excepting the truth that there is no absolute truth.

We believe in the rejection of creeds,
and the flowering of individual thought.

Since I’m currently wrapping up Part 6 of my response to Witmer (which should be posted either tonight or, more likely, tomorrow) and that part is going to deal with morality, I’ve been thinking a bit on many atheist objections (not just Witmer’s) to the Christian idea of morality, especially as it concerns my own position, a derrivative of the Divine Command Theory.  Atheists often argue it is arbitrary for God to ground morality in His nature.  Therefore, I present this analogy (which, as an analogy, is not going to be 100% exact, but which ought to convey the point):

I don’t like spinach.  This is part of my nature.  I cannot choose to like spinach (although I can choose to eat it or not).

Is my dislike of spinach arbitrary or is it simply a reflection of my nature?

On the other hand, I like Diet Pepsi.  Again, I cannot choose whether or not I am going to like it; I just do or I don’t.

Is my liking of Diet Pepsi arbitary or is it simply a reflection of my nature?

I do not whimsically choose what I will or will not like; I either like or I do not like.  My likes are determined by my nature.  Certain things just appeal to me more than other things do.  This is not arbitrariness–this is simply me.

So, if God likes for people to obey His commands and He dislikes when they do not, can we actually argue that it is arbitary of God to do so?  Is it not more accurately explained by the fact that God’s moral commands are simply a reflection of God’s nature?

Yeah, well…there’s thing thing called LIFE!

So what if I don’t have one?  It’s still my excuse!

Actually, I have a good reason for not blogging yet this week.  It’s called work.  Normally, we get about 60 “batches” of work to do on a Monday.  Yesterday, it was 105!  Add to that the fact that I got a call from a friend who mentioned that another friend we haven’t seen in about 5 years was in town visiting and wanted to get together at 6:30 last night, and that meant that I couldn’t even blog after work!

Of course, the big downer is that the first game of the season that I couldn’t watch, the Avs had to go and cream L.A. 6-1.  I mean, I’m glad they won…but I woulda liked to have seen it, just so I could jump in the chat channel and yell at Mutato: SVATOS!!!!  (If you don’t get this, too bad.)

Anyway, I’ll attempt to blog more later on today.  Tonight, through work, I’m going to be able to watch an advanced screening of The Nativity Story.  Not really sure if I’m looking forward to it or not yet.  “Christian” Hollywood movies tend to…what’s the word I’m looking for?  Oh yeah: SUCK.  But we shall see (needless to say, I’m gonna blog about that after I see it, whether you want me to or not–after all, this is my blog!).

But for now, time to start processing more batches.  (Batches?  We doan need no stinkin’ batches!)

Thanks to the others in the channel for pointing this ad out.  It’s one of the funniest things I’ve seen in a long time:

http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=6206168244750210137

Since Witmer brought up the idea of Platonism, and since Daniel Morgan [see update below] has also claimed to be a Platonist when it comes to the laws of logic, I thought a brief illustration of what Platonism is would be in order before continuing with my response to Witmer.Platonism is, simply, the idea that there are universal forms (or archetypes) that exist as abstractions, and material objects are “shadows” of those universals. As shadows, they don’t correspond 100% to the universals, and thus there are variations.

For example, suppose a red fire truck drives past you. There is a universal form of “redness” that the color of the fire truck is a shadow of. Likewise, there is a universal form of “fire truck”ness that the fire truck corresponds to. Or to take another illustration, if you see a tree, it is but a representation of the abstract treeness. It’s green leaves are shadows of the universal greenness and universal leafness.

In other words, all material objects are merely “copies” of the archetypical forms for each object. As such, Plato argues that the copies are not true knowledge. Instead, to find true knowledge, one must consult the archetypes. Thus, Plato becomes an idealist (arguing that the immaterial forms hold primacy over materialistic instances of those forms).

Platonism cannot coexist with materialism. Materialism is the idea that everything either is, or reduces to, physical objects, causes and effects. Plato, on the other hand, argues that these physical objects (and by extension their causes/effects) are shadow-forms of an archetypical form that is immaterial.

And herein lies the problem for the materialistic atheist who would seek to invoke Plato to avoid the Presuppositional argument. He is, at this point, stating that the immaterial holds primacy over the material world; and as such, he cannot be a materialist anymore. In short, he refutes his own worldview.

For further research:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Platonism
http://www.english.hawaii.edu/criticalink/plato/terms/forms.html

UPDATE: in his latest comment, Morgan said: “BTW, in my earlier comment regarding Platonism, I want you to note that I am not actually advocating Platonism, but asking you if it is necessarily contradictory to frame the ontological conditions as I have…”

Witmer now moves into the realm of logic, which is his second weakest response (his first weakest being morality, which will be addressed later). After a brief look at the modus ponens law of logic and the troubles it brings forth for atheists who try to say logic is conventional or mental, he entitles section 10: “What’s wrong with Platonist atheism?” (Ibid, 9).

You mean, what’s wrong with an atheist who is not a Platonist in any aspect of his philosophy to suddenly grasp for Platonism because it’s the only thing he can think of that isn’t refuted by the Presuppositional argument, but who then promptly ignores Platonism when he returns to his regularly scheduled worldview? The answer is in the question.

In any case, titles aside, here’s what Witmer argues:

One thing that atheist can do is simply say that the laws of logic are unexplained, primitive facts in the world. They don’t need any further explanation; they just are. What we might call “Platonist atheism” is just this sort of atheistic view.(Ibid, 9)

Again, Witmer resorts to mere claims. He does not establish how the laws of logic are “unexplained, primitive facts in the world.” He instead still seems to think that one can create a presupposition simply by declaring it to be so.

Witmer says:

This may be thought inconsistent with atheism if you think atheism requires a certain kind of materialism according to which everything that exists is in space and time. But there is no reason to insist an atheist be a materialist in this sense.(Ibid, 9)

But there is reason to insist an atheist be a materialist when the atheist claims to be a materialist. Now certainly, there are atheists who are not materialists in this sense. However, one cannot begin with a logic not based in materialism and then conclude a materialistic worldview. Such shows an automatic presuppositional failure. Therefore, those atheists who are materialists (and I’ve met many) cannot use the Platonist escape route.

On the other hand, those who would use the Platonist escape route are no longer able to argue against God on materialistic principles! To do so is to commit intellectual suicide.

Witmer unwittingly exposes his ultimate purpose here though, for he continues:

Of course, you might not like Platonist atheism. Maybe you’d like something more satisfying. But it’s certainly available as an option. One could explore other explanations but hold out this one is always what you can revert to if the other explanations fail.(Ibid, 9, emphasis his)

But this is flat out false. This explanation is only available to revert to if it does not refute the rest of the atheist’s position! In other words, if you don’t like Platonist atheism (presumably because you’re a materialist), then you cannot revert to it in an attempt to escape a presuppositional argument without proving that your worldview is inconsistent, incoherent, and self-refuting.Witmer, it appears, seems more interested in winning debates than he does in understanding the truth. Here, he is proposing nothing more than a debate tactic to get an atheist out of a bad position.

Continuing:

The presuppositionalist cannot complain that this is unacceptable, of course, since he has his own unexplained thing in his system, namely, God and his nature.(Ibid, 9)

But at question is not whether there are unexplained things in a system; at question is whether a person’s unexplained things disprove their own position. Therefore, the presuppostionalist is perfectly justified in complaining that an atheist plugs a hole in his worldview by inserting something that refutes his worldview.

Witmer then tries to demonstrate that the presuppositional argument for logic being grounded in God is wrong. He quotes an argument from CARM. I’m not going to get into great detail on his critique of that argument since I’m critiquing Witmer’s critique of presuppositionalism in general, not his critique of CARM. Besides, I’m sure that Daniel Morgan and I will get into a discussion on my own defense of the theistic position anyway. Likewise, I am not going to deal with Witmer’s claims regarding induction (as induction is not a part of my arguments either).

Lynchedburg, VA–Members of The Calvinist Jihad stormed Bondage University today with shouts of ”Calvin Ahkbar!” after being notified that an interview students of the university had conducted with arch-uber Calvinist Jihadist, James White will not be aired as promised.

Ergun Caner, the inventer (in name only) of The Calvinist Jihad, was quoted as saying:

The difference is, Muslims know when to quit…

The Calvinist Jihad decided to prove him correct by detonating en mass outside Caner’s office.  Before doing so, they pointed out that it was Bondage University who was acting more like a Jihadist state in supressing free speech.  As one Calvinist Jihadist stated: “There is no theology but TULIP, and Calvin is his prophet!”

The Calvinists were fended off before detonation by quick action on Caner’s part, who pointed out, “You don’t have any bombs on you.”  Caner, the former Muslim now turned anti-Calvinist, then used every tactic he could conceive of, including lies, distortions, and suppression of the opposition, all done in the righteous name of Jesus of course, to try to convince the Calvinists that the Regulative Principle was of Satan.  After sticking his fingers in his ears and screaming, “LA LA LA LA LA!” as loudly as he could, Caner managed to frighten the Calvinists into converting to Southern Baptistism and abstainance from alcohol.

Caner warned that other Calvinist Jihadis were still at large, and could strike from any blog.  Today, he recommended that the Internet be banned from Bondage University, as it could lead to someone accidentally finding an on-line Bible to read, thereby becoming infected with the possibility of actually seeing John 6, Romans 9, or Ephesians 2.

Caner also sent out a notification that Bondage students should look behind every nook, crany, and Bible just in case a Calvinist Jihadist had sneaked onto campus when he was busy laughing with Dr. Falwell.

MCCAIN ON POSSIBLE DEM TAKEOVER: ‘I think I’d just commit suicide’…

Witmer continues by giving us an example of two types of meanings behind “justify” (note to Roman Catholics, I’m not using the theological term here) and “account.” He says:

If I ask you for a basis for your belief that (for example) 15+16=31, one thing I might be asking for is a justification or argument for that belief. Why believe it’s true? In response to this I might present to you the process by which I calculated the sum. The other thing I might be asking for is an explanation of its truth: why is it true? In response to this I might say that numbers have their relational properties essentially, perhaps; this question is harder to answer in the case in question.

(Ibid, 7)

This can, indeed, be a valid distinction to make. As such, it is important that the presuppositionalist be able to specify which meaning he intends. But granting this doesn’t solve Witmer of his problems, as we shall see.

Witmer continues:

One could have good reason to believe something is true while still finding it mysterious why it’s true. So, for instance, suppose my doctor calls me up one day and tells me, “Listen, I’m in a rush and I can’t explain, but your student So-and-so is going to have a fit this afternoon, probably during your class, and when this happens you need to react immediately and call the paramedics.” And then he hangs up. Now I have a good reason to believe this student will have a fit, but I have no idea why he will have a fit.

(Ibid, 7)

In this case, we see that Witmer has surrendered personal thought for an argument from authority. He assumes that the doctor knows what he is speaking about, and therefore Witmer trusts that what the doctor claims will come to pass.

There is nothing wrong with this approach in general. It is certainly impossible for any person in one lifetime to become an expert on everything! Therefore, we are forced to move to arguments on authority at some point.

However, what cannot be denied is that an argument from authority is a faith-based argument. In the above, Witmer does not actually have good reason to assume that something would actually happen to one of his students because he, presumably, isn’t a medical technician. Instead, he says he has a good reason to trust the doctor who has made the claims. But Witmer’s trust of the doctor does not make the claims of the doctor more sure. The doctor’s claims either are or are not valid, regardless of what Witmer believes about the doctor.

Thus, Witmer’s argument is really that he has a good reason to trust the doctor. Again, there is nothing wrong with this approach as long as one accepts that it is an argument from authority that gives Witmer the ability to “know” something without knowing why.

Let us continue:

One could also have a good explanation for something’s being true without having any good reason to believe it is true in the first place. So, for instance, suppose that I speculate that someone I know (but haven’t seen in years) has just been murdered by her husband; I have no reason to believe this, it’s just an idle speculation. Even so, I might be able to suggest a good explanation for it. If she’s been murdered, one thing that could explain this is her husband’s tendency to alcoholism and extreme jealousy.

(Ibid, 8)

I don’t see how this could be considered a “good” explanation. It’s a hypothetical explanation, yes; but “good”?

Continuing:

Notice that our discussion earlier of beliefs that we take for granted indicates that some beliefs might be reasonable without argument. So if my belief that my senses are mostly trustworthy is to be taken for granted, then, if someone insists on a basis for this, I can of course say, “there is no basis; this is one of the things I take for granted.”

(Ibid, 8)

Again, this shows that Witmer does not understand truly presuppositional positions. (Likewise, based on Daniel Morgan’s comments to my previous blog entry in this series, Daniel doesn’t understand this part either.)

Just because someone says “X is my presupposition” does not mean X actually is his presupposition! (If presuppositionalism was that easy, everything could be claimed a presupposition!) One’s statement that something is foundational does not make it truly foundational. One must actually establish that a claim truly is presuppositional. Here’s a major hint: if your “presupposition” requires other presuppositions in order to be true, you’re not at your presuppositions yet.

True, Witmer could argue that I am forcing my definition of presupposition on him; but Witmer is the one who chose to write in the English language. And the terms we use have definitions. If he seeks to abandon those definitions, then he is operating from a completely different presupposition than anything he’s written so far anyway.

Moving back, when Witmer claims that he can presuppose the trustworthiness of his senses without any basis at all, we are not yet at a presuppositional position. In order to be able to take our senses as valid for granted, one must first presuppose that our senses are accurate and that they provide a totality of information about our universe (two ideas that are subjected to much criticism already). In other words, there are presuppositional requirements to saying that our senses can be taken for granted, and that is a presuppositional idea of the nature of the universe!

In order to take our senses for granted, we must presuppose that there is no supernatural world. We must presuppose empiricism. We must presuppose that there cannot be anything outside of the range of our senses that could actually impact reality. All these things precede the concept that our senses are trustworthy, and therefore Witmer’s objections are groundless.

Continuing:

(Again, there’s a good question as to why some things should be taken for granted and others can’t; that’s a deep question that I don’t want to try to tackle here.)

(Ibid, 8)

And yet it is the backbone of his argument at this point. If his argument is to be considered by rational people, Witmer must explain this very point!

Witmer continues:

In the same way there are truths that don’t have any deeper explanation. So, perhaps the right answer to “why is it that 15+16=31?” is just “That’s just the way it is; there’s no further explanation.”

(Ibid, 8)

Except that I, for one, can already see something more basic than 15+16=31 at root. It is correct because of the Law of Identity. 1 = 1. We define the number 2 as 1 + 1, etc. We could just as simply define ^ as 1 + 1; the symbol doesn’t matter. What matters is the identity of the defining unit, in this case 1. Therefore, 15+16 is simply another manner of writing 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + … It is a matter of identity and definition.

Now Witmer could certainly argue about the concept of “identity” and “definition” and say that those are things that “just are” instead. At least that would get us closer to a basic starting point.

Witmer continues:

Just as it’s hard to see how one could avoid taking some beliefs for granted, it’s hard to see how one could avoid allowing that some facts are just primitive or unexplained in this fashion.

(Ibid, 8)

Of course; but what is at issue isn’t the fact of primitive, unexplained facts. What’s at issue is which facts actually are primitive and unexplainable.Witmer concludes this section by stating:

I stress this because it is in fact always open to you, if you are defending yourself against this negative strategy whereby they aim to show that all belief systems contrary to theirs are self-undermining or incoherent, you can take advantage of this option. If they say, “But what is your basis for logic?” (and if they mean “what explains why these things are true?”), you can always say, “They just are, and that’s the end of the story. They can hardly complain that this move is never allowed, as they need to make it themselves, albeit with a different (alleged) truth.

(Ibid, 8)

Again, this shows that Witmer does not understand truly presuppositional positions. Again, something is not a presupposition just because it is claimed to be foundational. It must be foundational first.

Therefore, Witmer’s claims that theists “can hardly complain that this move is never allowed” is false. It is only “allowed” at the presuppositional level, not at something built two hundred stories above the foundation!