CalvinDude.com

Although a lot will depend on whatever I feel like at the time, I’m predicting that this blog will go into a bit of a slow down through November.  After all, I’ll be working on the NaNoWriMo challenge, and we’re also getting more and more into our busy season at work.  So I might not be as active.

Consider yourselves warned!

I just caught this over at Triablogue: TANG & TAG

In the midst of the post, we read Interlocuter’s question to Steve:

“Further, and I don’t mean to but you in a difficult spot with the other contributors and supporters here, how do you feel about people like Paul Manata and Peter Pike/Calvindude who seem to think that TAG is a done deal? It seems they believe this pretty dogmatically. You, as I understand it, are a close personal friend of John Frame, the living guru of presuppositionalism. Do you believe the view of TAG that you have presented here is more representative of his views or do you think Manata and Pike are closer?”

Steve’s response re: my position (read the rest of it on the T-blogue too; it’s good stuff) was:

I can’t speak for Peter Pike. However, Peter isn’t dealing with some ideal, hypothetical opponent.

Rather, he’s dealing with real opponents like Daniel Morgan and John Loftus.

We can only debate the people who debate us, and not some Olympian abstraction.

And, from what I’ve read of him, Peter Pike doesn’t have any great difficulty getting the better of the argument.

So even assuming, for the sake of argument, that he’s pretty dogmatic about the sufficiency of TAG, it’s not as if his opponents have given him much occasion to doubt his dogmatism. If anything, prolonged exposure to the general level of the opposition simply confirms his operating assumptions. But he will have to speak for himself–and he’s more than welcome to do so.

I’ve actually been meaning to put something on this for a while, so I guess now’s as good a time as any to post on it.  I’ll put it here on my blog too so no one can accuse the response of being posted (as to misrepresent my position) by one of the crazy “anonymous” folks who like to troll and yawn a lot.

A little biography.  My first exposure to philosophy came during my Medieval History class when the prof actually made us read such works as Machiavelli and Descartes.  I instantly fell in love with philosophy and began to devour as many works as I could get my hands on.  The first real hints of the Presuppositional argumentation that I picked up actually came when I read Pascal’s Penseès.  I liked them so much, you can see I have a category entitled Penseès for my blog posts too (where I put short, not fully developed, but interesting stuff).

Pascal meshed a great deal with my theological background; or rather, a specific portion of my theological background, which dealt with the spiritual incapacity of the unregenerate man.  As such, before I ever heard of Van Til or Bahnsen, I was already a presuppositionalist in all but name.

For a time, I ran a Calvinist e-mail list, and it was only there that someone first introduced the ideas of Presuppositionalism.  I read them and thought, “That’s pretty much what I already believe” but of course no one on the list challenged any of it as we were all Calvinists.  So I just continued on my lovely little way without bothering to get deeper into it or anything.

It was only after debating atheists that I even began to dwell on the subject, and then it was mostly from a defensive position.  Even now, the only book that I’ve ever read that gave a positive presentation of Presuppositionalism as the focus was Bahnsen’s Always Ready.  In point of fact, that’s the only book by Bahnsen that I’ve read.  The only Van Til that I’ve read, aside from a few articles here and there, was the introduction he wrote to B. B. Warfield’s work on the inspiration of Scripture (which is packed away or I’d get the exact title).  I own two Frame books–The Doctrine of God which I have not yet begun to read (I’m currently going through Calvin’s Institutes), and No Other God which I have read but which deals with Open Theism, not Presuppositionalism.

In any case, I really didn’t even get all that much into Presuppositionalism until I started conversing with Dawson Bethrick on my old website.  And then, it was more of a reaction to Dawson’s Randianism than anything else.  He’d write something and I’d disagree with it and state my reasons why, etc.  My arguments fit the Presuppositionalist viewpoint (the reason I knew that was because others told me that, not because I was going out of my way to find out what Presuppositionalism was).

So my views on Presuppositionalism are, in a nutshell, the result of my Calvinistic beliefs as they’ve been run through debates with atheists for the last five years or so.  Those Presuppositional writings that I’ve read since I realized I was a Presuppositionalis I have agreed with (mostly).  Frankly, I’ve always found it rather interesting that my ideas have “evolved” through debate to be generally the same as other Presuppositionalists when I have not submerged myself in their writings at all.  It would be one thing if I was a Van Tillian sychophant; but I can’t claim that.  Indeed, I actually like to read, and agree to a large extent with, Gordon Clark’s books too! (Those who are in the “know” will understand the utter horror…)

In any case, to respond to the question on TAG (i.e. “how do you feel about people like Paul Manata and Peter Pike/Calvindude who seem to think that TAG is a done deal? It seems they believe this pretty dogmatically”).  I don’t hold to TAG “dogmatically” at all.  I actually learned what TANG was before I learned what TAG was.  

But here’s what I do know.  I know that atheism is not a negative worldview.  It doesn’t only deny.  In denying the existence of God, atheism is asserting positive truths that atheists must defend.  Atheists love to pretend they have a corner on logic, rationality, and reason.  Religious people are Fundamentalist whackos, too stupid to waste giving the time of day to.  Yet atheists hold to such things as logic, rationality, reason, and morality without ever expressing a reason for why they do so.

Indeed, as my recent discussions show, atheists have to resort to a just-so story: “Logic is true just because” which is another way of saying, “I have faith that logic is true.”  It’s even worse with morality.

My only objective when I debate atheists is to point out that they are inconsistent with their worldview.  If we accept the ramifications of the atheist worldview, we are left with a worldview that guts itself.  I think the surest proof of this is that thus far, in the ten years I’ve been on-line through my various websites, I’ve never found an atheist who even bothers to try to give a metaphysical, epistemological, and moral grounding for his or her views that actually stands up to the Presuppositional position.

As I’ve stated before many times, why should I give up a worldview that explains everything and that I have right now just because someone promises that at some point in the future there might be another worldview, different from mine, that also can explain all these things.  Why give up $100 in your pocket for the promise that someday you might get $100?  It’s all risk, no reward.

And that, ultimately, is the key.  The atheist is going to have to show me the value of his worldview if he is going to convince me to change to it.  Even if he manages to tear down Christianity, all he does is set us all at an equal field.  I would not jump to his atheism unless he could offer a positive reason for his worldview.

As it is, I have no reason to think he will ever tear down the theistic worldview in the first place.  Thus far, the most “devastating” critiques have been less than underwhelming.  Until a lot changes, I’m going to keep to my current views.  So far, they’re working just fine.

Since today is another heavy mail day at work, I’m not going to respond to every comment Daniel Morgan made on my blog posts re: Witmer.  In fact, I won’t respond to any of his comment yet! :-)  This is because I’m waiting for him to respond to parts 6 & 7 before I do a full reply.

However, I did see that Daniel posted a response to Steve Hay’s over on the Debunking Atheism website.  In response to a comment there, Daniel wrote that he does think it’s important to address presuppositionalism; yet he continues to reject the notion that he needs to account for such things as logic.  Indeed, he writes:

The demand that I “account” for that statement has been shown, both by the nature of the internal/external issue, and by virtue of his attempt to explain how it is even possible/feasible, to be invalid.

This, of course, has not actually been shown at all.  Instead, Daniel simply asserts that he doesn’t need to provide such an account and then ignores my response to his argument and then proclaims that it has been demonstrated.  He likewise pretends it’s actually part of his worldview, even though he has no reason for it to be in his worldview and it is, indeed, antithical to the rest of his worldview.  Thus, Daniel also writes:

Thus, I see this as quite relevant, for it shifts the entire nature of these debates from “hey atheist, give me a brief book on metaphysics,” to “hey presup, you’re demanding something of me that is inconsistent with my own worldview, and thus with your own claim to ‘internal critiques only’,” I think it is quite important.

This is simply amazing.  Daniel is complaining that presuppositionalists require him to come up with a metaphysical position!  How dare we!  Don’t you know that philosophy doesn’t need metaphysics?

For that matter, logic is actually an epistemological issue anyway.  But who’s keeping track? :-)

In any case, Daniel’s argument at this point pretty much matches the fundamentalist:  “We don’t need to give you any reasons for what we believe; you’re just supposed to let us believe the way we do.”  Unfortunately, such a thing does indeed undermine Daniel’s own definition of “reason”…

In any case, to set the matter bluntly and to call Daniel out on it: Yes, Daniel, I do want you to provide your metaphysical grounding.  If you cannot do so, then you are basing your atheism on faith, and only faith, not reason.  Therefore, either provide a reason for your position or admit that you are a fideist who therefore has no consistent grounds to attack anyone else’s faith.

I’ve found a great Biblical resource on-line through the channel.  It’s E-Sword. This program let’s you download Bibles (it’s got the ESV for free!!!), commentaries, and other stuff.  The program itself is free, and only a few of the Bibles (like the NASB) actually charge you for anything (although it’s only $20, so it’s not that bad either).

You can get stuff like Calvin’s Institutes, Josephus’s Antiquities and Wars of the Jews, as well as some STEP libraries (like the works of A.W. Pink and John Bunyan).

Did I mention it’s free?

Check it out :-)

I got to meet with a Catholic Monk earlier today.  It was a rather interesting meeting.  I met this monk through one of my friends, who has been looking into Catholicism recently.  We got together, along with my brother, with a few pre-set questions…that unfortunatley didn’t get to Father Curtis beforehand!

All the same, it was actually an enjoyable experience and I hope to meet with him some more.  We spoke briefly on Justification, Scriptural Sufficiency (he personally hadn’t heard the distinction between “formal sufficiency” and “material sufficiency”), whether works were meritorious, who could be saved in other religions, and I also asked him what he thought of Trent anathematizing me.

His answers were fairly “stock” answers, but also (ironically, and somewhat contradictory to what I just wrote) different from a lot of Catholic internet apologists I could name.  For instance, while he said he had not studied it recently, the Canons of Trent did indeed anathematize my position.  And unlike Dave Armstrong he did not attempt to say that they were not directed at me (as I said that I agreed word-for-word with specific sections that said, “He who agrees with this, let him be anathema”).  Of course, since Vatacan II is in play, he did not say that he considered me damned by that anathema.

Of all that he said, I probably disagreed mostly with the idea that non-Christians could still be saved.  Father Curtis did insist that they were saved by Christ still; but it was through their ignorance.  I asked him why, then, we should not just cease to evangelize them and let them believe in their own gods in ignorance rather than expose them to the risk of hearing and rejecting the Gospel and thus damning themselves?  He argued that it would be better for them to hear and accept Christ, which is true I suppose; but it still doesn’t answer my first charge.  Is it better to not hear and be saved, or to hear and be damned?

In any case, we didn’t have infinite time so we weren’t able to get in as deep as I would have liked.  Still, we shall hopefully meet again in the future.  I would definitely look forward to it.  In the meantime, he gave me a couple of pamphlets: Pillar of Fire, Pillar of Truth and Handbook for Today’s Catholic.  Since I’ve got my own Catholic Catechism, I’ll be able to use the second one more indepth (since it’s indexed to the Catechism).  I’ll probably end up posting some stuff in this blog about it, although as you can tell just be looking at my categories index and the number of posts under each category, I’m much more interested in debating atheists.  Still, for some reason, Catholics like to debate me too… :-)

Oh well; this is life!  I think I’ll manage.

I looked over at Triablogue today and saw that Steve Hays has responded to Witmer too. It’s nice to see he agreed with me on several points ;-)

I encourage you to read the whole thing, but here’s some snippets:

But that [sic] Witmer is saying throughout this section is that an unbeliever should make opportunistic use of any blocking maneuver or evasive maneuver whether he believes it or not.

He is coaching the unbeliever on how to win the debate without winning the argument. How to lose on the merits, but survive intact. It’s pretty revealing that Witmer would resort to such unscrupulous counsel.

Use any old argument, good or bad, just to get the presuppositionalist off your back! The convenience, and not the cogence, of the argument is all that matters.

Exactly my conclusions as well.

Speaking of Travis, he’s written a piece on The Nativity Story too.

The most effective internet evangelical technique ever!

Because it’s gonna scare the Hell right out of those atheists….. Or something.

Witmer concludes his talk with some tactics for atheists. What is most interesting about these tactics is that they once more demonstrate that Witmer is writing for atheists to win debates and not to come to an understanding of truth.

 

Witmer begins:

Keep in mind that the presuppositionalist wants to trip you up in the sense of showing that you contradict yourself or are committed to things that are incoherent. 

(ibid, 17)

But it is not a question of Presuppositionalists “wanting” to trip up atheists. Instead, it is the fact that Presuppositionalists are pointing out that the atheistic worldview is self-contradictory and incoherent in and of itself. Thus, the Presuppositionalists only “wants” to demonstrate this to the atheist in the hopes that God will use it to open the unbelieving heart. 

Witmer continues:

It’s not surprising that he can enjoy some success in the online world, because, frankly, he asks questions of a philosophical sort that are hard to answer; and if you feel forced to answer and venture to say something, you can easily become tripped up. Suggestion: don’t be too ambitious. Instead of setting out ambitious but exploratory theses about the nature of logic and morality, simply be modest and refuse to overcommit yourself. 

(ibid, 17)

This is advice that I truly wish more atheist would actually follow! Instead, what we find online usually degenerates very quickly into ad hominem, insult, and abuse. This is, in my opinion, a direct result of the fact that the Presuppositionalist does ask those very philosophical questions and atheists realize that they cannot answer the questions. Thus, they have no recourse but to flee into the realm of non-scholarly debate. At this point, I wish they would follow the advice of Lincoln: “It is better to be thought a fool than to open one’s mouth and remove all doubt.” 

So with Witmer, I would also encourage atheists to not over-commit. On the same token, I’d encourage theists who have not studied Presuppositionalism enough to not try to beat someone over the head with it either. While typically those who are really skilled at Presuppositional argumentation (e.g. Greg Bahnsen, John Frame) make it look easy, you can quickly run into areas that you haven’t studied yet yourself, thus giving the atheist a chance to turn the tables on you.

 

So on this advice, I think Witmer’s correct both for the atheist and the theist. We should all know our limits and not seek to go beyond them.

 

Witmer continues:

Think in terms of tactics. That is, keep in mind that the presuppositionalist is not approaching you with an eye towards reasoning together to get to the truth. He’s admitted as much by saying that he sees you as deranged and in need of some kind of personal confrontation. 

(ibid, 17)

While the use of the term “deranged” is poisoning the well, the concept is accurate enough that my objection to it need not be strenuous. It is not so much that Presuppositionalists view atheists as “deranged” as it is that atheists are spiritually blind and totally depraved (i.e. depraved in the totality of their being (all parts), not that they are as evil as they could be). The atheist begins with a flawed view of “reasoning” and as such it is impossible for us to “reason together” without establishing that common ground. 

Again, Presuppositionalists do not deny that there is some common ground; we simply deny that it is neutral common ground. The atheist has to use theistic common ground in order to begin to think. The Presuppositionalist is merely trying to point this out to the atheist.

 

In any case, as far as it goes, it has been my experience that there are very few atheists who do not think theists are “deranged and in need of some kind of personal confrontation” either. This knife cuts both ways.

 

Witmer continues:

In an ordinary intellectual discussion among friends, it’s fine to speculate on things, refining one’s ideas as one goes along; but in this sort of encounter they will try to commit you to as much as they can, to force you off balance. So when I say “think in terms of tactics” I mean: keep focused on how your words will be used by the presuppositionalist. In effect, think of those famous Miranda warning words: “Anything you say can and will be used against you.” 

(ibid, 17)

That’s the funny thing about words… 

They’re supposed to mean what you believe. Thus, if you use them carelessly you should expect that carelessness to be pointed out. Likewise, I know that I too am fully aware that atheists pick over everything I write. This comes with the territory when you’re doing apologetics.

 

Witmer continues:

Regarding terminology, I recommend being aggressive in forcing your opponent to slow down and explain his questions as you go along. The presuppositionalist has little patience, I gather from what I’ve read. He sees himself as dealing with a fool, so he tries to rush in and “fix” him with a quick shock of amazing argument. 

(ibid, 17)

Of course we remember that Witmer has not had much experience with Presuppositionalism, so his sweeping generalization here doesn’t carry much weight. (Or at least, it shouldn’t.) Secondly, the Presuppositionalist ought not be interested in “winning debates.” We are not looking for the “quick shock of amazing argument.” We are interested in what is true.

 

The fact of the matter is that we believe the Bible is true, and it is the Bible that calls atheists fools. We cannot both accept the Bible as true and deny its descriptions of atheists if we are to remain faithful to our beliefs. Be that as it may, the “job” of the Presuppositionalist is not to change the unbeliever—that’s God’s job. I never expect an atheist to agree with the Bible’s assessment of their condition. That’s why it is necessary to demonstrate that the Bible is correct: the atheist holds to self-refuting philosophy and, as such, is a fool.

 

None of this ought to mean the Presuppositionalist is rushing headlong in without any concern of what his “opponent” is saying. Not at all! The Presuppositionalist looks at this as an opportunity to share the Gospel with another fallen human being; one who, were it not for the grace of God, we would be identical to. Furthermore, since the method of Presuppositionalism requires that we demonstrate to the atheist the foolishness of his beliefs, it is vitally important that the Presuppositionalist pay attention to what the atheist is saying!

 

Indeed, I would go so far as to argue that Witmer’s tactic of slowing down is important because it is the atheist who rushes too fast and he quickly gets in over his head. The Presuppositionalist merely listens to the atheist and points out the fallacies in the atheist’s thinking. Thus, the atheist needs to go slow to avoid the fallacies in the first place.

 

Anyway, Witmer continues:

If they mock you for this, you can always deflect it… 

(Ibid, 18)

I will be the first to point out that if a Presuppositionalist mocks someone he is not engaged in proper evangelism. However, it is also important to point out that often times atheists are offended by simple declarations of the truth because they don’t like the truth. Their dislike of the truth will often lead them to assume that the Presuppositionalist is “mocking” them. So I would argue that the atheist must first determine whether he is actually being mock, or whether he is just taking offense at the Gospel. 

Witmer continues:

If the presuppositionalist position is as I’ve described it, where they think it’s okay to take certain things for granted, then you should keep in mind that you can make the very same move. 

(ibid, 18)

Can you now? 

The Presuppositionalist position does take certain things for granted; but does the atheist’s position allow the atheist to take certain things for granted? And not only that, but does the atheist position allow the atheist to take for granted the very thing that is at debate?

 

This is the point that Witmer (and also Daniel Morgan) fail to grasp when it comes to Presuppositional argumentation. All arguments are grounded in certain unproven ideas, but these unproven ideas cannot be created on a whim.

 

Naturally, Daniel Morgan in the comments has said often that my saying this is imposing an external restriction on the atheist. But this is not the case. For if it were actually possible for someone to just whimsically pick Presuppositions, then to be consistent within that system there can be no truth!

 

Thus, if an atheist argues that he ought to be able to pick Presuppositions at a whim, then he cannot argue that theism is wrong! For that matter, he cannot argue that anything is wrong!

 

Witmer continues:

So if they say they take God for granted and insist you give a “basis” for logic, you can say that you take logic for granted and insist that they give you a “basis” for God. 

(Ibid, 18)

Let’s carry this out then in a true internal critique. Assume for the moment that the atheist can “just assume” logic is true without establishing it. 

How does it follow from this that the atheist can now insist the theist give a basis for God?

 

It does not follow. You see, if we accept that logic can “just be” then it is illogical to require the Christian give a basis for God; it in fact refutes the atheist’s worldview to require such a thing. For God is defined by Christians as something that is not contained by logic. That is, logic is an attribute of God; thus, God is higher than logic. As such, one cannot start with logic and then assume that logic compels someone to argue for something that is higher than logic. Such is absurd.

 

But this is not the case for the Presuppositionalist. The Presuppositionalist argues that God is the grounding of logic. Therefore, since logic is lower than God, we are not going beyond our worldview to demand that atheists account for logic apart from God.

 

Thus, the Christian Presuppositionalist avoids the internal problem while the atheist is stuck with it; unless the atheists wants to argue that we have no need to argue for anything, in which case I am content that everyone (not just theists) will consider him a fool.

 

Witmer continues:

Don’t make the mistake of thinking that you yourself don’t take anything for granted, as this is almost surely false, and it leaves you very vulnerable. Admit that there are things you don’t have settled or figured out or the like. 

(Ibid, 18)

Indeed, this is sage advice. In fact, it is advice that Witmer should have engaged in in the previous section. If an atheist responds with, “I don’t know. I’m not sure what to think there” any charitable person will not harass such a person! We might point out that this is something the atheist ought to think about, but we will not “mock” him for his ignorance—we are all ignorant at the start! 

But if instead of saying you don’t know you create a false worldview (like pretending you can just say logic is true without a basis for it), then you are not admitting you are ignorant and unsure. You are instead making up stuff. In such a case, the Presuppositionalist has every right to tear down these false worldviews and demonstrate that they are bunk.

 

Witmer continues:

Keep in mind that while you might want to have more interesting and ambitious theories about, say, the nature of logic and morality, you can always say things like “While I’m inclined to think that the laws of logic can be explained by linguistic facts, I recognize there are problems here. If it turns out that the laws of logic are primitive and unexplained by anything else, then, so be it.” 

(Ibid, 18)

Of course this is NOT the same thing as saying, “I don’t know.” This is asserting, “While I’m inclined to think that the laws of logic are linguistic facts, after you’ve destroyed that argument I will just claim, for absolutely no reason, that they are unexplained and then I will not listen to you demonstrate that they cannot be unexplained.” Furthermore, what is obviously lacking is the notion that the atheist will ever concede, “If it turns out that the existence of God is the only way for logic to be valid, then, so be it.” 

Witmer continues:

They will strenuously resist you imposing certain demands on them (e.g. that they provide a certain kind of evidence for accepting the Bible as the Word of God, &c); they will insist that you’re imposing views on them, about what is required, that they don’t hold; and if you find that those views lead to trouble, that is no worry for them — they just don’t accept those views about what is required in the first place. Realize that you can resist things in just the same way. 

(Ibid, 18)

Except, of course, for the fact that rejecting them in this manner refutes your own worldview. 

Witmer is now pretty much revealing his tactics. It doesn’t matter whether your arguments fit your overall philosophy of life. The only thing that matters is that you can find something to plug a hole in each step of the way. Never mind if those plugs tear larger holes as you cram them in. We’re not interested in consistency here; we’re interested in surviving the debate and getting out without considering if the theist is right.

 

Let’s illustrate this for better clarity. Suppose that Witmer were to argue that everything must be reduced to materialism. I then say, “That’s not true.” But Witmer argues that it must be true. So I say, “Fine, God is a material object.” If Witmer then says, “But if God is material, He’s not God” can I respond with, “That’s not fair! You get to say everything is material, so I do too! I’m just using your tactic back at you.”?

 

No, I cannot respond this way! Because if I were to say that, I would refute my worldview. In the same manner, if Witmer says, “I don’t need to establish logic; I’ll just be a Platonist at this point” then he refutes his worldview. Just as I cannot use Witmer’s presuppositions and pretend that God fits into them, Witmer cannot use my presuppositions and pretend atheism fits into them. If Witmer wants to establish that logic can just be assumed, he must demonstrate this within his own worldview rather than try to steal it from mine.

 

Continuing with Witmer:

Above all: remember that insofar as they have an argument, it is purely negative in character: trying to show that the atheist is committed to some incoherent view. This gives you enormous resources for responding. All you have to do is point out that you can be minimal in your commitments and not be incoherent. You can say that lots of things are primitive and unexplained and that they’ve hardly shown that you can’t consistently say such things. 

(ibid, 18)

Leaving aside the fact that I have shown atheists can’t consistently say such things, the atheist who agrees to the above minimalism is at a tremendous disadvantage. If you are minimal in your commitments, you cannot very well present a positive argument for atheism. If you escape Presuppositionalism by making your worldview gelatinous, you cannot solidify it later! 

In point of fact, Witmer in the above paragraph all but concedes that the only way atheism can be rational is if it has no substance. As soon as you start putting substance into it, the Presuppositionalist can point out that you’re wrong. Witmer therefore argues, “Just leave out the substance and wait for the Presuppositionalist to go away; then you can continue in your fundamentalist atheism unchallenged by critical thinking.”

 

Witmer continues:

A final thought on these matters. What I’ve discussed above is all about playing defense against the negative argument the presuppositionalist is likely to try to use against you. I’ve not said anything about how you could try to persuade the presuppositionalist theist that he is wrong, only about how you could try to show them they have no case for saying that you are irrational. 

(ibid, 19)

Of course, if you are able to show that atheism is not irrational, then you have refuted Presuppositionalism… 

In any case, Witmer is correct that he has offered no positive arguments for atheism. This is because all the positive arguments for atheism rely on stolen concepts (such as logic), and those are the issues that Presuppositionalism addresses. Witmer has to remain shadowy in order to not get pinned by Presuppositionalism, but in remaining shadowy he cannot mount an offense.

 

Witmer says:

But what about that other project — going on the offense? With many believers, I think this can be a fruitful pursuit, since many believers will in fact accept many claims that we also accept, and we can work from there. My impression of several of the presuppositionalist theists online, however, is that it is very unlikely to be fruitful to try to do this. If they take for granted not just the beliefs that God exists and is the author of scripture and so on, but nothing else, then we have nothing in common to work with by way of argument. 

(ibid, 19)

In other words, Witmer agrees with me that there is no neutral common ground between theism and atheism. 

He finishes:

In general, it’s only sensible to engage in such debate if some common ground can indeed be found. I wouldn’t recommend trying to browbeat them into acknowledging what they already know, that God doesn’t exist, the way that they aim to do that with us. This is because, first, I don’t believe they already know this; I don’t think they are just being willfully self-deceptive. And second, even if they are in some cases deceiving themselves in such a way, I don’t have any reason to believe that personal confrontation would have any positive effect. I have, after all, no faith that a God might in his grace enable them to see the truth. 

(ibid, 19)

I do wonder. If Witmer doesn’t think we are being willfully self-deceptive, what does he think? 

In any case, the second point is indeed telling. I, as a Presuppositionalist, do have faith that God not only can, but does enable atheists to see the truth. He does this every day through various means. As such, I don’t have any concerns actually engaging atheists. Because, you see, it doesn’t depend on he who runs, or he who wills, but on God who has mercy.

 

I have no problem acknowledging that my words have never convinced anyone, even if God has seen fit to bless me by using them. Since God is a God of second causes, I have no problem engaging atheists anywhere. And indeed, it is the very reason that I do so.

We now move on to what I consider Witmer’s weakest argument: morality. Witmer begins by giving some variant definitions to morality:

(1) What someone in fact morally ought to do
(2) What someone believes he morally ought to do
(3) What someone is motivated to do
(4) What someone actually does

(ibid, 12)

These definitions are, of course, valid. However, when it comes to Presuppositionalism and morality, we’re only interested in his first definition, although it suffers from the problem of using the term in the definition. In other words, Witmer defines morality as that which one “in fact morally ought to do.” As such, it begs the question as to what morality is in order to define the term morality! Therefore, it’s not a very useful definition. But we can correct it simply by dropping the “morally” from the sentence and instead define morality as “that which in fact ought to be done.”

Naturally, Witmer brings up each of these definitions because he is banking on the confusion between the terms. He writes: “Talk of ‘relative morality’ often confuses these four in a very bad way” (ibid, 12). This may indeed be the case in many discussions, but it is not the case when dealing with actual Presuppositionalism. Witmer’s only hope is in kicking up enough dust to force the confusion between the terms (and, of course, some theists do help him along by not defining their terms correcty too).

Witmer demonstrates his tactic here:

When a theist says that morality requires theism, which of these might he have in mind? Most likely he has either of two claims in mind. One concerns motivation; the other concerns moral facts:(a) If there is no God, there is no reason or motivation to be moral.

(b) If there is no God, then there are no moral facts; that is, no one is ever actually morally obligated to do anything.

(ibid, 12)

As we mentioned above, since the first definition is the one we have in mind then his (b) section here is the one we need to focus on. Ultimately, (a) does come from (b) (after all, if there are no moral facts then any motivation to be moral is going to depend on something other than morality, by definition), but this is further down the chain than what I want to focus on now.Regarding (b), Witmer writes:

Unfortunately, many atheists — at least of the layman sort — tend to agree with (b), although this is often put in very confusing terms by talking about “relativism” and the lack of “absolutes.” I think (b) is clearly false, but we’ll have to talk about all of these.

(ibid, 12)

The sad thing is that despite Witmer’s claim that he believes (b) is “clearly false,” he never gets around to demonstrating that (b) is false. That is, Witmer never establishes how he can have moral facts. This lack of demonstration is glaring in this discussion.In any case, Witmer continues:

If someone says that “morality differs from culture to culture,” which one do they mean? Probably a combination of beliefs and behaviors. But when people start to theorize about morality, they tend to focus on the facts about what people really ought to do and get that mixed up with facts about how people behave or what they believe.

(ibid 12-13)

Of course, this is a generalization. One that might have some backing in ”lay” apologetics, but one that also conveniently ignores the heart of the real issue.What we are interested in is not the argument that is obscured by distortion. We are interested in the correct definition.

Witmer, however, is interested in getting atheists to win debates. He is not concerned so much with establishing the truth as he is with knocking down what he perceives to be the majority arguments. But if Witmer cannot address the real, undistorted Presuppositional argument, then he will either have conversions based on distortions, or he will only solidify the opposition to his ideas all the more. Either way, I don’t see how that can be considered “successful” for a supposed Freethinker.

So again, we are not interested in any of the four definitions save the first. Are there any actual moral facts? This is not answered by appeals to confusion.

Witmer continues, after providing a distinction in the term “for”:

Very often, the big problem in talk about “relative morality” is that people go from the latter (using “for” to indicate what someone believes) to the former (using it to indicate the application of the rule). So, they might think: “According to A, doing X is morally okay; so, for A, doing X is morally okay; so, it’s okay for A to do X; that is, there’s nothing wrong if A does X.” This is very confused, of course. The fact that someone thinks that something is morally okay does not imply that it is okay for anyone, including them, to do that thing.

(ibid, 13)

Now here we see Witmer forget his previous four definitions of morality and engage in the very confusion of terms that he was at first critical of! The example that X is okay for A to do banks on the second, third, and fourth definitions given by Witmer: it is something that A believe he ought to do, is motivated to do, and/or actually does. What it is not is the first definition: an establishment of moral fact.

Witmer sees this, which is why his last sentence is “The fact that someone thinks that something is morally okay does not imply that it is okay for anyone, including them, to do that thing”—a sentence I agree 100% with! But in order for this conclusion to be valid, one must first disregard the other three definitions of morality and assume that they are not in play in the first part of the illustration. But when someone says, “According to A, doing X is morally okay” what is his definition of morality? It is the definition that is dependent upon A. It appeals to the second definition of morality—one’s beliefs. It does not appeal to the first definition of moral facts.

Witmer only continues this when he writes:

The confusion here is made worse — aided and abetted! — by the fact that if someone really does believe it’s morally okay to do X, and does it, we may say that since A was following his conscience, A was “doing the right thing.” But that’s a bad expression of what we’re trying to get at. A better way to put it is to say that A was sincerely trying to do the right thing, even though he didn’t; we then might say that he is not as much to blame, perhaps, but he still in fact did the thing he ought not to have done.

(ibid, 13)

No, what makes the confusion worse is that Witmer is falling back onto the first definition of morality without demonstrating that there are moral facts (aside from his statement of faith that he believes there are moral facts)! The only way there can be any confusion at all in the above relativistic ideas is if Witmer is admitting that the first definition of morality is the important one. But if all Witmer seeks to do is to demonstrate that the relativist cannot reach a definition of moral facts then he has argued about as complicated and unclearly as possible to get there!

In short, from what we see, Witmer, though acknowledging alternate definitions of morality, Presupposes the primacy of the important first definition in everything he argues, whether he is cognizant of it or not.

Witmer continues:

The claim about motivation seems to depend on the claim that nobody has any reason to behave morally unless they can be rewarded for it. Perhaps the presuppositionalist who advances this argument thinks that no one can be motivated to be moral unless they believe God exists and will reward those who do good. But it is just false to say that nobody has any reason to behave morally unless they can expect a reward for it. Doing good can be its own reward.

(ibid, 13)

Here Witmer steals so many concepts that it’s hard to know where to start. First, how is Witmer defining “good”? If we’re looking at the idea of motivation, as Witmer claims, then “good” is nothing more than doing what one is motivated to do. There is no actual behavior that is inherently good or evil; there is just behavior that one is motivated to do or not to do.

But suppose that I am motivated to murder people. Is that “evil” for me to do? Not in the above definition. I am motivated to do it, therefore it must be good! To say that there are moral facts apart from motivation is to once again blur the distinction in the definitions that Witmer himself draws! We are not speaking of the first definition of morality here; we are speaking of the third.

The simple fact of the matter is that “Doing good can be its own reward” is nothing more than saying “Doing anything can be its own reward.” Not very helpful at establishing morality though. Witmer is engaged in an is = ought fallacy here.

Witmer continues:

Now, of course, you might be suspicious of any particular claim that someone did something just to do the right thing, without any expectation of a reward. But while there are suspicious cases, I think it’s just overwhelmingly plausible that people do, at least sometimes, in fact try to do the right thing for no other reason than that they want to do the right thing.

(ibid, 13)

And yet there is no right thing! Witmer hasn’t established what is “right” and what is not yet; he is assuming that there is, indeed, right and wrong behavior. But he is just asserting that it is out there, he is not demonstrating why any specific action is right or wrong.

Again, motivational morality is nothing more than doing what you want to do. But our wants and desires don’t make something moral, as even Witmer acknowledges (remember, he said: “The fact that someone thinks that something is morally okay does not imply that it is okay for anyone, including them, to do that thing”). Witmer’s entire motivational argument here relies on the Presupposition of actual moral facts!

Continuing:

Now the presuppositionalist might assume than atheist is bound to believe that all people are pure egoists, only interested in themselves. But of course it’s not part of atheism itself to make that claim. If the presuppositionalist is trying for an internal critique, he can’t foist this claim on us. And we shouldn’t make it anyway, as it seems implausible. Yes, people are often self-interested and don’t behave very morally; but that’s hardly the same as saying that people are only ever self-interested and have no motivation at all to do the right thing.

(ibid, 13)

Of course the only thing Witmer misses here is the boat. The Presuppositionalist is not arguing that everything the atheist does is immoral; he is arguing that the atheist cannot define what is moral or immoral in the first place! Witmer continues to fall into the trap of using morality without establishing morality. He argues that “people are often self-interested and don’t behave very morally” without demonstrating what is moral in the first place! He continues to simply beg the question and avoid actually demonstrating anything.It doesn’t get any better:

It might be thought that atheism requires an evolutionary story, which in turn requires that only selfishness is selected for. But this is obviously not mandatory. Evolution doesn’t require that every state be selected for; and it’s clear that it could be adaptive to develop altruistic tendencies. (Notice I am not saying that evolution provides a “basis for morality” in the sense that it explains why certain things are in fact morally obligatory or wrong or the like, only that it could explain why people have certain desires or inclinations.)

(ibid, 14)

And thus, Witmer all but admits that he is not even bothering to establish morality in his argument! He is simply assuming it’s true. He has no reason for this assumption; and yet because he assumes it, he is then motivated to obey his views of right and wrong. Such is truly frightening for one claiming to be a “Freethinker.”

Witmer then moves on to critiquing the idea of the specialness of humans. But of course, it’s only the specialness that presupposes a “soul” that is wrong. Thus, we read:

Perhaps the idea behind Copan’s comments is that if atheism is true then, it seems, humans do not have these special things called “souls”. And that, perhaps, is the source of the thought. If humans don’t have souls, they aren’t sufficiently special for there to be moral principles applying to them.

(ibid, 14).

Here, Witmer doesn’t bother to define what a soul is (although he’ll give a really weird definition later); nor does he bother demonstrating how a soul is what Copan refers to in Copan’s argument.  Basically, all he does here is say that people can be unique without a soul.  But how does this solve the moral problem regarding the specialness of humans?

If we say that there are no souls, that is not, of course, saying that there is nothing at all distinctive about humans. There are, of course, various features that differentiate humans from other things in the world, and some of those features may be quite significant. Being self-aware is one such feature. The implication of atheism, however, is that one cannot cite “having a soul” — understood in the theological sense as a nonphysical substance created by God to be the bearer of personality and moral significance — as the thing that makes for specialness.

(ibid, 14)

Here we finally see Witmer’s definition of a soul. For some reason, he restricts it to “a nonphysical substance creatd by God to be the bearer of personality and moral significance.” But why should we accept that definition of the soul? Witmer doesn’t bother to argue for it, he just assumes we must accept it.

If, on the other hand, one accepts that self-awareness is part of the soul, then it is indeed true to say that humans have souls. And therefore, Witmer’s argument fails when he denies a soul.

Of course, at this point we’re just dealing with semantics. What’s actually important is the fact that Witmer still must account for why being “self-aware” grants a part of nature a special moral virtue. He doesn’t bother to argue for this. Once again, he just asserts it and assumes everyone will agree with him.

Witmer tries to avoid this by setting up the argument with his meaning defined in the outset:

To illustrate: suppose we say that being self-aware is indeed a very special and morally significant feature.

(ibid, 15)

But A) why should we say that being self-aware is a “morally significant” feature and B) what definition of moral is he using here? Witmer once again banks of the confusion he previously introduced to try to sweep in his stolen concepts without anyone noticing. Unfortunately, those who have actually studied Presuppositionalism can see this tactic for what it is: nonsense.

It’s especially nonsensical when you realize that Witmer doesn’t even agree to this! That’s right, he concludes his argument by saying, “I don’t endorse the view that being self-aware is the thing that is so special; I’m using it just for illustration purposes here” (ibid, 15). That’s nice; but aren’t we interested in the truth? At what point is Witmer going to actually put forth arguments for what he believes is true?

Apparently, never.

Witmer continues with a variation on the above by introducing reductionism:

One common line of thought is that if atheism is true, then we have to take a “reductive” view of humans, holding that a person is nothing but a collection of atoms in formation, and this, allegedly, causes some sort of trouble for seeing humans as morally significant. “If you’re just a bunch of matter,” we are asked, “why should you have rights while a pile of dirt here doesn’t?”

(ibid, 15)

This is, of course, the same as the above—arguing regarding the specialness of humanity. Again, Witmer “solves” the problem by asserting that there are differences between dirt and humans. In fact he states, “The only difference I can’t point to, as an atheist, is to say that I have a divinely-created soul and the dirt doesn’t” (ibid, 15).

But again Witmer does not establish why those differences ought to matter. He simply asserts that they do.

Witmer then moves on to the Conditional Problem of Evil argument, which I already addressed here and the Euthyphro problem, I already addressed (when John Loftus brought it up) here.

This concludes Witmer’s morality section. Let us quickly look over it again. Remember, Witmer begins by asserting “I think (b) is clearly false” where (b) was “If there is no God, then there are no moral facts.” Yet nowhere does Witmer demonstrate what these moral facts are! Indeed, he constantly argues as if he has established those moral facts, and all his arguments depend on those moral facts…and yet he NEVER demonstrates A) what these moral facts are; B) how he can prove these moral facts are true; or C) why those moral facts apply equally to us as well as to him.

If someone wants to refute the Presuppositionalist claim that one cannot establish morality apart from the existence of God, all the atheist need do is establish morality apart from the existence of God! The fact that Witmer did not even bother to try speaks volumes.