Daniel Morgan wrote a post on abortion on his blog. Unfortunately, the comments section truncates after a certain length. I already put forth a short response (basically just putting forth the logic of the Prolife position without defending any of it yet) and Daniel responded in the comments. Since my own response will necessarily be lengthy, I’m going to post it here (and provide the link to Daniel).
First it would be best if I went ahead and demonstrated the Prolife argument that was put forth since both Daniel and I have/will be referencing it. I wrote:
P1. It is wrong to take the life of an innocent human being without proper justification.
P2. Abortion takes the life of an innocent human being.
P3. While there are possible circumstances when this is justifiable (such as when saving the life of the mother), the vast majority of abortions are not morally justifiable, especially “abortion on demand.”
C1. The vast majority of abortions are immoral.
The first thing I should note is that the above argument is a legal argument, not a religious argument. This will help clear up some confusion, especially in P1 where I mention “innocent human being.” In this argument, I am refering to legal innocence and not moral innocence (the difference being that someone can do something morally evil without necessarily breaking the law, and thus be legally innocent).
This answers Daniel’s objection that: “There are no ‘innocent human beings’ in your total depravity worldview.” When talking about moral innocence, Daniel’s statement is correct; when talking about legal innocence, Daniel’s statement is incorrect.
I should note that if Daniel would like me to argue from the religious perspective, I can certainly do so–but that would entail me bringing forth my presuppositional argument once again :-D Therefore, it is probably better to replace the pharse “are immoral” in the conclusion with the phrase “ought to be illegal” to help maintain the legal aspect of the argument, so from now on I will refer to C1 as:
C1. The vast majority of abortions ought to be illegal.
Now with the issue framed, let us look at Daniel’s objections. I shall stick to his objections that are dealing with the legal issue since A) it probably wasn’t apparent that I was only making a legal argument originally so it’s not fair to argue against Daniel when he speaks of religious stands instead of legal stands; and B) it would take too long to put forth the proper foundation for the moral argument here.
Daniel said:
…I think it is also equally immoral to enforce upon others some restriction of what they can do to their own bodies, and anything which depends directly upon their body’s CNS/circulatory system/liver/etc. for life support.
I agree in principal with the above, but with the following caveat: basic human rights (including the right to life) are more important that the rights of someone to do what they want to “their body” (and the unborn is not part of the woman’s body anyway). As such, when there is a conflict, the basic human rights ought to take precedence legally.
Daniel wrote:
We all differentiate “killing” based on some concept of the organisms’ value. How do we evaluate a creature’s life potential?
An organism’s “value” is not equivalent to its “life potential” though. For instance, human rights are based on the organism’s humanity. Similarly, animal rights (which Daniel also speaks about in his post) are intrinsic upon the organism’s ontological animal-ness.
Human rights are ontological rights. They depend on the being of the creature. The reason that these rights are thus linked is so that all men and women are viewed equal under law. This equality can only be due to the equality of humanity that all people share. If it is linked to some other aspect (like consciousness, as Daniel suggests) then human rights vary according to the degree that that aspect is present. In the case of consciousness, people who are awake would have more human rights than those who are asleep if human rights are determined that way.
In point of fact, most of the rationals for abortions do not enable us to have consistent human rights. For instance, someone might argue “The fetus is really small–you can’t even see it!” In this instance, he is making the claim that larger humans have more rights than smaller humans. Someone might argue (as Daniel seems to be): “The fetus is inside the woman, therefore it doesn’t have the same rights as a human outside the womb.” In this case, human rights depend on the location of the human.Â
Finally, there is the issue of “self awareness” (which Daniel also mentions). For instance, he said:
We have to use those criteria [to evaluate life potential]Â which make some sense–self-awareness implies that an organism will know it is dying, wish not to die, and have an intense experience of pain in death. Because these creatures have a volitional opposition to us killing them, we afford them rights.
In this instance, then, animal rights and human rights ought to be identical. Under the above, any animal that fits the description has just as many “rights” as any other animal. However, under the law humans have more rights than animals do, precisely because human rights are based upon ontology–the fact that they are human.
Daniel’s argument then shifts to an issue of citizenship when he says:
Legally, if we don’t give people the option to prevent their own physical pain [when that option is available, obviously], so long as it does not infringe upon the rights of other citizens [which our own constitution defines as someone BORN here, so fetuses don't count, but once they are born, then yes, they have rights], then we have basically eroded liberty.
But this is not correct. Citizenship has no bearing over human rights. That is why you will still be prosecuted if you kill an illegal alien, despite the fact that the alien is not a citizen. Human rights do not depend on citizenship, but on the ontology of being human. The right to life is, again, a human right, not a citizen’s right.
Daniel then states:
I have tried to lay out a systematic method of appraising the legality of an abortion, when it is presupposed that a fetus is intrinsically the property of the woman carrying it, and her body is her sovereign property, and granting that we cannot, contrary to protests to the otherwise, do “whatever we wish to our own property” [we can't torture it - implying "it" is a conscious organism].
I would argue that a human being cannot ever be property. Even if a human could be property, a human being does not become the property of another person simply because of the location of that human (being inside the womb).Â
Furthermore, simply because any thing is in the woman does not make that thing her property. For instance, if a woman steals a diamond and swallows it, the diamond does not become her property even though it is in her body. Likewise, if a woman were to force someone to donate a kidney, the kidney would not become hers (it is only hers if the original “owner” of the kidney relinquishes it willingly).
Daniel then asks a pertinent question:
In defining a fetus as a “human being,” we must ask, “what is a human being?” Just something with human DNA?
The answer to the second question in the above is obviously “no.” My skin cells have human DNA, but they are not human.
So what is a human being? A good definition would be: “a self-contained homo sapien sapien that typically begins as two cells joined together (sperm and egg–although perhaps genetic modification will alter this part) and develops from there to naturally progress through the various stages of humanity (such as the fetal stage, infant stage, childhood, adolesence, adulthood, and elderlyness).”
Daniel then asks:
Do human beings lose their rights upon brain death?
No, they do not.
Does this mean we shouldn’t “pull the plug”? Not at all. It is not a human right for a machine to breathe for us, for example, and thus it is not a violation of human rights to turn off the machines. What would be a violation of a human right is actively killing someone who can live apart from machines with only the normal care necessary for all human beings (for example, food and water). Thus, a respirator or heart machine is not a basic human right, but a feeding tube is (not a tube per se, but the food and water it brings are a right; the tube is simply a means to deliver them).
Daniel asks:
Do we humans have the right to have life support, even as citizens? Obviously we do not. In that sense, even ER workers, when they attempt to revive a victim, are rendering aid, but once it is established that the person’s heart will not start on its own, they do not have the obligation to hook you up to a heart-lung machine, or continue doing chest compressions ad infinitum. WHY?
Again, because it is not a human right to have a machine breathe for us or to cause our heart to beat for us.
Daniel then says:
In the same sense, a woman’s body is life support for a fetus.
Actually, it is in a completely different sense. The woman’s body provides nutrients to the fetus–but food and water are basic human rights. (I know that the mother also “breathes” for the fetus–but in this case, the oxygen comes in the blood as a nutrient; the fetus does not breathe at all.)
Based on all the above, I would still argue that legally the vast majority of abortions should be outlawed.