John Loftus responded to this previous post by stating that his presuppositions are fewer than mine, and thus his position is better.  His exact words:

[T]he fewer things we must presuppose, then the more likely that accurately describes our human condition, based upon the principle of parsimony.

This ought to work well in the court of law.

“Your honor, it takes fewer presuppositions to suppose that the victim just died than it is to suppose that my client actively killed him; therefore, on the basis of parsimony, my client is innocent.”

Unfortunately, fewer isn’t better.  Let’s get to as few presuppositions as possible:

Nothing physically exists, I just imagine it.

That’s far fewer presuppositions than to suppose that matter exists, that it is arranged as we view it, that we actually exist consciously, etc.

But John would obviously disagree with this conclusion.

Fewer isn’t better if it can’t explain something.  John’s “fewer” atheistic presuppositions cannot explain morality and thus fewer is not better.  John’s presuppositions must be able to actually work before he can claim we need to go with the argument with fewest presuppositions.

I’ll note that John has never once explained how his morality flows from his presuppositions, let alone how his logic does.  I do give him credit for one thing though–it does appear he is at least trying to find his presuppositions now.