John Loftus is continuing his break-up. Now he has posted on hell. The title says it all: “Any View of Hell Needs To Pass the Moral Test.”

Now this is a misquote of Clark Pinnock (despite it being in quotation marks), but Loftus apparently approves of it nonetheless.  He then concludes his statements by stating:

[Presuppositionalists, don't even start. If you cannot see that it's plausible that the traditional view of hell is unjust without having an ultimate moral standard, then you're just not thinking].

Here’s the problem for Mr. Loftus. What is the reason that any view on hell needs to pass the moral test?  What need is there for a view to pass any moral test?  This need is not a logical need, for all that logic needs is logical consistency.  This need can only be a moral need.

Thus, John Loftus presupposes a definition of morality before he presupposes a second moral view on hell.

Mr. Loftus seeks to avoid all discussion whatsoever by cutting off the response that he knows is coming.  The only moral imperative that is involved here is the moral imperative that Mr. Loftus assumes.  This is not even a “common” moral argument–this moral argument of Mr. Loftus is: “It is a moral imperative that you provide a view on hell that is consistent with my moral system.”

The big problem here is that that the term “moral” changes definitions in mid-process.  ”It’s a moral imperative (Moral 1) that a view on hell is consistent with my moral system (Moral 2).”  Moral 1 is not Moral 2; Moral 1 superceeds Moral 2.  But where has Moral 1 been proven (let alone Moral 2)?

The only need for “any view on hell” to pass Mr. Loftus’s morality is found in Mr. Loftus’s morality (Moral 1) and only in Mr. Loftus’s morality.  This moral imperative (Moral 1) does not exist outside of Mr. Loftus’s brain, except insofar as others might agree with him (as mentioned before, he would then use the “might makes right” to force those who disagree with him into agreeing with him anyway).

So Mr. Loftus is not only asserting a moral claim (Moral 2) here, he is asserting two moral claims.  He is asserting that it is morally necessary (Moral 1) that any view on hell must conform to his moral viewpoint (Moral 2).  But since I reject all of Mr. Loftus’s morality, what basis does he have for claiming that Moral 1 is to be enforced?  Mr. Loftus cannot say that “Any view on hell needs to pass the moral test” and mean anything other than “In my subjective moral opinion, any view on hell needs to pass my other subjective moral test.”

I reject both of Mr. Loftus’s points, and thus defuse the force of his argument immediately.  I have no moral imperative to conform to Mr. Loftus’s subjective moral opinion, and therefore I won’t.  If he doesn’t like it, he can lump it, but he certainly can’t force his morality on me.