I just read this article about Haleigh Poutre, a young girl in MA who was beaten into a coma, according to the police by her stepfather.  The details around the case are, naturally, somewhat heart-wrenching.  However, I think that this shows yet more reason why we need to take a look at the so-called “Right to Die” issues from a view of logic and reason rather than from an emotive response.

The girl was in what doctor’s thought was an irreversable vegetative state (similar to Terri Schiavo).  Now, however, doctors are saying that her condition has changed.  To what extent they have not yet revealed, but it does show two things:

1) Doctors are not infallible.

2) Medical situations change over time.

This obviously brings to question what means we should use to determine whether someone should be “allowed to die” (as the medical profession puts it, to make it a passive death rather than an active murder).  What are the ethical and moral standards that we ought to use for this?

One thing is certain.  To be philosophically fair, the standards must be applied across the board.  That is, whatever standard is used in determining what actions should be done for Haleigh must equally apply to any other human being.

From reading the article, we see the following justification for allowing Haleigh to die:

Haleigh’s doctors have said her brain stem is damaged and she would die within a few days without a feeding tube.

As you can see, there are two determining factors in this reasoning.  First, Haleigh’s brain stem is damaged; secondly, she would die within a few days without a feeding tube.  Neither one of these issues, taken by themselves, are sufficient reason for us to allow the death of another human being, and that is easily shown:

1) If someone’s brain stem is damaged but they can still feed themselves, no one would argue that that person should be killed.  Thus, brain stem damage alone does not determine that someone should be killed.

2) Infants, for example, cannot eat on their own, and yet infant murder is not condoned even if an infant is just left to die rather than actively killed.

Thus, neither reason by itself is sufficient to allow the death of the individual.  The question then is why having both of these conditions simultaneously would result in the ability for us to now kill the person.  In order for this to be morally valid, it must be demonstrated that there is some kind of correlation between brain-stem damage and inability to feed oneself that is morally sufficient to alter the way we would act toward a person who only had one or the other instead of both.

In this case, I don’t see what the valid argument would be.  Naturally, I cannot prove a negative and thus I cannot prove there is no argument that could be made; but the burden of proof is on the one who claims there is a sufficient reason to kill someone who displays both of these problems when we know there are individuals who have only one problem who we would not kill.

Most commonly, this focuses around the issue of the ability of a person to feed and care for oneself.  If we restrict the argument to just this point it may help clarify the issue somewhat.  Is it morally justifiable to kill someone who cannot feed and care for himself?

1. We know that in the case of infants, this is not morally justifiable.

2. The only difference between an infant and an adult is the age of the human being. 

Is the age of a human being sufficient reason to kill or allow the death of that individual? 

Some may argue that this difference in age also includes a difference in the “potential” of a person–an infant has the potential to grow and mature while an adult does not.  Thus, one does not expect that an infant will stay incapacitated forever, while the adult is not expected to recover.

Let us grant that the doctors do not err in determining that someone is beyond recovery (although as we have seen they often do err).  Is “potential” a sufficient reason to allow the death of one person and not another?  How much “potential” is required?  What is the standard to use in this case?

In point of fact, there is no real standard of “potential” but instead one must arbitrarily declare, “This person has potential and that person does not.”  Potential, after all, is something that may occur, and therefore is by definition a guess about the future.  Some guesses are certainly more reasonable than other guesses, but does a guess give us the moral ability to act in a certain way toward one person and not another?

These are certainly issues that call for much thought.  The “right to die” argument is far from settled because until these questions are actually answered instead of simply ignored no one will be able to make informed moral judgements.  Until these questions are answered, it is only an emotive response.