CalvinDude.com

Yes, I am actually writing this from work. I finally get to escape. For today. As Neil Diamond might sing (not really): “Sweet overtime…” (not really).

Scientists from Nasa say that Mars has warmed by about 0.5C since the 1970s. This is similar to the warming experienced on Earth over approximately the same period.

Stupid SUVs…

If there is one thing that characterizes Dawson Bethrick’s intellectual engagements, it’s the ever-shifting goalposts. A fine example of this is in the recent exchanges that we’ve had.

First, Dawson posed a question that he claimed “would have ruinous implications for the presuppositionalist approach to Christian apologetics.” Everything that Dawson put forth in his argument was done in order to demonstrate this “ruinous” presuppositional position. Let me make this clear. Dawson’s reason for writing anything at all was, as he himself stated, because:

If it can be determined that an “omniscient” consciousness would not possess its knowledge in the form of concepts, this would have ruinous implications for the presuppositionalist approach to Christian apologetics which seeks to contrive aspects of man’s cognitive experience as evidence for an omniscient being whose thinking serves as the model for man’s mental abilities.

I responded to Dawson, pointing out that nothing of what he said was in fact ruinous to the presuppositional position. My response to Dawson showed that his argument did not apply to the presuppositionalist position in the least, was based on faulty presuppositions of his own, and did not accurately reflect Christian understanding of the concepts of omniscience, etc.

Dawson then claimed that I misunderstood his post and had responded to something he didn’t even write about. I then showed how Dawson’s response to my response was, in fact, the very thing he claimed I had done: that is, he responded to things that I didn’t write.

Now Dawson has posted another response. This one is basically ad hominem attacks against me. Hey, when it’s all you’ve got in your arsenal…

Anyway, if we cut through the abuse, we find that Dawson has merely shifted the goalposts and forgotten the original point of his first post, as he typically does. Dawson’s original point was that if God’s knowledge was not held in the form of concepts, then this would be ruinous to the presuppositionalist position. Now, however, he claims that all his post was meant to show is that God’s knowledge could not be held in the form of concepts. He’s not even pretending to try to demonstrate how this provides “ruinous implications” for presuppositionalists anymore. Instead, he’s hoping to distract everyone with a song and dance routine in the hopes that no one will realize that he’s no longer defending his original premise.

For instance, I had said:

Now Dawson’s argument is simply that God does not hold knowledge in the form of concepts. To which I respond: so what?

Dawson responds:

That was always my argument. It has not changed.

But that has NOT always been Dawson’s argument. Remember, Dawson’s argument was: “If it can be determined that an ‘omniscient’ consciousness would not possess its knowledge in the form of concepts, this would have ruinous implications for the presuppositionalist approach to Christian apologetics…”

Dawson then opines:

Now his response to my argument, after he’s realized what it is, is “so what?” Why was it any different before I had to rescue him from his repetitive mistakes?

Dawson, you’ve not “rescued” anyone from repetitive mistakes–you’ve only succeeded in making those mistakes.

Allow me to demonstrate the lunacy of your argument. It would be as if I said: “The sky is blue, therefore atheism is false.” You respond: “I agree the sky is blue. So what?” I then respond: “See! Dawson agrees with me that the sky is blue! That’s all my argument ever said. He’s such an idiot for arguing against me when he didn’t even understand what I was arguing in the first place!”

This is what’s known as the classic “Bait & Switch” (which, incidentally, has the same initials as what Dawson’s arguments are composed of…but we won’t go there… *wink*)

Naturally, I cannot end this without offering the perfect example of how Dawson operates. I originally pointed out:

This [Dawson’s argument] obviously does not cause “ruinous implications for the presuppositionalist approach to Christian apologetics” since God can still use concepts.

Dawson responds:

Then why did Pike get his panties in a bundle in the first place?

Yes, that’s right. Dawson makes a claim, X. I point out that X is false. His response to that is to say, “Then why are you refuting X?”

I cannot make this up!

52.3 is the magic number.

That number could be referring to the average IQ of the current presidential candidates.

It could be referring to the number of calories in a single serving of my tastey beverage I am imbibing.

It could refer to the resting heart-rate of a Delta Force soldier.

But it’s not. No, 52.3 is the number of miles that I have biked since last Friday. And, since I finished biking today earlier in the day than I started biking a week ago, that means I did do 52.3 miles in one week.

It’s not as impressive as it will be. But 50 miles for the first week ain’t bad :-)

Dawson responded to my comments on his original post. It’s difficult to know how to respond to him now. I’d try to explain it, but this is probably best simply demonstrated.

Dawson said:

Nowhere does my paper argue that an omniscient being would not know what a concept is. Rather, my point is that it would not possess that knowledge in the form of concepts. Pike fails to distinguish between the object of knowledge and the form in which that knowledge is held. He’s talking about the former while my paper talks about the latter.

I must have fallen victim to the notion that Dawson was trying to present an argument that was relevant. I suppose it’s a natural assumption that if someone is going to write 3,300 words on a site dedicated to “incinerating presuppositionalism” that that article would actually be applicable to a presuppositionalist position, but apparently Dawson doesn’t think that way. Dawson seems to be the type of person who would go to a Star Trek convention to argue that the Death Star should have been two meters wider.

Since I assumed that Dawson was trying to interact with the position he was critiquing, I read it in that manner. But I suppose I needn’t bother myself with such “trivialities” in the future.

But I’ll also say this certainly doesn’t seem to fit with Dawson’s original supplied reason for his argument in the first place, namely:

If it can be determined that an “omniscient” consciousness would not possess its knowledge in the form of concepts, this would have ruinous implications for the presuppositionalist approach to Christian apologetics which seeks to contrive aspects of man’s cognitive experience as evidence for an omniscient being whose thinking serves as the model for man’s mental abilities.

Now Dawson’s argument is simply that God does not hold knowledge in the form of concepts. To which I respond: so what? This obviously does not cause “ruinous implications for the presuppositionalist approach to Christian apologetics” since God can still use concepts. Surely Dawson is bright enough to realize this. Surely, he meant more by his post than just the above.

But apparently not.

Dawson displays his hypocrisy when he says:

My paper provides a rationale, based on the objective theory of concepts, for supposing that an omniscient being would not have its knowledge in the form of concepts. Pike himself said his god’s knowledge is not conceptual, but he did not provide an alternative rationale for supposing this other than the loose statements found in the bible which say nothing about concepts whatsoever.

Those statements are:
For as the heavens are higher than the earth, so are my ways higher than your ways and my thoughts than your thoughts (Isaiah 55:9).

For who knows a person’s thoughts except the spirit of that person, which is in him? So also no one comprehends the thoughts of God except the Spirit of God (1 Corinthians 2:11).

Neither of these verses say anything about whether or not the god it speaks of possesses its knowledge in the form of concepts.

Back the truck up, Dawson. I quoted those verses in response to YOUR CLAIM that: “Many believers might think that, since Christianity teaches that man was created in the Christian god’s image, man’s thinking in the form of concepts would indicate that their god thinks in the form of concepts as well.” I responded with those verses and concluded: “Given these passages, it would be very foolhardy indeed for a believer to argue, ‘I think this way, therefore God does too.’” I wasn’t quoting those passages as “an alternative rational for supposing” that “[G]od’s knowledge is not conceptual.” I was pointing out by those passages that a Biblical believer would be stupid to assume God thinks conceptually on the basis that they think conceptually.

If you’re going to criticize me for supposedly responding to something that you didn’t write about, perhaps you shouldn’t respond to something I didn’t write about in the process.

Dawson said:

First, my statement “consciousness is consciousness of something” was nowhere offered as a definition. Why does Pike suppose it was?

Since it was in this paragraph:

To understand how erroneous it would be to assume that an omniscient, all-seeing and omnipresent consciousness would possess its knowledge in the form of concepts, we need to consider what concepts accomplish for man. And to understand what concepts do for man, we need to understand the essentials of his consciousness. Consciousness is consciousness of something, i.e., of an object(s). And man’s consciousness begins with perception of the world around him. Perception does not give man awareness of concepts; it gives him awareness of particular entities, their attributes, actions, etc. Sense perception gives man awareness of these things in the form of percepts.

(Emphasis added.)

Am I to suppose Dawson doesn’t think the definition of a term is needed “to understand the essentials of” that term? Do I really need to think he is that big of an idiot? Is this what he is really asking me to do here?

Dawson said:

Second, ‘consciousness’ is an axiomatic concept.

Good. This means that the following, which I wrote and you’re “responding” to now, should apply:

Now Dawson would most certainly argue that it is because consciousness is axiomatic; but even if it is, all he has done here is given us an empty label that he bases the rest of his argument upon. It’s about as meaningful as saying “A is A.” It tells you absolutely nothing about the nature or ontology of A. “Consciousness is consciousness of something” tells you absolutely nothing about what consciousness is, other than that it involves “something.”

So, tell me Dawson–how in your argument is “consciousness” anything other than an empty label? What is conscious? Or, since consciousness is involved it is more proper to ask: WHO is conscious? What are the attributes that this axiomatic consciousness requires of the subject who is conscious?

You want to ignore all that and just assume “consciousness” as if consciousness could exist without a subject. If it does, then it is a content-less, meaningless “empty label” as I said before.

Dawson said:

Like other axiomatic concepts, it lies at the fundamental level of the conceptual hierarchy, which means: it is not defined in terms of prior concepts.

So “consciousness” is meaningless in Dawson’s world. Yet Dawson seems to know an awful lot about it. Dawson is giving us restrictions on what consciousness can do, etc. and yet he has acknowledged that he doesn’t even have a way to define it.

Remember, Dawson originally said: “Consciousness is consciousness of something.” So what he’s really saying is “An undefinable term is an undefinable term of something.”

Very helpful indeed.

Dawson then said:

Pike then got sidetracked on the unrelated issue of whether or not concepts are open-ended, and presented a thought experiment to substantiate his position that they don’t have to be.

Actually, my thought experiment was only to demonstrate that you could actually perceive every single physical object and still be able to form concepts. It is therefore frankly dishonest for you to complain:

The original issue is whether or not concepts are open-ended, but the scenario Pike presents in his illustration is deliberately crafted so that open-endedness cannot apply.

Since I was never asking whether concepts were open-ended or not, Dawson’s response is ingenious at best. Now Dawson could certainly argue that my illustration only applies for close-ended concepts (although even he argues that it applies to open-ended concepts), but he cannot claim that my argument was meant to address that issue in the first place.

Once again, Dawson is doing the very thing he claimed I did (that is, responding to what wasn’t written in the first place).

Dawson said:

Also, he asks us to assume that “the entire universe consisted of one room with two objects in the room.” “Room”? What does this mean? Where did he get this concept? That’s right, he got it from the real environment. To make his thought experiment work, he needs to borrow from outside it, which makes it an unclean laboratory for developing his point.

Newsflash: I’m not saying the thought experiment universe is real! It doesn’t matter that it borrows from the outside world. The thought experiment is designed to focus on specific points.

Seriously, you need to get out more, Dawson. You’re freaking out over an analogy here. No analogy is ever going to be a perfect one.

Dawson continues:

Then, without explanation, Pike adds an “observer.” Is this observer part of the universe? If so, then we’re asked to contradict what we were first asked to suppose, namely that the entire universe consisted of one room with two objects. Now it’s a room with three objects, one of which is an observer. How many more changes to the thought experiment are we to expect coming down the pike?

Surely you are able to think better than this. No, the observer is not a physical object within the thought-universe, just as God is not a physical object within the real universe. Since the analogy is linking the observer to the nature of God (that is, demonstrating that an observer can have full knowledge of all objects that exist within a universe and still be able to form concepts) then the only reason you have to assume I’m adding an object is because you’re being willfully pedantic.

Dawson says:

Another problem is that we’re asked to suppose we know something without any explanation of how we’re supposed to know it; we’re asked to suppose that the entire universe consists of one room with two (um, make that three) objects in the room. How would we know this?

Gee, Dawson, I dunno…maybe by READING WHAT I WROTE?

Seriously: fresh air. Try it from time to time.

I wrote:

Or, to put it another way, if you can conceptualize based on a few objects, you can conceptualize based on a few more than that. And if you can conceptualize with more objects, you can conceptualize even when you have all objects, both real and potential

To which Dawson responds:

This does not reverse the facts that we are directly aware of only a small number of units at any time, that there are always many units of which we are not aware at any time, and that we need concepts to help us cognitively manage those units which lie outside our immediate awareness.

Which completely ignores the fact that we’re talking about an omniscient being here. Dawson forgot that he’s the one who posed the original question: Would an Omniscient Mind Have Knowledge in Conceptual Form?

Dawson said:

Again, Pike has missed what my paper argues. It argues that an omniscient being would not have its knowledge in the form of concepts. I did not say that Pike’s god could not have the ability to form concepts.

So where’s the problem with Presuppositionalism?

Finally, Dawson concludes with another complaint:

But this does lead to a question: If the Christian god does not possess its knowledge in conceptual form, what is the form in which it possesses its knowledge? Pike did not speak to this.

Could that be because I was RESPONDING to your argument instead of presenting a positive one of my own?

In any case, Dawson has promised to use the concept that God doesn’t think in concepts for another post. If it’s anywhere near as torturous as this one, the Marquis de Sade would be well pleased.

I just read this article about Global Warming. It’s very interesting, so you should read the whole thing.

But I had to laugh at the last paragraph:

“We solved the ozone and acid rain problem. With effort, and a new way of doing things we could solve this one too,” said Phillips.

Right. We “solved” ozone problems and “acid rain.” Uh-huh. And how were they solved?

Global Warming alarmists indicate it’s NOT due to a reduction of car pollution, industrial pollution, etc.

So how were these problems solved?

It’s simple: ozone problems and acid rain are, and have always been, FRAUDS. These “problems” were “solved” precisely because they were never a problem in the first place! They were fictional, made up environmental whacko positions designed to scare people. They’re myths, and as such they’re “solved” because the doomsday disaster would never occur.

So yeah, we’ll “solve” Global Warming in the same way as we solve any other fraud, and we won’t have to change anything we’re currently doing to get there.

Looking at Dawson Bethrick’s site after reading Steve’s response, I found that Dawson has posted a lengthy essay answering the age-old question: “Would an Omniscient Mind Have Knowledge in Conceptual Form?

My heart really goes out to this man now. Of all the things he could be doing in San Francisco in the spring (like putting flowers in his hair, watching the Giants, or whatever), he decided to write this post instead. And while it demonstrates Dawson’s commitment to Randian philosophy, it also demonstrates his inability to grasp basic Christian concepts.

Dawson said:

Many believers might think that, since Christianity teaches that man was created in the Christian god’s image, man’s thinking in the form of concepts would indicate that their god thinks in the form of concepts as well.

Firstly, this relies on the worn out, “Many unnamed non-specified people think X” fallacy. Dawson plays this card a lot, I’ve noticed (I’ve been interacting with him for several years–probably close to half a decade by now). I’ve no doubt that he’s heard the above from someone; but it makes his argument seem more relevant to change it to “many.”

Secondly, even if “many believers” do think this, it’s certainly not due to Biblical knowledge, which includes such verses as:

For as the heavens are higher than the earth, so are my ways higher than your ways and my thoughts than your thoughts (Isaiah 55:9).

For who knows a person’s thoughts except the spirit of that person, which is in him? So also no one comprehends the thoughts of God except the Spirit of God (1 Corinthians 2:11).

Given these passages, it would be very foolhardy indeed for a believer to argue, “I think this way, therefore God does too.”

So now we get to the purpose of Dawson’s argument:

If it can be determined that an “omniscient” consciousness would not possess its knowledge in the form of concepts, this would have ruinous implications for the presuppositionalist approach to Christian apologetics which seeks to contrive aspects of man’s cognitive experience as evidence for an omniscient being whose thinking serves as the model for man’s mental abilities.

(Note: readers of the above sentence may now realize why I included Bethrick in my previous satire, Ode Owed to Bethrick, Morgan, Enloe, Orthodox, et. al..)

Of course I can see many ways in which this would not be ruinous at all, even if we ignore the fact that Dawson is attacking a straw man here. I will delve into those more in detail as Dawson presents his argument. But at a bare minimum, I also have to wonder just what Dawson thinks “omniscient” means.

If we define omniscience as knowledge of everything, this is not actually a definition of omniscience that is held by a Biblical believer. For instance, God does not know what a round square looks like. And of course God doesn’t have experiential knowledge of sin: that is, God does not personally know what it is like to lie, etc.

But when we realize that omniscience refers to those things that are possible for God to know, such as all true propositions, then we simply ask: is it impossible for a being that knows all that is possible to know to know what a concept is? If it is possible to know what a concept is, then a being that knows all that is possible to know, would indeed know these concepts too.

Dawson claims:

It would not make sense to suppose that man’s cognitive functions are patterned after a consciousness whose awareness is so vastly superior to or different from man’s consciousness that it would have no use for the kinds of functions man’s mind employs.

This, of course, begs the question. After all, is it not possible for a being that knows all that can logically be known to use concepts that He knows to communicate to beings He created with the ability to understand these same concepts? If God intends to use concepts to communicate with His creation, how would that cause any logical problems?

Simply asking these questions before he began to write his essay would have saved Dawson a lot of time to watch the Giants…

By now, you may be wondering just how Dawson defines what a concept is anyway. Seeing the definition helps to demonstrate why there is no contradiction in Christian theism.

Dawson writes:

To understand how erroneous it would be to assume that an omniscient, all-seeing and omnipresent consciousness would possess its knowledge in the form of concepts, we need to consider what concepts accomplish for man. And to understand what concepts do for man, we need to understand the essentials of his consciousness. Consciousness is consciousness of something, i.e., of an object(s).

I’ll interrupt for a second to point out the obvious problem with the last sentence. “Consciousness is consciousness of something” demonstrates that Dawson cannot define “consciousness” without referencing the very thing he’s trying to define! As such, this “definition” requires you to know what is being defined in order to understand the definition. Now Dawson would most certainly argue that it is because consciousness is axiomatic; but even if it is, all he has done here is given us an empty label that he bases the rest of his argument upon. It’s about as meaningful as saying “A is A.” It tells you absolutely nothing about the nature or ontology of A. “Consciousness is consciousness of something” tells you absolutely nothing about what consciousness is, other than that it involves “something.”

Continuing:

And man’s consciousness begins with perception of the world around him. Perception does not give man awareness of concepts; it gives him awareness of particular entities, their attributes, actions, etc. Sense perception gives man awareness of these things in the form of percepts….

But man can perceive only a limited number of existents at any moment, and his perceptual faculty can retain and integrate only a limited number of sensations at any moment. However, man can get “beyond” these limitations by means of conceptual integration. Conceptual integration allows him to expand his awareness beyond the objects of his immediate, perceptual awareness by combining them into classes which include not only the particular entities which he perceives in the “here and now,” but also similar entities which he has perceived, may one day perceive and may never perceive. What makes this expansion of man’s consciousness beyond the immediate inputs of sense perception possible, is the process of abstraction: integration of multiple units into categories by means of measurement-omission according to common isolated essentials.

Now it should be noted that I have no objection to any of the above. Man certainly does seem to think in this manner. But how Dawson gets from the above definitions to the idea that an omniscient being cannot use concepts is where the problems are.

In the above, Dawson is dealing with man: a finite creature. This is demonstrated by Dawson pointing out that “man can perceive only a limited number of existents at any moment.” No matter how hard a man may wish it, he simply cannot become infinite. He cannot view an infinite number of “existents” because he is limited both in space and in time. Without the ability to form abstractions, communication and higher thinking simply could not exist.

All this I agree with Dawson on. However, he then concludes:

Concepts thus allow man to treat as a single whole an unlimited series of existents which he has not observed or directly perceived, on the basis of those which he has observed or directly perceived. Concepts are therefore a kind of mental shorthand which he needs because he does not have direct awareness of all members of a class.

And this is where I disagree. Concepts can be formed even when one has “direct awareness all the members of a class.” This can easily be demonstrated by a quick thought experiment.

Suppose the entire universe consisted of one room with two objects in the room. These objects both had the same shape. One observer looked in this room and said that the shape of the first object was “square.” The other shape is also a square. He can thereby state that if anything else were to pop into existence with that shape, it would also be square. He has abstracted the shape “square” and yet has full knowledge of all the actual existent objects in the universe.

Or, to put it another way, if you can conceptualize based on a few objects, you can conceptualize based on a few more than that. And if you can conceptualize with more objects, you can conceptualize even when you have all objects, both real and potential.

Of course, I should point out that Dawson did couch his argument in terms of “need” for he said: “Concepts are therefore a kind of mental shorthand which he needs because he does not have direct awareness of all members of a class.” So perhaps he could argue that God did not need the ability to form concepts even though He could do so.

But God did not need to create man either, and He chose to do so. Once God created man, then the need would certainly be there if He desired to communicate with man. If God did not wish to communicate with man, then there would be no need for Him to be able to form concepts; but because that view is heretical to the Christian position, which Dawson is supposedly critiquing, we can safely ignore it.

Skipping down to Dawson’s response to his made-up theist objections, we read:

[Believing that God’s consciousness is infinite] will only play into my point, namely that the “knowledge” which Christians claim on behalf of their god could not be conceptual in nature. Since its awareness is not limited to only a small number of units at any given time, it would not possess its knowledge in a form which omits specific measurements in order “to extend its grasp beyond a mere handful of concretes.” Such a method of cognition would actually destroy its omniscience, for it would obliterate its immediate awareness of all the details belonging to everything that exists save for a statistically insignificant few.

Of course, as I’ve quoted in the verses above, the Bible doesn’t treat God’s knowledge as only “conceptual in nature.” Dawson put this limitation on the theist, not the Bible. But what Dawson fails to realize is that an all-knowing God could still form concepts in order to communicate to those He created. God knows what concepts are; if He is all-knowing, He knows not only all objects but all true conceptualizations of these objects too. God can use them to communicate (revelation) with man. There is nothing inherently illogical with this.

Dawson, after quoting Bahsen, concludes:

Since, according to this view, the Christian god “has no ‘percepts’ from which He constructs His knowledge,” it would have no need for a faculty which “integrates and thus condenses a group of percepts into a single mental whole.”

Once again, Dawson begs the question. He supposed God would have no “need for a faculty which ‘integrates and thus condenses a group of percepts into a single mental whole’”, which begs the question that God does not wish to communicate to concept-based beings! God most certainly WOULD need the faculty to do so if He wished to relate to His creation, and (as I argued above) it is not illogical to state that God can do so. Since He logically can do so, and since Christians state God does want to communicate to us, then Dawson has no argument left.

God’s knowledge–what He Himself knows–is not conceptual. But He reveals Himself to us conceptually because that is the only way that we can think. We are the image of God, not God Himself.

I mentioned earlier, when I finished up my classes, the various stressful levels of my life (which was why my blog had slowed down for a bit). Time for a bit of an update.

First, the good news. 1) My classes are done. Hurrah! I cannot repeat that enough. MY CLASSES ARE DONE!!! (I haven’t decided yet if I will take some more next semester or not.) 2) Loratadine works perfect for my allergies. Thus, two of the stressful things (which I noted earlier accounted for 25% of my then-current stress levels) are gone.

Now the bad news. The other 75% was work related, due to the vast number of people who have left, the need for training, etc.

Well, today we got another one. This time, my supervisor is accepting another position.

This is a mixed thing, because it’s definitely good for her and she deserves a better position. I wouldn’t envy anyone as the supervisor of my department. It’s nothing but pure stress 100% of the time (which is why I’m not going to even pretend to apply for the open position now). However, she is one of those people that is impossible to replace without hiring another four people or so. One of my co-workers said (rightly, in my opinion): “There is no one here who could take her place.”

So this means that the stress factor in my department just shot up past the red-line. To top matters off, we are still waiting for one person to retire in June, and another will be going on maternity leave (again, my experience is that there’s a 50/50 shot she’ll return from that instead of being a stay-at-home mother). In addition to that, there’s supposed to be an update to our credit card software (the last I heard it was scheduled for May–but that was months ago when I heard that) and our scanning software was supposed to be updated last June/last September/last February/and now this coming June (one of these days they’ll actually do it…won’t they?).

And now we’ll get all that fun stuff without our awesome supervisor. Needless to say, we could use prayers during this time.

It is raining snow.
The evil wind is in it.
Now what will I do?

Yes, more wind/snow/rain outside. I had to bike into the wind en route to work today; it better be at my back on the way home!!! (Yeah, like the weather has ever listened to me!)

Earlier this evening, I happened to look over on the DebunkingAtheism website and saw that Jim Benton has written a little piece responding to some of my comments in this post.

Benton said:

A moderately sophisticated version of biological or cosmological Creationism such as Intelligent Design only demonstrates the existence of a Deistic God. It can’t prove that the Creator-God is, in fact, Theistic.

Surely Benton knows that “Deist” is only the Latinized form of the Greek “Theist.” In point of fact, it is definitional: it is impossible to have a non-Theistic God.

I’ll assume what Benton means here is that ID can be used to prove a completely impersonal God, as opposed to the personal God of Christianity. And as far as that goes, I’d agree. This is why teaching ID isn’t equivalent to teaching religion, and further evidence why there’s no reason the courts shouldn’t allow ID to be taught in schools due to the separation of church and state excuse.

Benton said:

Remember that all our current Gods were conceived when the Universe was considered to consist of the Earth — in reality a small part of it — and some ‘lights in the skies.’

Remember that Benton simply begs the question that all “Gods” were “conceived” instead of an actual God revealing Himself to a certain group of people on Earth at a specific point in time.

Benton said:

In this context, it was reasonable to see Man as the high point of, and the reason for, Creation.

So? That’s not the context that Christian theism holds to. That’s only the concept that Benton’s position holds to.

Benton said:

In a Universe consisting of a billion galaxies each with a billion stars, a much stronger argument — or ego — is needed to see Man as its center and reason for existence.

Again, this isn’t the Christian position, which does not view “Man” as “its center and reason for existence.” Rather, Christianity views GOD as the center and reason for the existence of the universe. We are theocentric, not anthropocentric. Hence:

What is man, that you make so much of him, and that you set your heart on him, visit him every morning and test him every moment? (Job 7:17-18)

What is man that you are mindful of him, and the son of man that you care for him? (Psalm 8:4)

Benton said:

But moral Creationism is different. Were it to be provable — as unlikely as this appears — it would be an absolute refutation of the claims of Christianity — at least in its literalist-evangelical form.

Given that thus far you haven’t even accurately represented the Christian position, your claim doesn’t frighten me.

Benton said:

But, of course, the best place to find expressions of this is from Paul Manata and the TRIABLOGUE crew, whose portrayal of ‘strong Christianity’ accomplishes a level of self-debunking that matches anything we say here.

As an aside, when you say “accomplishes a level of self-debunking that matches anything we say here” are you acknowledging you self-debunk?

In any case, I wonder why you say “the best place to find expressions of this is from Paul Manata” and yet the only quotes you give are from me? That might make Paul jealous :-P

After my quotes (which you can read in the post or in their original context) Benton (who unfortunately didn’t use paragraphs and seemed to switch thoughts in mid-sentence throughout) said:

Let’s try and summarize the argument they make:1) The Creator of the Universe included within it, or within humanity, a certain universal and absolute morality, and that when someone speaks of something as ‘moral’ or ‘immoral’ he is recognizing this inherent ‘moral standard.’ Thus it is only by way of this standard that it is possible for an action to be judged ‘good’ or ‘evil.

No, that’s not how it starts. It starts like this: Atheism has nothing qua atheism that allows anyone to speak of anything as “moral” or “immoral.”

This is a negative argument. I am simply denying that atheists have a basis for their morality. You could easily prove my position wrong by…what’s the word I’m looking for here? Oh yes: by demonstrating a basis for atheistic morality.

Given that Benton hasn’t even understood my argument in the first place, most of his summary amazingly enough has nothing to do with what I’ve said. I wonder why he even bothered to list my quotes.

In any case, although it’s irrelevant to my own arguments, I’ll look at some of the other things he said in his “summary” of my position.

Benton continued:

2) That this Creator is identical with the ‘Abrahamic’ God.

Again, my argument is a negative argument against atheism. I’m not advancing an air-tight argument for Christianity. I don’t need to in this instance. My sole objective is to demonstrate that atheists have to jettison atheism in order to have morality.

They can do this with any deity they please, but they cannot remain atheists.

Benton said:

3) That this God is the ‘author’ (or ‘inspirer’) of the Old and New Testaments.

Again, not addressing my argument. But let’s play along and pretend it did.

Benton said:

But there are logical consequences to these statements: A) If this God is both the creator of the ‘moral standard’ and the Bible, he cannot contradict himself in these two ‘authorial creations.

How do you know that God cannot contradict Himself? You seem to be imposing a morality on God rather than getting the morality from God. That I happen to agree that God doesn’t contradict Himself is irrelevant to this point–how do YOU know that God cannot contradict Himself? You’ve not established this in your argument.

Instead, you seem to be taking the Christian conclusion as your presupposition. Which is fine insofar as that goes; but that does mean that you have to be consistent with the entirety of the Christian presupposition instead of your current “pick and choose” method, which violates this Christian presupposition (meaning that your refutations of it are external additions to it, not due to internal inconsistencies).

In short, either presuppose it correctly or demonstrate it externally without any reference to the Christian presuppositions involved.

Benton said:

‘B) Even if we argue that the Old Testament and ‘time of the Jews’ was a way of preparing the world — by growing ideas of monotheism, social justice,’ personal responsibility, and a direct relationship with God — for the message of Christ, the final message of God — we have to assume that the Old Testament does not, in itself, contain immorality.

No, we don’t have to agree with that at all, as you acknowledge in your next point. The Scriptures can contain immorality; they just cannot be immoral.

Benton said:

To eliminate two frequent complaints…

Good thing you eliminated that which no one was going to raise. We can all rest easier at night now :-)

Benton said:

The two books can, obviously, contain stories OF immorality — the story of David and Bathsheeba being an obvious example — but they cannot, if written by the Creator of the ultimate moral standard, accept or celebrate such immorality.

This is simply naïve. What is the most immoral action ever committed? The murder of Jesus Christ. Yet this was for the greatest possible good because it saved His people. The Bible can celebrate the fact that evil people did an immoral action because of what was accomplished by it: the greatest good.

What the Bible cannot do is call that which is evil good. And it doesn’t. The men who murdered Jesus are rightly condemned as evil people, even though the good that we gain through His death is celebrated Scripturally.

Benton said:

D) The existence of the ‘two Testaments’ implies that humanity’s moral sense might grow and deepen, but the ‘ultimate standard’ cannot itself change.

I don’t see how that follows from the existence of the two Testaments. God’s immutability and His promises are the reasons why “the ultimate standard” won’t change.

Benton said:

Humanity’s moral sense might grow, but it cannot grow beyond that which the Creator has created. (To make that clearer, if God has permitted something as moral, we may not claim we now ‘know better’ and see it as immoral — not if the standa5rd is in fact ‘absolute’ or ‘ultimate.’

This likewise does not follow. That God permits something does not mean that what is permitted is good. Jesus Himself points out that God permitted divorce under Moses, even though He hates divorce. Due to the hardness of men’s hearts, God does not enforce the law 100%, but has mercy on whom He has mercy.

Mercy isn’t owed; therefore, it need not be given to all. If God permitted (for example) polygamy in the Old Testament, it doesn’t mean He cannot choose to no longer permit it in the New Testament.

Benton said:

And some [commandments], like the rules on ‘mildew and infectious skin diseases’ — Leviticus 13,14 — or the laws on planting two crops in the same field or wearing clothes of two different materials — Leviticus 19:19 are inexplicable, at least to me — I’d go so far as to call them simply ‘weird.’)

Yes, and we know that Benton’s standard of “weirdness” is the objective standard that we must all accept, and that if Benton doesn’t get it then no one can get it. Argument from ignorance.

Benton said:

Many Christians argue that the “New Covenant” wiped out the Old, that the laws of the Old Testament were abolished by Jesus.

“Christians I know believe X” fallacy. Many Christians are Biblically illiterate. That doesn’t disprove Christianity. The New Covenant didn’t “wipe out” the Old; it fulfilled it.

And then suddenly it’s over. Benton’s argument is just finished (with the promise that there will be more someday).

So I ask, since Benton is going to write more, that he establish morality under atheism. Now it should be noted that by “morality” I mean an objective, transcendent morality. That is, Benton needs to show how he can come up with moral commands that I ought to follow, without invoking a deity of any kind. If he wants to say that murder is wrong, then he needs to establish it without abandoning his atheistic principals. He needs to demonstrate, FROM ATHEISM, how murder is wrong.

If he cannot do so, then I’d say that’s a pretty airtight argument that morality presupposes some form of deity.