Responding to Witmer Part 2

As we continue with examining the Witmer talk, I’ve noticed that Daniel has responded to the previous section already. I will refrain from responding to Daniel until after my examination of Witmer’s critique is finished (I’m doing it in chunks since certain sections will require more response than others and I don’t want this a super-long bloated blog post!); but I will respond to Daniel :-)

Continuing with Witmer:

The negative arguments that the presuppositionalist wants to give focus on logic, induction and morality: their claim is that if the unbeliever uses any of those, he or she is relying on something that presupposes God’s existence.(ibid, 4)

Yes, this is indeed what the presuppositionalist position claims. In order to refute this argument, the atheist must demonstrate what he or she is relying on for the basis of logic and morality. This is something that Witmer does not do in this talk.Witmer continues:

What is the relevant sense of “depend” here? Beware one path the presuppositionalist might take. Suppose that theism is true. In that case, it might be that everything depends on God in the way the presuppositionalist says they do, just because God has power to do anything (I ignore here questions about any limits on God’s power). If this is the sort of “depend” in question, however, it’s of no use in an argument for thinking God exists. That’s rather a sense of dependence that follows if God exists, but it’s not a sense that helps us get “Logic exists; hence God exists” or the like.(ibid, 5)

Apparently, Witmer is arguing that the theist supposes it is possible that logic exists due to God’s power (although he conveniently ignores questions about what that means). Let us grant that (although I do not hold to it) for a moment.If logic is true because of God’s power, then God must exist in order to exert His power, no? And if God must exist, then it most certainly still remains a proper argument to say that the existence of logic necessitates the existence of God. Otherwise, you have the power of God without the existence of God, which is frankly absurd.

In other words, far from not enabling us to argue for the existence of God, even this bastardized form of presuppositionalism would still demonstrate the existence of God.

Continuing:

What the presuppositionalist wants to say is, rather, that these things depend on God in the sense that they cannot exist unless God exists, or that they cannot be “made sense of” or understood in some appropriate way if God doesn’t exist. So let’s turn to these claims.(ibid, 5)

This is indeed closer to the presuppositionalist position; and it is the same conclusion that one must draw from the previous arguments Witmer tried.Now I’ll note that it is relatively easy to disprove the presuppositionalist position in theory: all one must do is establish the grounds of logic and morality apart from God. The atheist ought to have no problem doing so…right?

But as we shall see, Witmer does not do this; nor for that matter can he do this.

Witmer continues:

Insofar as there is a presuppositionalist argument for Christian belief, it can be understood this way. First, for every set of beliefs contrary to Christian belief, that set is incoherent or otherwise problematic. Second, the only remaining belief system must be correct.One obvious difficulty with this style of argument is that it requires that all the options be eliminated, and given how many there are, this seems quite difficult. It is not enough to sum up the opposition as one simplistic kind of atheism and argue that that can’t be right; all varieties thereof must be dealt with.

(ibid, 5)

This would be a problem except insofar as all arguments that deal with worldview level issues reduce down to simple either/or statements. For instance, either a God exists or a God does not exist. These two ideas cannot both be correct.Therefore, presuppositionalists in general will reduce the atheist’s arguments down to its core principles and examine those. Those core principles are going to be either/or ideas. Every argument reduces to them, and therefore we can look at them.

It is necessary to point out that if one has not reduced an argument to these core presuppositions, one is not arguing presuppositionally. In other words, if one wants to argue about the differences between naturalistic secular humanism and Ayn Randian morality, one is not looking at the presuppositions involved; on is instead arguing at a level that has not yet reached the presuppositions.

These arguments work if one has already established presuppositions; but without those established, the two debaters are arguing from different worldviews and will never come to a correct understanding of their issues. This is why it is not a daunting a task for the presuppositionalist theist as the atheist would like to believe: we are dealing with root arguments, not the leaves on the argument’s tree.

Witmer continues:

Another difficulty to bear in mind: this sort of argument only succeeds if the same kind of alleged incoherence does not threaten Christian belief as well. Suppose we eliminate the opposition, but the tools we used eliminate our own position; we then need to go back and rethink the techniques used. So, for instance, if the presuppositionalist argues that atheistic treatments of morality fail because of such and such an implication, he needs to ask himself whether or not his own treatment of morality has the same problematic implication.(ibid, 5)

I actually agree with Witmer on this point. If an argument a theist uses against an atheist also destroys the theist’s position, then the argument is going to be flawed. (The third option, that both the atheist and theist position could be in error, is not possible if one is actually looking at presuppositions, as I argued above, since we are at the either/or level.)Speaking of things I agreed with Witmer on, he also said: “We all, in fact, take beliefs formed by perceptual processes to be true, where we do this without having an argument for doing so” (ibid, 6). Likewise, he states, “…this is a fair point they make, and it’s important not to try to respond to the presuppositionalist by insisting that you, in fact, never take anything for granted. If you make such a bold and unqualified claim, you’re setting yourself up for a fall” (ibid, 6).

So it is certainly true that not all of Witmer is wrong; however, on the key parts he is in error.