In the comments at Triablogue referenced in my previous post, I made mention of an argument based on X. In this case, X simply stands for an unknown entity (be it a being, a force, a place, or whatever) which enables my existence.
The question is: what does my existence presuppose about X?
The question is properly framed. I can only prove my existence with 100% certainty (and then only to myself). After all, I perceive things. If what I perceive is imaginary, I still must exist in order to perceive it. Likewise, in order to deny my existence I must exist to deny it. In all instances, I have proven to myself that I exist.
That doesn’t mean I can prove that other people exist with the same certainty. Nor does it mean that other people can prove my existence with the same certainty (although they can prove their own existence to themselves with the same certainty, using the same principles).
So, what does my existence demonstrate about X?
Obviously, firstly if X enables my existence, then X must likewise exist. If X did not exist, then it would be unable to account for my existence. (By the way, I would note that at this point it would be folly to assume X couldn’t be me–that is something we have not yet looked at–and thus X could possibly be self-contained in myself too.) Since we have defined X as that being/entity/what-not that establishes my existence, then by definition X must exist.
Likewise, if X establishes my existence, then X must exist wherever I exist. If X establishes my existence, I cannot exist apart from X. Therefore, wherever I exist, so too must X.
Likewise, if X establishes my existence, then as long as I exist X must also exist. If I cannot exist apart from X, then if X ever departs I shall no longer exist. X must exist at least as long as I exist, and at least in the location(s) I exist.
Thus far, X matches up with my being. But now it is time to make some extrapolations.
1) I perceive other objects.
These objects must exist in some sense of the term or else they would not be perceived. This existence does not have to be physical existence (indeed, thus far none of the instances of “existence” requires physicality–it could all be functions of consciousness).
2) These objects either exist on their own, or due to my existence.
Either these objects are “real” (in that their existence is independent of mine) or else I imagine them. Thus, either these objects have their own state of being (which I shall call Y), or else their being is derrived from my own being and they are imaginary (X1).
3) Likewise, my own being is either self-existent or else derrived from the existence of something else.
4) Even if my own state of being is not self-existent but derrived, at some point in order to avoid an infinite regress there must be some being that is self-existent. That self-existent being must be the cause of my being. We will call that original self-existent being X2.
5) If other objects are imagined by me, their state of being is likewise dependent upon X2 working through me. In other words, imaginary objects (X1) are dependent upon my being (X) and my being (X) is dependent, after however long a chain, upon the original self-existent being (X2).
6) If those other objects have being of their own, distinct from mine, (Y) then they likewise must go back to some aspect of being that is self-existent if logic is universal. Now this self-existent aspect of Y could be different from the X2 over my existence, so we will label it Y2.
7) Regardless of which of the above, there is some aspect to existence that must be self-existent. This self-existence must be true in at least one instance (X2 and Y2 and …. all as coming from one self-existent being), but could be true for more than one (X2 or Y2 or… coming from different beings).
8) Just as whatever causes my existence must exist wherever I am at, so too must whatever causes the existence of everything dependent upon X2 (or Y2, etc.) must exist wherever X2 is (or Y2, etc.). So also must X2 (or Y2, etc.) exist for as long as all things that are dependent upon X2 (or Y2, etc.) for their existence exist.
9) Therefore, as far as those things which are dependent upon X2 (or Y2, etc.) for their existence are concerned, X2 (or Y2, etc.) is omnipresent, eternal, and self-existent. Again, these terms are limited to the scope of X2 (or Y2, etc.) and are not yet viewed in a universal sense (in order to get to that, one must first show X2 = Y2 = Z2, etc. which, while certainly probable, isn’t 100% necessary).
Now all of steps 6ff. depends on the universality of logic. This is obviously not a problem if X2 = Y2 = Z2, etc. But logic isn’t necessarily universal if X2 is not Y2, etc. In such instances, Y2 could theoretically have a different logic than X2.
In this case, the logic formed on X2 cannot speak of truth or falsehood inherent in Y2. In other words, the logic derrived from my existence cannot speak of the logic derrived from the existence of any other object unless the grounds for both are the same.
So, if Y2 is to be considered logical like X2, then Y2 must = X2.
Thus, if we say that all objects in the universe are logical, then all objects must be derrived from the same self-existent being. If we deny the same self-existent being, then logic does not extend beyond the individual object. If we take this course, then we cannot argue anything (for all argument depends on logic).
Therefore, simply using logic presupposes that all objects come from the same self-existent source (either physically or through that self-existent source’s consciousness).
Since I have argued elsewhere that universal logic requires the existence of God, I will not reproduce that argument here.
Suffice it to say, either the atheist must stipulate the existence of a being with all the attributes of God, or else the atheist must confine himself to being unable to speak logically about anything. Either choice renders his atheism foolish.