It’s becoming increasingly difficult to believe this man was ever a pastor. John Loftus, in attempting to show that Matthew misuses the Old Testament, instead demonstrates for us his complete lack of understanding of Messianic literature and how the pre-Christian Jews understood the role of the Messiah.
Loftus claims, for example, that Psalm 110 is not Messianic. His idea:
Psalms 110:1 reads: “The Lord says to my lord: ‘Sit at my right hand until I make your enemies a footstool for you feet.” The New Testament writers make a big deal out of the fact that David wrote this Psalm in which he calls someone else “lord.” This supposedly refers to David’s future Messianic son, Jesus–his divine nature and mission. But it’s fairly obvious that if David wrote this Psalm he did it on the coronation of his son Solomon, whom he subsequently called, “lord.” He did this because of Solomon’s new status, which placed him as a ruler even above the aged David himself. The Jews of that time would not have understood it any other way.
Except for that pesky little verse that says: “The LORD has sworn and will not change his mind, ‘You are a priest forever after the order of Melchizedek.’” (Psalm 110:4). No Jew would have thought that Solomon was a priest of anything, let alone after the order of Melchizedek. In fact, all priests had to be after the order of Levi. The only person who could possibly be a priest without being a Levite was the Messiah. This is precisely why the author of Hebrews spends so much time talking about Christ’s priesthood.
But don’t let a little thing like reality get in the way of Loftus’s arguments.
Since Loftus was apparently asleep the day they taught Bible at seminary, allow me to give him a brief history lesson on the nature of the Messiah. The Messiah was first promised in Genesis 3, when God cursed the serpent:
“Because you have done this,
cursed are you above all livestock
and above all beasts of the field;
on your belly you shall go,
and dust you shall eat
all the days of your life.
I will put enmity between you and the woman,
and between your offspring and her offspring;
he shall bruise your head,
and you shall bruise his heel.“
After this, Moses predicted there would be a Prophet who would come after him. Of this prophet, Moses said:
The LORD your God will raise up for you a prophet like me from among you, from your brothers–it is to him you shall listen. (Deut. 18:15)
Then of course you have Psalm 2…which Loftus tries to diffuse by saying it’s a “hope” instead of a prediction. But what does Psalm 2 say?
The kings of the earth set themselves,
and the rulers take counsel together,
against the LORD and against his anointed [aka: Messiah]….
I will tell of the decree:
The LORD said to me, “You are my Son;
today I have begotten you.
Ask of me, and I will make the nations your heritage,
and the ends of the earth your possession….
Kiss the Son,
lest he be angry, and you perish in the way,
for his wrath is quickly kindled.
Blessed are all who take refuge in him.
(verse 2, 7-8, 12)
Now, anyone who says this is expressing a hope is not reading the text. This entire Pslam is definitely speaking of the Messiah and his role. It calls the Messiah the Son of God; begotton of the Father. It shows the Messiah as a ruler, and informs us that we are to “kiss the Son” and pay homage to him and indeed are to take refuge in him, something that is rightly only done toward God!
Loftus then glibly claims that Luke invented a census to get Jesus to Bethlehem to fulfil Micah 5:2. What Loftus forgets to do is look at Micah 5:2:
But you, O Bethlehem Ephrathah,
who are too little to be among the clans of Judah,
from you shall come forth for me
one who is to be ruler in Israel,
whose origin is from of old,
from ancient days.
This shows that Messiah is eternal, for it links back to Psalm 90:2 (“Before the mountains were brought forth, or ever you had formed the earth and the world, from everlasting to everlasting you are God.”).
Loftus then makes the absurd claim that Matthew was a fraud: “How he uses Isaiah 7:14 to predict the supposed virgin birth of Jesus (Matthew 1:23), is simply fraudulent.”
Loftus no doubt is staking the claim on the fact that while the Hebrew term could be translated as “virgin” (see Genesis 24:43) it is not necessary for it to be so for it can also be translated “young woman”; but in the process, he forgets that it was the Jews who translated the Hebrew into Greek in the form of the Septuigent who chose to use the Greek term for “virgin”–all this written 200-300 years before Matthew was alive. Thus, Matthew hardly was alone, and indeed one could rightly expect that the Jews of the time believed the “young woman” = “virgin” aspect too, and in fact only changed it after Christianity came about.
Loftus continues to show his ignorance of the way prophecy works when he says:
When Herod the king ordered all boys two years old and younger in Bethlehem to be killed, Matthew sees this as a fulfillment of Jeremiah 31:15. Jeremiah is mourning for those who will be cast into Babylonian captivity.
This, of course, totally ignores the fact that prophecy many times has a duel aspect. There is the initial prophecy, and then there is the reality that the shadow of the original prophecy refers to. Prophecies didn’t happen in a vacuum–they happened for a purpose, all of which pointed toward the Messiah.
Likewise, when Loftus writes:
What exactly does the word “fulfill” mean in Matthew 2:14-15: “Then Joseph got up, took the child and his mother by night, and went to Egypt, and remained there until the death of Herod. This was to fulfill what had been spoken by the Lord through the prophet, ‘Out of Egypt I have called my son.’” According to The Bible Knowledge Commentary : An Exposition of the Scriptures, “This is a reference to Hosea 11:1, which does not seem to be a prophecy in the sense of a prediction. Hosea was writing of God’s calling Israel out of Egypt into the Exodus. Matthew, however, gave new understanding to these words. Matthew viewed this experience as Messiah being identified with the nation.”
But this likewise ignores the typology of Israel as it was related to the Messiah. Israel coming out of Egypt was a symbolic demonstration of how the Messiah would come out of Egypt; just as Israel engaging in the Passover feast was symbolic of Christ’s death. And furthermore, Egypt is also a typology of living in sin–thus the bondage in Egypt is a shadow and type of our bondage to sin, requiring a Messiah to set us free.
But these things are ruled out automatically by Loftus, who assumes that the Bible is wrong and then sets out to show what the authors “really” meant. If one does not approach Scripture with the assumption that it is wrong, however, it is easy to see how all these typologies work.
Loftus finally concludes:
Our methods for discerning exactness and correctness have changed. If we were to judge the NT writers by our standards of hermeneutics today they wouldn’t measure up. Another way to put this is that if we would employ the same methods in scholarly studies today as they did, we would be laughed at by our contemporaries–just try it and see!
I would argue this is primarily because most people today have not studied typology. Once you have (a good start is to read the book of Hebrews) then the manner in which Matthew quotes the Old Testament is easily understood.
P1. God exists
P2. God is good
P3. God wants us to believe he exists
C1. God should have a morally acceptable reason for causing suffering that is understandable from our perspective.
C1 is an obvious non-sequitur and makes additional assumptions that are false. But rather pick them apart, I will demonstrate by analogy.
Suppose a murderous killer is on the loose. His moral sense is so corrupt and perverse that he does not understand that murder is a crime. Police apprehend him using weapons that almost kill him.
P1. Police exist.
P2. Police are a force for good.
C1. Police should ensure that the suspect understands their morally acceptable reason for causing his suffering.
Because the police made no attempt to enlighten the murderer, either P1 or P2 is false.
—
Ybsghf jvyy abj fnl fbzrguvat yvxr “Tbq vf n zheqrebhf xvyyre ba gur ybbfr” be “Tbq vf yvxr na rivy cbyvprzna” jvgubhg fgbccvat gb tenfc zl pevgvpvfz bs uvf nethzrag.
Besides, if we are so demented as human beings that we cannot remotely understand the moral reasons God has for causing human suffering, as in the case of Job, then God cannot expect us to believe he exists and that he is good. And if that’s the case, then there is likewise no reason to cast us away forever in hell, which is also morally repugnant to us and not even remotely understandable from our perspective.
Christians know God exists, and also have a general idea of the Law he enforces, even if we have trouble complying with it at times. If you are going to step into the Christian worldview and critique it you must be prepared for a response from within that worldview.
The essence of my “uneducated” (?) objection is that God is not obligated to tell us anything. When did God ever say he was?
1) God exists.
2) God is good.
3) God wants us to believe he exists and is good.
4) God causes intense creaturely suffering.
5) God ought to have a morally acceptable reason for causing that suffering.
6) That morally acceptable reason ought to be understandable from our perspective.
7) There isn’t a morally acceptable reason that is understandable for us.
.: Either God doesn’t exists, he isn’t good, or he doesn’t care whether we believe he exists and is good.
This conclusion, however, does not follow from the logic, and is instead an either/or fallacy. Mr. Loftus only wants us to look at premises 1), 2), and 3) above and conclude that they are flawed based on 6) and 7). However, the conclusion needs to include the fact that 6) and/or 7) could be wrong too:
.: Either God doesn’t exists, he isn’t good, or he doesn’t care whether we believe he exists and is good; or6) and/or 7) are wrong.
If 6) or 7) is not valid, then there is no logical tension here. So the question immediately becomes, is there any reason that 6) or 7) must follow from 1)-5)?
I can only assume that Mr. Lofuts intends 6) to follow from 3) as:
i) God wants us to know he is good.
ii) God must have a morally sufficient reason for doing something we consider bad in order for us to know he is good.
iii) If we do not know what that reason is, we do not “know” that God is good.
However iii) does not follow. We do not necessarily need to know what the moral reason is; we only need to know that the moral reason is good. Thus, we could ammend it:
iii-a) God has told us that He has a morally sufficient reason.
iv) If God is truthful in iii-a) then God’s actions are good regardless of whether we know what His reason is.
v) if God is not truthful in iii-a) then God’s actions are evil regardless of whether we know what His reason is.
This shows that 6) does not follow in the argument Mr. Loftus has made. Instead, his argument must be ammended to:
1) God exists.
2) God is good.
3) God wants us to believe he exists and is good.
4) God causes intense creaturely suffering.
5) God ought to have a morally acceptable reason for causing that suffering.
6) God has told us He has a morally acceptable reason for causing suffering.
.: Either God speaks truthfully (in which case there is no contradiction) or else falsely (in which case 6) contradicts 5)).
This, then, is the proper place to argue from instead of from where Mr. Loftus’s argument lead us.
As far as my argument being a fallacy, read this, and understand that pinning an informal fallacy on a control belief is practically impossible.
We do not necessarily need to know what the moral reason is; we only need to know that the moral reason is good.
And how can we know that the moral reason is good? Upon what basis can we know such a thing? Such a thing suffers the same kinds of criticisms as I have mentioned previously. If I do not have a remote understanding of why someone like Job and his family suffered like they did, how can I believe there is a moral reason for causing such suffering if one cannot be produced?
.: Either God speaks truthfully (in which case there is no contradiction) or else falsely (in which case 6) contradicts 5)).
Now exactly how can we determine whether or not God speaks truthfully? In the first place, if he regularly beats and tortures us, I don’t see why I should trust what he tells us. Furthermore, if Christians want to argue that God’s moral ways are not our moral ways, then his truth may appear to us as lies. And we’re back to square one all over again. How do we know God speaks truthfully? How do we know he has good reasons for causing us to suffer?
“We do not necessarily need to know what the moral reason is; we only need to know that the moral reason is good.“
Mr. Loftus responded with:
“And how can we know that the moral reason is good?”
Although you may not realize it, you are now shifting the debate from where it began. Remember that you started with a bunch of premises that were assumed true as the “given” of the argument (e.g. “God exists”; “God is good”; etc.) Your argument then flowed from those premises in which you tried to construct a contradiction between the conclusions that necessarily followed it and the premises. For the purposes of your argument, we need only respond with the fact that God could have morally sufficient reasons without our knowing what those reasons are.
But the epistemological question, separate as it may be, is yet an intriguing one. So while it diverts us from your original argument, I shall nevertheless answer your question:
“And how can we know that the moral reason is good?”
And:
“If I do not have a remote understanding of why someone like Job and his family suffered like they did, how can I believe there is a moral reason for causing such suffering if one cannot be produced?”
We know because God has told us that He has purposes to what He does, that He is a good God, and that we do not need to understand His purposes in all things.
I see that you expect this argument as you try to pre-empt it with your comments:
“Now exactly how can we determine whether or not God speaks truthfully?”
I would answer that we determine this in the same way that we determine whether anyone else speaks truthfully or not. This is an issue of revelation and whether you accept it as true or not.
For instance, allow me to reveal to you the following fact: “I am 28 years old.” Is there any way that you can verify this information?
Unless you have a time machine and can come back in time to watch me as I write this, the answer is that you cannot verify that I am 28 years old. You could come over to my house and speak with me, but you would not know for sure that the person you spoke with is the person who actually posted this comment (after all, I could have gotten a 28-year-old friend to substitute for me just to fool you when you come to visit).
Thus, you have nothing other than the implicit faith that I would not lie about my age to accept the statement “I am 28 years old.” You have the revelation given to you. You can either accept it or reject it.
In the same way, God has spoken to us. You can either accept what He has said or reject it. But your acceptance or rejection does not alter the truthfulness of what God has revealed (just as my acceptance or rejection of it does not alter it either).
Mr. Loftus also wrote, “Furthermore, if Christians want to argue that God’s moral ways are not our moral ways, then his truth may appear to us as lies.”
I must confess that I do not understand your point here. Even if I granted that this was true, it doesn’t change anything. How we perceive truth does not determine truth. (Or to put it another way, our perceptions do not alter reality.)
“And we’re back to square one all over again. How do we know God speaks truthfully?”
Square one has already been addressed though. How do you know I speak truthfully when I write “I am 28 years old”? How do you know when anyone speaks truthfully?
“How do you know when anyone speaks truthfully?”
Mr. Loftus said
“I have my ways. ;-)”
Yes, you do. But do you apply these ways consistently?
“But if I cannot determine this when it comes to God, then that becomes a problem if he wants me to believe him.”
But why would it be a problem? You have no way to determine if I tell the truth when I say “I am 28 years old.” Does it become a problem because I want you to believe me? If not, then why would it be a problem if God wanted you to believe what He said?
I think if you probe this issue you will see that you have several underlying assumptions at work that are coloring your view when you seek to determine if what God has said is true or not.
I do not say this as if I do not have similar assumptions that color my view, of course. I think we all have them (perhaps that’s what you mean by your phrase “control beliefs”) but I do wonder if you see yours or not.
If the manner in which we determine the veracity of a person’s statements is identical if the person is man or God then what is it that causes you to doubt God’s statements even if you are to accept mine when, in reality, you have absolutely no evidence beyond my mere statement that my statement is actually true?
If the manner is different when juding statements of men and God, then what are the differences and why ought we have those differences?
These are the questions that come next.
“I notice that none of the apologists in this thread have actually attempted to give reasons why they consider God to be good…”
This was one of the “given” statements in the argument Mr. Loftus presented, and thus it is not in debate here. Mr. Loftus’s argument was not “God is evil” but instead was on whether we needed to know what God’s purposes were in order to call God “good.”
If you want to discuss the topic of whether God is good or not, feel free. But it hasn’t been addressed by any of the “apologist” precisely because it’s off topic on this post.
Please accept my apologize. I did not mean to call you ebonmouse in the above comment.
You seem not to understand what John was attempting to do. His post was an example of proof by contradiction: say for the sake of argument that a given premise is true, show how the acceptance of that premise leads to an inescapable contradiction, and conclude that therefore the original premise must have been false. John Loftus did not concede that God was good. Quite the opposite: He was giving a reason why we should not believe that. And none of the Christians posting to this thread have given any valid reason to believe otherwise, which was my point.
Secularism, you ask how anyone can know if you have spoken truthfully about your age. I suppose there’s independent documentary evidence somewhere and if I was enrolling you for an election, serving you alcohol in a public bar or issuing you a driving licence, I would want this rather than your say-so.
When God’s behaviour doesn’t appear to meet ordinary human standards of decency, “God could have morally sufficient reasons without our knowing what those reasons are” is a pretty weak response if God wants me to worship him. Could have, but does he? The say-so of ancient biblical authors is not enough and we are back to the points and questions in the final paragraph of John’s 2.19 post.
I know that you think you are correct, but in this instance you have missed the point of any debate. You wrote
“His [Mr. Loftus] post was an example of proof by contradiction: say for the sake of argument that a given premise is true, show how the acceptance of that premise leads to an inescapable contradiction, and conclude that therefore the original premise must have been false. John Loftus did not concede that God was good.”
Your first sentence is correct; your second sentence is in error. Mr. Loftus did indeed “concede that God was good” for the reason you stated in the first sentence: “for the sake of argument.” Mr. Loftus’s argument depends on the initial acceptance of the claim “God is good” and then he is attempting to demonstrate from that that it logically must necessarily follow that there is a contradiction between that premise (which is assumed at the offset) and a certain conclusion (i.e. what I listed above as point 6) in my reduction of Mr. Loftus’s argument).
The debate rightly centers then on the validity of point 6). Point 2) is a given that is not debateable in this argument.
Therefore, to question why the “apologists” have not provided evidence for point 2) is a red herring. Point 2) was a logical given and in this argument is not debateable.
Look at it this way: if we assume that point 2) is what the debate is about, then point 6) is irrelevant. Point 6) depends on point 2) being valid. Thus, if point 2) is the point of contention, there is no point in Mr. Loftus’s argument to continue beyond point 2).
If you want to change the debate to the issue of point 2) (e.g. “God is good”) then feel free to do so. Just be aware that it is a separate issue from the point of Mr. Loftus’s argument and thus requires different argumentation than what has presently been provided while addressing Mr. Loftus’s argument.
“Secularism, you ask how anyone can know if you have spoken truthfully about your age. I suppose there’s independent documentary evidence somewhere and if I was enrolling you for an election, serving you alcohol in a public bar or issuing you a driving licence, I would want this rather than your say-so.”
Hello Kiwi. You have misunderstood what I was attempting to point out. Let us suppose that I decide to drive over to where you live and I had you my identification demonstrating I am 28 years old. All you would be able to say is that someone who claimed to be the same person who posted these comments has an I.D. card that says he is 28 years old. You would not be able to know, other than based on my self-revealing the information to you, that I am actually the same person who wrote this as when I give you that I.D. card. This is why I said that, unless you have a time machine so you can go back in time and actually witness me typing this, you cannot verify other than on my say-so that the person behind the label “Secularism is a religion” is actually me.
kiwi dave wrote
“When God’s behaviour doesn’t appear to meet ordinary human standards of decency, ‘God could have morally sufficient reasons without our knowing what those reasons are’ is a pretty weak response if God wants me to worship him.”
This opens up several secondary issues that are beyond the scope of this present argument (e.g. “ordinary human standards of decency” are different for someone like Zarqawi and pacifistic Quakers, etc.). However, the basic gist of your argument seems to be: “What Secularism is a religion said doesn’t convince me.”
But simply because something does not convince you does not mean we have a logical contradiction in theism. Mr. Loftus’s argument, again, was an attempt to show that there is a logically necessary contradiction inherent in the assumptions of Christian theism. This is not the case, regardless of whether such a response seems “weak.”
kiwi dave said
“The say-so of ancient biblical authors is not enough…”
This likewise brings up several secondary issues, the first of which being “How does kiwi dave know that the ‘say-so of ancient biblical authors is not enough’ evidence to demonstrate that God has reasons for what He does?” Again, all you have said is really, “The say-so of ancient biblical authors doesn’t convince me.” But whether you are convinced or not is not germane to the argument Mr. Loftus presented.
I showed above how point 1 falls apart on its own, but I think Loftus reveals where he is coming from in point 3.
> 3) .: Either God doesn’t exist, or he isn’t good, or he doesn’t care whether we believe he exists and is good.
This isn’t really the conclusion of a logical argument so much as an expression of annoyance. Loftus is annoyed that God does not explain everything he does to Loftus’s satisfaction. And, I can’t really blame Loftus for this. We humans like to understand things and it’s frustrating to be told, “you can’t”. But that is the essense, I think, of God’s response to Job: “you have no guarantee of understanding everything I do; I am the creator and you are the creature. Get used to it.”
Now while it may be irritating it’s not a real problem unless you diverge from the overarching message of the Bible and presume that God is actually evil. When Loftus is a theist, he is a maltheist, so the idea that God might be up to something–anything–outside of Loftus’ personal view of reality is not just annoying, it’s downright scary.
Get my drift?
“Get my drift?”
Honestly, Mr. Loftus, I do not.
You presented an argument earlier, one that had the appearance of being logically oriented. I addressed that argument logically on the grounds of that argument in order to demonstrate that the argument itself was flawed.
The questions you ask in the above paragraph are all unrelated to the argument that you put forth earlier. I could, naturally, give you some answers to those questions (e.g. “What about human suffering?”, What about the trinity or the incarnation?”, etc.) but these would all be completely different topics than your above argument that started this topic.
Yeah, I get your drift. When your argument is shown faulty, you react with a bunch more of the same fallacy, hoping that twenty pounds of the same material will somehow collectively smell better than the first.
If you had better answers to explain free-will and foreknowledge and morality and eternity and human suffering, you haven’t presented them here! You tell me not to believe in God. “What about morality?” I ask. “Well there really is no such thing as universal morality; morality is just a social convention but I am going to continue imposing mine on you as if it was a universal.” “What about Creation?” “Well we can describe it but ultimately it just, sort of, happened on its own. Or it always was. We’re not sure.” “How is it possible for consciousness to arise from non-consciousness, thought from non-thought, free will to arise from deterministic material, etc?” “Well we’re not really sure so we’ll just say those things don’t exist or are irrelevant” “On what is logic grounded?” “Logic is fluff.”
5) God ought to have a morally acceptable reason for causing that suffering.
6) That morally acceptable reason ought to be understandable from our perspective.
.: Either God speaks truthfully (in which case there is no contradiction) or else falsely (in which case 6) contradicts 5)).”
Secularism just doesn’t get it. If God lies, then I’m right that he’s a tyrant who cannot be trusted. If God values the morality of telling the truth then there ought to be a morally acceptable reason for why he tortured Job in the story.
But I cannot even remotely guess at a morally acceptable answer to why God purportedly did this. And since I’m supposed to believe in such a God, and since God purportedly created me with brains to understand in the first place, then lacking any answer I conclude God either doesn’t exist, or isn’t good, or doesn’t care what we believe about whether he exists or is good. Sheesh.
Secularism, you remind me of what politicians do when in power…they gerrymander districts. You participate in logical gerrymandering.
Besides, it’s simply silly to speak of my having to show a contradiction before my argument can succeed. I never suggested there was a contradiction. I merely claim that it’s extremely implausible that a good God exists from our perspective of life here on earth. There are a host of things which might be possible but which are implausible. I might be dreaming right now. So what? There is no contradiction if I am indeed dreaming right now. It’s just implausible.
You wrote
“Secularism just doesn’t get it. If God lies, then I’m right that he’s a tyrant who cannot be trusted.”
How do I not “get it”? Did I not say that if God lies then 6) contradicts 5) (which would result in your argument successfuly demonstrating a contradiction in the Christian ideals)?
As to whether that would make God a “tyrant”–that would be debatable (I’m sure you’ve lied–as all humans have–but I would not classify you as a “tyrant” solely because you’ve lied before), but beside the point. I’ll give you the fact that if God lies He cannot be trusted.
Mr. Loftus wrote
“If God values the morality of telling the truth then there ought to be a morally acceptable reason for why he tortured Job in the story.But I cannot even remotely guess at a morally acceptable answer to why God purportedly did this.”
“Allow me to rephrase the above in a logical sequence again:
1) God values morality
2) God has a morally sufficient reason for the “evil” inflicted on Job.
3) Mr. Loftus does not know what this reason is, nor can he fathom what it could possibly be.
.: God does not have a sufficient reason.
But this is obvious non sequitur and continues to propogate Mr. Loftus’s fallacy of arguing from ignorance.
Anyone can have a reason for acting without revealing that reason to someone else. Our knowledge of a reason is irrelevant to the issue of whether there is or is not a reason.
Mr. Loftus continues
“Secularism, you remind me of what politicians do when in power…they gerrymander districts. You participate in logical gerrymandering.”
Please demonstrate what you mean by this term, and how I have engaged in logical gerrymandering. I think any fair reader looking at these comments will see that I have been extremely careful to look only at your exact argument, to focus specifically on it while excluding extraneous red herrings, and determining the logic of your argument. If this is logical gerrymandering, consider me guilty.
If you may allow me to make a personal comment, it appears to me that it is you who has presented a “logical” argument that you have then pressed beyond the logical extent of that argument. You have presented a logical argument (as I demonstrated in my first response to you) but yet you seem to want to talk about a bunch of extraneous issues instead. If you don’t stick with your argument then may I assume you no longer stand behind it? I would gladly stop arguing against your argument if you concede that your argument is flawed.
Mr. Loftus wrote
“Besides, it’s simply silly to speak of my having to show a contradiction before my argument can succeed.”
Your argument is based on a contradiction, and therefore it is not “silly” to ask you to demonstrate that contradiction. You started with the theistic assumption that God is good and then you tried to demonstrate that God was not good in order to demonstrate that the original premise is flawed. That does, indeed, necessitate a contradiction between the steps in your argument where:
1) God is good.
2) God is not good.
.: The original premise is false.
Mr. Loftus said,
“I merely claim that it’s extremely implausible that a good God exists from our perspective of life here on earth.”
But this is not what you said. You originally said:
1) If God exists, and if he is good, and if he wants us to believe he exists and that he is good, then he should have a morally acceptable reason for causing intense creaturely suffering that is remotely understandable from our perspective.2) There isn’t a morally acceptable reason for an existing good God to cause intense creaturely suffering in our lives that is remotely understandable from our perspective.
3) .: Either God doesn’t exist, or he isn’t good, or he doesn’t care whether we believe he exists and is good.
The conclusion you draw is not “it is implausible that a good God exists from our perspective.” Stated as you did, you are saying it is a logically necessary conclusion. I have demonstrated that it is not.